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ABSTRACT

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 311 TECHNOLOGY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE
IMPACT ON CITIZEN-INITIATED CONTACTING
By
EMEFA SEWORDOR
DECEMBER 2016
Committee Chair: Dr. John Clayton Thomas
Major Department: Public Management and Policy
Prior studies have documented the expanded role of 311 non-emergency systems in
public participation, public management and performance management in local governments.
Three-one-one began as a simple telephone-based system for requesting non-emergency services
and now plays an important role in local governments. Yet, there are very few insights into the
impact of 311 systems on their public users, even as local governments increasingly turn to 311
as a public engagement tool, using it to facilitate citizen-initiated contacts. This dissertation
explores two research questions. First, how has 311 technology affected citizen behavior?
Second, has the introduction of a 311 system produced a more equitable pattern of participation
in the administrative process by changing the profile of citizens who contact local government?
Once introduced into a local government, 311 systems are widely accessible (particularly
in the case of multi-channel 311 systems that offer several easy-to-use options for contacting)
and relatively inexpensive and should, therefore, stimulate contacting. The technology’s ease of
use should appeal to potential users, particularly those intimidated by more complex, pre-311
methods of contacting. This study uses a mixed methods research design with three case studies

(Denver, Minneapolis and Kansas City) to conduct a pre- and post-311 implementation analysis
of contacting patterns. It focuses on determining whether contacting rates change and whether
there are equity implications of the patterns generated as a result of 311 use.
This dissertation finds that the cities faced several challenges during implementation,
including managing the internal culture change associated with introducing 311 into local
government. It also finds some evidence of higher contacting rates and increased equity
associated with 311 use. These findings have two main policy implications. First, they highlight
the importance of designing a variety of participation options to ensure that participation is open
to various cross-sections of the population and to equalize access to government across venues.
Second, more consideration needs to be given to the design features of an implementation plan
for an innovation such as 311, ensuring a clear link between the features and specific desired
outcomes, given the unique conditions of the implementation context.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
This study examines public engagement and participation in the administrative process,
through the lens of the 311 non-emergency center technology. The inaugural launch of the 311
non-emergency system in Baltimore, Maryland in 1996 ushered in a new era for local
government administration. In the ensuing years, the innovation has been adopted by many
jurisdictions (O'Byrne, 2015), potentially expanding citizens’ participation in public
administration and influencing local governments’ approach to serving the public as customers
(Thomas, 2012). According to a 2012 survey by the International City/County Management
Association (ICMA), as many as 263 local governments have established 311 or 311-related
systems in the country, in a diversity of local contexts (C. Fleming, personal communication,
April 29, 2014).
Three-one-one was conceptualized in a time when its emergency equivalent – the wellknown 911 number – was being subjected to a wide variety of non-urgent calls, often adding to
the strain on operators (Tracy & Tracy, 1998). Cities initially established the 311 nonemergency number system to provide relief to their 911 emergency systems, which were being
inundated with these non-urgent calls (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007). The magnitude of the
problem is noted by Mazerolle et al. (2002, p. 98), who cite nationwide statistics on the rate of
non-emergency calls to 911 systems as between 40 and 80 percent.
Over the next two decades, 311 technology developed from being simply an auxiliary
phone service to 911, used mainly for providing information, into sophisticated systems that
constitute an integral part of local governments’ service delivery and performance systems (Behn,
2005; Clark, Brudney, & Jang, 2013; Kavanagh, 2007; Nam, 2012; Nam & Pardo, 2012; Tumin
& Wasserman, 2008). A number of factors have contributed to these developments. As Poister
1

and Streib (1999, p. 326) note, in the 1990s, a confluence of factors (such as budgetary pressures,
legislative restrictions and increasing mandates to sub-national governments) brought public
performance back to the fore in local governments. There is evidence that governments are
finding new ways to make increasing use of technologies in public administration (Anthopoulos
& Reddick, 2016). Developments in technology have allowed governments to advance this
agenda.
Overall, the use of 311 systems has gone beyond providing citizens with basic
information about government services. They are now being used in areas such as disaster
management (Holmes, 2007; Phelan, 2009; Schellong & Langenberg, 2007) and performance
management (Behn, 2005; Reddick, 2010; Schwester, Carrizales, & Holzer, 2009). Arguably,
311’s most important role is making government more accessible and facilitating public contact
and participation in local governance (Reddick, 2011; Schwester et al., 2009).
The type of government-public relationship that technologies such as 311 facilitate is
somewhat “unique” in the public participation literature (Hirlinger, 1992, p. 555; Sharp, 1984;
Thomas, 1982; Verba & Nie, 1972). This type of interaction, termed citizen-initiated contacting,
is unique due to the fact that it is motivated by an individual’s need - whether objective or
“perceived” - for a particular service provided by the government (Jones, Greenberg, Kaufman,
& Drew, 1977; Sharp, 1984; Thomas, 1982, 2012; Thomas & Melkers, 1999) and thus
introduces the public into the administrative process. Although literature on citizen-initiated
contacting as a mode of public participation dates back to the early 1970s (for example, Verba &
Nie, 1972; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978), compared to other forms of public participation, it is
relatively under-researched, particularly in the literature after 2000.
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The literature is even more sparse when it comes to assessing the impact of technologies
on citizen-initiated contacting. However, studies in e-government have contributed to our
understanding of technology use in government, particularly the Internet. There is no consensus
on what constitutes “e-government” but most definitions stress the use and role of computer and
Internet technologies (see, for example, Marche & McNiven, 2003; Roy, 2006), thereby
effectively precluding first generation 311 telephone systems. In the 1990s, e-government was
characterized by government-to-citizen (G2C) communication (Cavallo, Lynch, & Scull, 2014),
whereas 311 was always designed to facilitate, citizen-to-government or C2G communication.
Furthermore, the focus in the e-government literature has overwhelmingly been on how the
technologies have impacted government’s level of responsiveness and accountability to the
public as customers; that is, the focus is on change at the government’s end (Behn, 2005;
Reddick, 2010; Schwester et al., 2009). Researchers pay less attention to the changes that these
new technologies cause at the users’ - that is, the public’s - end. Some studies that have
examined the impact of Internet technologies on public participation focused on whether they
result in representativeness or if there is a digital divide in usage patterns (for example, Best &
Krueger, 2005; Clark et al., 2013; Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2010; Thomas & Streib, 2003).
As use of the 311 technology continues to grow and evolve, it is important to examine its
impact on the user end. The reach of 311 technology means that a larger segment of the
population is potentially exposed to it as an avenue for engagement. As such, 311 has the
potential to change the pattern of participation from those in the traditional participation
literature.

3

A Primer on 311 as an Innovation in Local Government
Much of our understanding about the 311 innovation in local government relies primarily
on non-academic studies and industry reports on best practices. Two decades after Baltimore
implemented the first 311 call center system, little in the way of academic literature explains the
phenomenon of 311 systems in local government, particularly with a focus on its impact on the
administrative side of government. This section offers a brief review of the history of 311,
discusses some of the main developments in usage and how the concept of 311 now refers to a
sophisticated technology that is, in many cases, intimately tied to the functions and performance
of local governments.1
The 311 non-emergency number is one in a series of specially designated “N-1-1”
telephone codes used for accessing information or various types of social or government services
(Mid-America Regional Council, n.d.). The origin of the 311 number is tied to the best known
of these N-1-1 numbers: the 911 emergency number. According to the National Emergency
Number Association (NENA), deliberations about instituting an emergency number date back to
the 1950s when fire safety professionals recommended a designated number for fire services
(NENA, 2013-14a). This discussion subsequently broadened to include considerations for a
comprehensive number for all emergencies and, in 1968, 911 came into effect (NENA, 201314a). However, as NENA (2013-14a) and the Industry Council for Emergency Response
Technologies (2015) note, this was mainly based on a telecommunications industry agreement
and was not immediately institutionalized. Although the 911 number became widely accepted,
formal legislative support would only follow 30 years later with the Congressional Wireless
Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, whose intent was “to promote and enhance
For a more detailed review of this history, including the mechanisms via which 311 technology has diffused and
been adapted, and service integration, see two recent dissertations by O’Byrne (2015), and Nam (2012), respectively.
1
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public safety through use of 9-1-1 as the universal emergency assistance number” ("Wireless
Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999," 1999). The 911 number gained popularity and
spread across the country, reaching almost full coverage of the American population by the end
of 2015 (NENA, 2013-14b).
With 911’s popularity came the unintended consequence of misuse of the number,
creating pressures on the emergency response systems as the system was often subjected to a
wide variety of non-urgent calls (Tracy & Tracy, 1998). Concerns over the strain on 911
systems, particularly from non-emergency calls, led officials in search of alternative or parallel
systems to handle these calls (Mazerolle et al., 2002; Purdum, 1996). The US Department of
Justice applied to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for 311 to be a national
number for non-emergency calls (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007, The COPS Office Responds
to a National Crisis section, para. 3). In comments submitted to the FCC prior to its final ruling,
several organizations opposed the request (FCC, 1997). For example, NENA feared that the
public would confuse “N-1-1” codes for emergency and non-emergency, while various
associations of 911 operators and administrators feared that the implementation of a nonemergency number would harm efforts to achieve full coverage for the emergency number (FCC,
1997, p. 21). In 1997, the FCC approved the application (FCC, 1997).
Despite its availability nationwide, some jurisdictions that already had seven-digit nonemergency numbers in place have not transitioned to using 311. This study will focus only on
the three-digit systems since, as noted by Mazerolle et al. (2002, p. 119), these tend to
incorporate more advanced call-taking technologies and their memorable standardized format
makes them a distinct technology from the seven-digit options.
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The innovation and diffusion literature provides some possible explanations for the
spread of 311 systems and the mechanisms via which the systems spread across the country
(O'Byrne, 2015). One hypothesized reason for the spread of innovation, which is likely to be
applicable to the case of 311 adoptions, is “social learning theory,” which explains the diffusion
of ideas as the result of a process in which officials learn from the experiences of their peers in
other juridictions as they seek solutions to problems (Boehmke & Witmer, 2004, pp. 39-40).
Officials in jurisdictions that are considering their own policy adoption are likely to look to
leaders or “pioneers in the adoption of a policy” as part of the learning process, in what is known
as a “leader-laggard model” of diffusion (Berry & Berry, 2007, p. 230). The transmission of
innovative ideas is posited to take place within forums or “policy networks” where officials
interact with each other (Mintrom & Vergari, 1998, p. 128). Mintrom and Vergari (1998, p. 130)
note that, particularly within these “policy networks,” there are key, well-connected individuals known as “policy entrepreneurs” and defined as “people who seek to promote policy
innovations” - who help to transmit and push the innovation process along.
O’Byrne (2015, pp. 63-64, 116) finds that mayors, particularly of big cities such as
Baltimore and Chicago, played a significant role as political policy entrepreneurs by providing
strong leadership that facilitiated both local adoption and the spread of 311 systems. This
finding lends support for the “leader-laggard” thesis. O’Byrne (2015, p. 64) also finds that
various associations of local governments served as policy networks that encouraged the
adoption of 311 technologies.
Referring to 311 as a technology is a bit misleading, as the concept has developed over
time from a simple phone-based system to a multi-channel or multi-technology system. For the
purposes of this study, one of the most notable technical developments related to 311 technology
6

is the addition of customer relationship management (CRM) systems to the 311 system. CRM
systems “facilitate collection and analysis of data on contacts for use by the sponsoring
government or agency” (Thomas, 2012, p. 62). See Nam (2012) for a thorough review of the
history and literature on 311/CRM systems. Other technological developments have also been
previously detailed elsewhere. For example, in his dissertation, O’Byrne (2015) provides an indepth discussion of several significant developments in 311, related to both technologies as well
as their changing uses in local government. In many jurisdictions, 311 technologies now
facilitate contacting via a variety of communication modes, including cellular phones and social
media, among others (O'Byrne, 2015). For example, in Chicago “about 1/3 of the calls placed to
311 are now made using a cellular phone,” (City of Chicago, 2010-2016a,
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/311/supp_info/faq.html). An Internet search for “311
call center” returns hits for many cities’ 311 Web pages, which provide most of the same
services available via the telephone system. 2
The significance of these changes is that evolving 311 technologies extend the reach of
311 and thereby broaden the set of participants in this aspect of local government administration.
David Moody of KANA (a 311 software company) claims that
‘The starting point was always channel shift – getting people to use mobile devices rather
than make a phone call… The reality is that’s not what’s happening anymore. You’re
actually opening up a new demographic. You’re not shifting channels, but you’re actually
getting more people to contact you’ (cited in Verton, 2012, Lessons Emerging, para. 7).

The Web hits include, for example, City of Columbus (http://311.columbus.gov/); City of New York
(http://www1.nyc.gov/311/); District of Columbia (http://311.dc.gov/); City of Pittsburgh
(http://pittsburghpa.gov/311/form)
2
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Engagement of a broader range of people speaks to the potential transformative power of 311
technology on public participation (Fountain, 2013), perhaps with the promise of a more
equitable pattern of participation than is offered by more traditional modes of public
participation.
Three-one-one’s success in achieving its goals depends on how the implementation
process for the innovation is managed. Of critical importance to a successful implementation
strategy for 311 in city government is understanding that “local government lacks a unified
culture” (Edwards & Thomas, 2005, p. 370) and the implications of this for managing the
organizational change that ensues when 311 is introduced. Edwards and Thomas (2005) find
that the decentralized and diversified nature of local government was an important consideration
for the city of Atlanta when it implemented an innovation (the Atlanta Dashboard) into city
government. The authors note differences across departments in areas such as customer service
orientation, technologies and personnel (Edwards & Thomas, 2005, p. 371). Strategies for
dealing with the unique implementation context in local government would be important for
understanding the outcomes of a 311 implementation process as well.
Drawing on the organization theory literature, Fernandez and Rainey (2006, pp. 169-173)
offer insights into eight key factors that influence the success of an implementation in
government: making sure that the change is needed; having a plan for managing change;
galvanizing support within the organization; obtaining leadership support; obtaining support
from external partners; ensuring adequate resources are available to support implementation;
ensuring the change takes hold in the organization; and ensuring a complete implementation.
These factors or criteria, arguably, take on more weight in light of the uniqueness of the local
government context.
8

Contribution of the Study
This study contributes to public administration research by focusing specifically on
contact with the administrative side of government. In this context, the focus then is on the
public’s role in public management primarily as customer, although the other two roles – citizen
and partner - identified by Thomas (2012) may also come into play, though to a limited extent.
As Thomas (2012, p. 9) notes, the customer role may be the most common role that the public
takes on and thus is of no less significance than the public’s other two roles as citizen and
partner, and warrants attention as a legitimate participatory role in modern public management.
This dissertation examines how the introduction of 311 technology affects who contacts
local government and who participates in the public administration process, with particular
emphasis on its impact on representation—that is, equity. Public participation is important in a
democratic society (Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Checkoway & Van Til, 1978, p. 27;
Lijphart, 1997). As political scientists express concern over what they view as the declining
participation of citizens in public affairs (for example, Lijphart, 1997; Putnam, 1995) and
disparities in representation (for example, Lijphart, 1997; Strolovitch, 2006; Verba, Schlozman,
Brady, & Nie, 1993), it is a matter of policy relevance whether innovations in public
administration – such as 311 systems that affect participation in the administrative process –
improve or worsen these patterns. Furthermore, as a direct means of public participation, it is
important to understand who has access to the administrative side of government and
consequently gains access to local government services.
I use a model of contacting and conduct a pre-post analysis to assess the impact of the
introduction of a 311 system on the demographic and socioeconomic profile of citizens who
contact local government. This study also has important implications for understanding how
9

local government operations are affected by citizen contacts. As Sharp notes of such contacts, it
is “a dynamic that should drive the allocation of urban bureaucracies’ resources toward areas
where problem solving is most needed” (Sharp, 1984, p. 669).
The 311 system is a preferred lens for studying public participation in the administrative
process, given that telephone service is more pervasive than Internet penetration in the United
States. By 2008, 95 percent of households had telephones (FCC, 2010, p. 16 - 3), but by June
2013, only about 70 percent of residential households had a fixed Internet connection with speed
of at least “200 kilobits per second in at least one direction” (FCC, 2014, p. 12).

Research Questions
Citizen-initiated contacting has been studied since the 1970s but 311 as a technological
innovation in government has only recently gained attention in the academic literature. There
remains a large area ripe for academic exploration where these two strands of literature intersect.
In an attempt to contribute to the scholarship that links the political science literature on
participation with the public administration literature on contacting via 311, I will explore the
following research questions: How has 311 technology affected citizen behavior? Has the
introduction of a 311 system produced a more equitable pattern of participation in the
administrative process by changing the profile of citizens who contact local government?
I choose three study sites for my investigation and use a mixed methods research design.
The City and County of Denver, Colorado, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Kansas City, Missouri
all implemented 311 in the mid-2000s. In the mixed methods design, I employ local government
quantitative survey data to conduct pre-post evaluations of the characteristics of citizens who
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contact their local government. I then conduct a qualitative study involving document review
and telephone interviews with 311 experts. The qualitative analysis provides the necessary
contextual information to assist with the interpretation of the quantitative results.

Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation has eight chapters. Chapter two begins with a review of the literature on
public participation more broadly and then narrows down to focus more specifically on the
theoretical and empirical literature on citizen-initiated contacting as a mode of public
participation. This review of the literature shapes the conceptual framework that guides the rest
of the study and informs the hypotheses.
Chapter three describes the components and features of the mixed methods research
design. The design is heavy on the quantitative component, with the qualitative component
serving a supporting role. I describe the case (that is, city) selection procedures, the data
collection procedures for the quantitative data (local governments’ survey data), interviewee
sampling procedures and procedures for collection of the qualitative data (document and
interview data). I also provide an overview of the data collected and outline my methods for
quantitative and qualitative analysis. I discuss my approach for mixing the quantitative and
qualitative components.
Chapters four through six present the findings for the three study cities individually.
Each of these findings chapters begins by presenting the qualitative findings to set the stage and
then proceeds to discuss the results from the quantitative analysis. The chapters wrap up with a
discussion that “embeds” the qualitative findings within the quantitative results.
11

Chapter seven synthesizes the research findings from the three preceding chapters
through a discussion that cuts across the three cases. Chapter eight offers some concluding
thoughts, including the policy implications of the research findings and future directions for
research in this area.
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CHAPTER II: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The concept of “public participation” covers a diversity of “publics” and acts or
behaviors. Verba and Nie (1972, p. 2) define political participation as acts “directly aimed at
influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take.” Public
participation encompasses slightly more than political participation, as the former includes a
broader set of publics, such as traditional interest groups (Thomas, 2012, pp. 122-123). Rowe
and Frewer (2005, p. 253) define public participation broadly as “the practice of involving
members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy-forming activities of
organizations/institutions responsible for policy development.” Because of its
comprehensiveness, I will use the term “public participation” in this study. Despite the
recognition of the importance of public participation, there is disagreement over how that
participation should take place - encapsulated in the “politics-administration dichotomy,” which
calls for the separation of politics (where public involvement “should” take place) and
administration (Thomas, 2012, p. 15).
Despite the debate as to whether the public should be engaged in the affairs of
government, when scholars note a decline in indicators of activity among the public, the reaction
is often one of alarm. For the last few decades, researchers have documented a decrease in
public participation, citing, for example, low voter turnout and voter apathy, and the potentially
detrimental consequences of lack of involvement on society (Putnam, 1995).
This chapter provides a synthesis of the literature on public participation to inform the
conceptual framework that guides this study. First, I discuss some relevant terms and the origin
of the concept of public participation in current usage. I provide a synopsis of typologies of
participation and proceed to discuss the trends in participation since the 1960s. In the second
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half of the chapter, I delve into the literature on citizen-initiated contacts specifically, discussing
theoretical and empirical contributions to this literature. These inform the development of the
research framework and hypotheses.

What Constitutes Public Participation?
As Thomas (2012, p. 19) notes, the public participation movement in America of the
1960s was a response to criticisms that public administration was unresponsive to the public, and
to accusations of pervasive prejudice within the public sector. According to Denhardt and
Denhardt (2000, pp. 551-552), the old public administration model focused on neutral
competence, direct service provision, top-down program implementation and narrow citizen
participation. In the 1960s, President Johnson’s War on Poverty federal programs called for
public involvement, through “maximum feasible participation” by program beneficiaries in the
planning and administration of programs, thereby spawning the “citizen participation” movement
(Langton, 1978, p. 14; Thomas, 2012, p. 20). Over time, the move for more public participation
at the federal level influenced state and local governments.
Providing a clear and precise definition for public participation is difficult since the term
is often confused with a number of other related terms and concepts, including citizen
participation and political participation (Langton, 1978, pp. 13-14; Yang & Callahan, 2005, p.
193). Following Langton’s example (1978, p. 16) and disaggregating the terms into their
constituent parts, the first part refers to who acts while the second part describes what they do.
Arguably, public participation is the most comprehensive term as its first component – public –
captures a diverse set of publics that includes the segment of the public also represented by
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citizen (Langton, 1978; Thomas, 2012, pp. 122-123; Yang & Callahan, 2005, p. 193). Public
participation is also a broader concept than political participation (Yang & Callahan, 2005, p.
193), the latter of which, according to Langton, “stresses the state (polis)” (Langton, 1978, p. 20).
The second part of these related concepts, participation, covers a broader set of acts that occur in
the engagement between the public and the state. Langton notes that the distinction between
(citizen) participation and (citizen) involvement lies in who controls the interaction process – the
state or citizens or both (Langton, 1978, pp. 20-21). With (citizen) participation control could be
shared between the two parties or be vested in only one side, whereas with (citizen) involvement,
all control lies with the state (Langton, 1978, p. 21). This study focuses on the broadest and most
inclusive of these concepts: public participation.

Classifying Public Participation Types
Over time, as the politics-administration dichotomy eased, scholars and administrators
became open to exploring different participatory mechanisms for engaging the public in the
administrative process. Historically, the “ladder” proposed by Arnstein (1969) is an important
place to start exploring the treatment of participatory approaches in the literature. Arnstein
(1969) presents a framework in which citizen power and control rise with greater participation.
The Arnstein (1969) ladder and other one-dimensional characterizations of the participation
landscape have been criticized for emphasizing a single aim and strong normative overtones
(Bishop & Davis, 2002; Cornwall, 2008; Fung, 2006; Tritter & McCallum, 2006). Bishop and
Davis (2002, p. 16) highlight the limited purpose of participation within the Arnstein (1969)
framework, explaining that, within the framework, “until direct democracy comes into play, no
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meaningful participation has occurred.” Tritter and McCallum (2006, p. 161) offer several
criticisms of Arnstein’s (1969) ladder, including its rigid hierarchy, and lack of
acknowledgement of other possible goals of participation. As such, Tritter and McCallum (2006,
p. 164) call for a variety of ladders to represent the diversity of participation.
With the critiques of earlier one-dimensional typologies, more recent scholars have
developed richer multi-dimensional frameworks that better reflect different objectives and the
contextual factors surrounding the participation (Bishop & Davis, 2002; Fung, 2006; Rosener,
1978; Thomas, 1990, 2012). These newer frameworks consider a variety of goals or purposes
for participation and therefore embrace a much wider set of participation efforts and activities.
They are therefore better able to represent the state of the field of actual participation initiatives
and mechanisms, and can inform the design of participatory mechanisms. These proposed
frameworks include, for example, the “democracy cube” (Fung, 2006) and the “design science
approach” (Thomas, 2012).

Patterns and Trends in Public Participation
Studies such as Lijphart (1997) highlight troubling trends in participation levels and their
potential consequences for democracy. The United States experienced high levels of public
participation in the 1960s and 1970s, followed thereafter by declines. Scholars, including
Putnam (1995), have noted declines in a wide range of public participation acts such as voting
and attendance at public meetings.
According to the United States Census Bureau, data on voting show that, despite
increases in voting rates for the 2008 and 2012 general elections, participation (that is, voting)
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rates remained about 10 percentage points below 1964 and 1968 voting rate levels (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2012). Apart from the secular decline in participation, there is the additional concern
that those who participate may not be representative of the wider society (see, for example,
Lijphart, 1997). There may be equity implications of non-representative participation.

Evolving Effects and Trends
The most common finding in studies on participation patterns is that socioeconomic
status affects participation (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Jones et al., 1977; Vedlitz, 1980;
Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1993). Earlier studies tended to find the link between
participation and socioeconomic status to be direct (e.g., Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1993),
while later studies find the link to be less direct. Later studies find the existence of mechanisms
that attenuate the link between socioeconomic status and participation - one of the most
significant mechanisms being through “needs” in the case of the contacting mode of participation
(Hirlinger, 1992; Marschall, 2004; Sharp, 1984; Thomas, 1982; Thomas & Melkers, 1999).
As noted by Fiorina, (2001, pp. 4-5), some scholars argue that the debate over declining
participation is altogether misguided, because it views participation too narrowly. For example,
Dalton (2008, pp. 85-86) finds that, as opposed to declining, participation is moving away from
traditional “duty-based” modes (such as voting) toward increased engagement in more “direct”
modes (for example, contacting). This line of argument is important for ensuring that research
captures all forms and mechanisms of participation, especially as new forms are introduced
through innovations such as new technologies.
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Citizen-Initiated Contacts as a Mode of Public Participation
Over the last few decades, studies have approached public participation as a complex
concept with many facets and nuances (Claggett & Pollock, 2006; Sharp, 1984; Thomas, 1982;
Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1978). As Claggett and Pollock (2006, p. 593) note, the
frameworks for organizing participation proposed by Verba, Nie and their co-authors are
amongst the first to use empirical evidence to identify several forms of participation, including
contacting (Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1978). According to the authors, there are five
dimensions that are useful for defining the sphere of participation acts: the influence exercised,
outcome scope, conflict level, the initiative required on the part of the participant (Verba & Nie,
1972, p. 47) and the degree of cooperation (Verba et al., 1978, p. 312). These studies make a
significant contribution to the study of contacting behavior, not just by recognizing it as a mode
of participation in and of itself, but by also identifying two forms of it. On the one hand,
“contacts with broad referent” are contacts whose outcomes have the potential to impact the lives
of a large segment of the community (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 66). On the other hand, “contacts
with particularized referents” tend to have a limited impact, usually on the contactor and/or their
family (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 66).
Scholarship progressed with studies that focus on the attitude that characterizes
contacting as a unique type of participation, with most scholars focusing on empirically
analyzing local contacting data to explore this (for example, Hero, 1986; Hirlinger, 1992; Jones
et al., 1977; Peterson, 1986; Sharp, 1984; Thomas, 1982; Thomas & Melkers, 1999). As Thomas
(1982) notes, research on contacting advanced with the contribution by Jones et al. (1977)
highlighting another key aspect to contacting as a specific type of participation when they
include a measure of need into their contacting framework. The argument is that people take the
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initiative to make contact with government because they need something from government (such
as a city service) (Thomas, 1982). This makes contacting out to be different from traditional acts
of participation, such as voting, where the motivation to act is based on some sense of civic
obligation (Dalton, 2008).
Thomas (1982, p. 504) notes that contacting is a unique type of participation because of
its “instrumental” ends. Thomas (1982, pp. 510-511) sharpens the focus on needs in his
“clientele participation” model by explaining that what is essential in motivating contacting is
not the objective needs of prospective participants, as proposed by Jones et al. (1977), but rather
their subjective assessment or perception that they have some need from government. This leads
Sharp (1984) to theorize that a different philosophical motivation drives contacting than most
types of participation. Sharp (1984) postulates that an “ethic of government responsiveness on
demand” (p. 654), in which individuals show a preference for turning their problems into public
problems, drives contacting in municipal governments (p. 664). By this, Sharp (1984) is
emphasizing the uniqueness of contacting as a mode of participation in that it is motivated by
some situation that the individual faces – one the individual deems his or her local government
can or should assist with.

Models of Citizen-Initiated Contacts
Hirlinger (1992) identifies several models of citizen-initiated contacting, based on which
set of variables received the most attention in the study: the socioeconomic status (SES) model,
the parabolic model, the political ties model and the perceived needs model. The latter models
tend to build on the basic socioeconomic status model (Peterson, 1986), and add more layers of
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complexity to achieve richer modeling of the phenomenon of contacting. Moreover, these
updated models offer deeper insights into the place and effect of the socioeconomic status
variables in contacting models (Sharp, 1984; Thomas, 1982). For example, Sharp (1984, p. 662)
concludes that, “perceived need is crucial to understanding contacting behavior, in part because
it is a significant predictor of contacting and in part because the importance of socioeconomic
variables is contingent upon it.”
The traditional socioeconomic model has a long record but it is a weak model for
explaining contacting activity, as Thomas (1982) notes. The SES model is a “resource model,”
by arguing that social status confers resources such as “time, money and civic skills” that make
participation feasible (Brady et al., 1995, p. 271). With respect to contacting behavior - an
example of what Brady et al. (1995, p. 282) classify as a “time-based act” - the results for the
effect of socioeconomic variables are mixed. For example, Brady et al. (1995, p. 283) report that
income has no impact and education has little effect. Thomas (1982), for example, finds weak
support for the SES model in his study of Cincinnati contacts, with a positive association
between income and contacting in only some of the services included in the study and no
statistically significant relationship in the remaining services.
Jones et al. (1977) put forward another form for the relationship between SES and
contacting behavior: higher SES people have less need but more “awareness” so that, as need
and awareness interact they generate a quadratic or “parabolic” relationship. Thus, contact may
initially rise with SES as citizens become more aware that they can turn to government to solve
their problems, but then fall with SES as their needs decline (Jones et al., 1977). Several studies
have tested the Jones et al. (1977) model and most do not find empirical support for its central
thesis (see, for example, Sharp, 1984; Thomas, 1982; Thomas & Melkers, 1999; Vedlitz, 1980).
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The subsequent “need” models of contacting were developed in response to the
unsatisfactory performance of the SES and parabolic models. Thomas (1982, p. 511) critiques
the parabolic model, highlighting the failure of Jones et al. (1977) in capturing an objective
measure of need, based on SES, rather than capturing the belief (from the perspective of the
potential contactors) that they have some need from government. This subjective measure of
need for some assistance that government can provide, for example, trash pickup or filling
potholes – measured from the contactor’s perspective – is known as “perceived need” (Thomas,
1982). Perceived need became the dominant measure of need in models of contacting (Hirlinger,
1992; Sharp, 1984; Thomas, 1982; Thomas & Melkers, 1999).

Factors Associated with Citizen-Initiated Contacting of Local Government
Because of its long history, the SES model is the most tested model of contacting. SES
variables remain important in the participation literature as researchers continue to test the
applicability of the SES model or control for these factors in their participation models (Leighley,
1995). As such, this study includes SES variables to test the resource theory underlying the
elaborated SES model of Brady et al. (1995). Following Thomas and Melkers (1999), this study
groups into three main categories the key explanatory variables that potentially mediate the
effects of antecedent variables, specifically SES and demographic characteristics: perceived need,
other involvement, and psychological engagement. This study also includes measures of
stakeholding as control variables (see Figure 1). Stakeholding refers to having a vested interest
in the quality of services in one’s community (Thomas & Melkers, 1999, p. 669).
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Researchers usually operationalize SES with some measure of income, education and
occupation, usually in the form of an index that incorporates some or all of these three variables
(Brady et al., 1995; Hirlinger, 1992; Verba & Nie, 1972). Verba and Nie (1972, p. 132) use all
three in a summative measure of SES in their baseline model and find that particularized
contacting is unrelated to SES, but note that there is a significant difference between the lowest
and highest SES groups, with the latter being more active. They determine that the SES
framework does a poor job of modeling particularized contacting (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 136).
Subsequent research extend the standard or baseline SES model to analyze the impact of
socioeconomic variables in models that include a broader set of determinants of participation.
Brady et al. (1995) propose a resource model, which analyzes the paths from SES to the
necessary civic skills that aid in participation. Income has no bearing on the level of those skills
but directly impacts those acts that require money (Brady et al., 1995). With respect to
contacting acts specifically, which take up time, Brady et al. (1995) find that civic skills, that are
fostered through work and schooling, have a significant positive impact on activity, while family
income and education do not. Hirlinger (1992) finds his SES scale to be insignificant in
contacting.
Jones et al. (1977, p. 150) use a model that proxies SES with a similar concept - “social
well-being” - to study contacting about environmental issues in Detroit, Michigan. The authors
find that a “parabolic” (quadratic) relationship exists between their two measures of social wellbeing and contacting, where contacting is highest for those with mid-levels of social well-being
and awareness. However, most other studies that have tested the parabolic assumption have been
unable to find evidence to support it (for example, Hirlinger, 1992; Sharp, 1984; Thomas, 1982;
Thomas & Melkers, 1999).
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The next most important set of explanatory variables in empirical studies of contacting is
needs. Jones et al. (1977) measure objective need, but most scholars measure perceived need,
often using survey questions about local conditions (for example, poor road conditions or
rundown buildings) (Hirlinger, 1992; Marschall, 2004; Sharp, 1984; Thomas, 1982; Thomas &
Melkers, 1999) or services (for example, Hero, 1986). Marschall (2004) finds that people who
perceive problems in their neighborhood are more likely to contact. Thomas and Melkers (1999)
find perceived need increases the likelihood of contacting city departments; that is, people who
gave lower ratings to services were more likely to contact the responsible service department.
Thomas and Melkers (1999) also present an interesting result for the effect of SES in a need
model, that is, SES is a weak factor in contacting. Hirlinger (1992) initially finds no relationship
between perceived need and contacting, but he does find that for those who have needs, having
political connections increases the likelihood of particularized contacting.
“Civic attitudes,” as a potential mechanism through which SES impacts participation
(Verba & Nie, 1972, pp. 13-14), remain relevant in contacting research (Brady et al., 1995; Hero,
1986; Hirlinger, 1992; Marschall, 2004; Peterson, 1986; Thomas & Melkers, 1999). According
to Verba and Nie (1972, p. 19) these attitudes include “attitudes such as a sense of efficacy, of
psychological involvement in politics, of an obligation to participate, and so on.” These attitudes
are essential for motivating people to take the initiative to contact (Hirlinger, 1992; Thomas &
Melkers, 1999). These diverse attitude factors have been measured in varying ways across
studies and so have been found to have differing effects. For example, Brady et al. (1995, p. 283)
find that interest in public affairs and civic skills (the latter of which tend to be positively
correlated with SES) are positively related to activities that use up time, such as contacting. The
interest in public affairs result is also found in Marschall (2004), on contacting about education
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and neighborhood safety issues. Hero (1986) finds that efficacy has a significant negative effect
on contacting. Hero (1986, p. 634), citing Verba and Nie (1972), explains that this counterintuitive finding may possibly be due to higher efficacy people choosing to participate in other
ways. Thomas and Melkers (1999) find that political efficacy is not related to contacting. They
find interest in public affairs has a significant positive effect on contacting behavior in some
cases and other involvement has a significant positive effect in most of the cases they study
(Thomas & Melkers, 1999).
In addition to SES, one of the earliest set of factors analyzed in participation studies,
especially by scholars interested in equity, are demographic factors, particularly race.
Researchers have faced challenges in their attempts to identify the unique contribution of
demographics - particularly race - to contacting; this is due in part to how closely these variables
tend to be intertwined with other variables, such as SES and psychological engagement
(Leighley, 1995; Thomas & Melkers, 1999; Verba & Nie, 1972). As Verba and Nie (1972, pp.
151-152) note, minorities tend to score low on SES, thereby reducing their propensity to
participate even though their disadvantaged position should serve as a mobilizing force to seek
amelioration. Verba and Nie (1972) find that blacks are less likely to engage in contacting and
posit that the possible reasons for this finding include lower levels of efficacy. Several
subsequent studies have found evidence to support the finding that minorities are less likely to
engage in contacting behavior (Hero, 1986; Hirlinger, 1992; Thomas & Melkers, 1999).
The life cycle model asserts that there is a curvilinear relationship between age and
participation, with participation peaking in mid-life (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 138). This pattern is
attributed to higher mobility and weaker ties to the community in early adulthood (Leighley,
1995, p. 184). When it comes to contacting behavior specifically, the results have been mixed
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(see, for example, Hirlinger, 1992; Thomas & Melkers, 1999). Verba and Nie (1972, pp. 138139) state that there is no relationship between particularized contacting and stage of life.
Because the age effect is sometimes interpreted in connection to community ties, age is
sometimes considered part of another set of variables in this study’s framework: stakeholding
(Thomas & Melkers, 1999). Stakeholding is usually operationalized through a variety of
measures, such as home ownership, having minors in the household and residency tenure, among
others, and there is no consensus on the effect of this set of factors (Thomas & Melkers, 1999, pp.
669-670). For example, Marschall (2004) includes home ownership in modeling contacting
about both education and neighborhood safety issues and finds mixed results, while Clark et al.
(2013) and Thomas and Melkers (1999) find strong evidence that this measure positively impacts
some forms of contacting. Leighley (1995, p. 184) notes that females’ voting rates have become
similar to men’s; however, there remain some gender disparities across different modes of
participation.

Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
This study is guided by the following conceptual framework (Figure 1), with factors that
influence citizen-initiated contacts informed by the literature discussed above, particularly the
needs model of Thomas and Melkers (1999).
The following hypotheses draw mainly from the literature on the factors that affect
participation in political acts generally and contacting behavior more specifically. The
hypotheses are mainly geared toward testing whether the new 311 technology serves as a
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mediating force in the presence of factors that historically have produced inequitable
participation, while facilitating the public’s participation in the public administrative process.
First, I establish whether the introduction and availability of the 311 technology to
facilitate contacting local government changes the overall amount of this form of participation in
the city. I expect that the availability of 311, which is widely accessible (particularly in the case
of multi-channel 311 systems that offer several easy-to-use options for contacting) and relatively
inexpensive, to stimulate contacting. The technology’s ease of use should appeal to potential
users, particularly those intimidated by more complex, pre-311 methods of contacting. I
examine total contacting rates and hypothesize the following:
H1: Post-311 contacting rates will be higher than pre-311 contacting rates.
Historically, SES variables influence other factors such as skills, civic orientations and
other types of resources or factors that affect participation. Lower SES groups have historically
had lower levels of those resources. Given this link, I expect 311 to play a moderating role that
makes it easier for low SES groups to contact their local government. For instance, I posit that
the technology should mitigate the effect of low levels of such factors as political efficacy and
awareness that are traditionally found among low SES groups. “Other contacting” or “non-311
contacting” is contacting that takes place outside of the 311 technology and includes such
contacts as direct contact with city council members, among others. Without the 311 technology
to facilitate contact, non-311 contacting should not exhibit the same patterns (in terms of
socioeconomic and demographic profiles of participants) as 311 contacting.
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H2: Patterns of participation via citizen-initiated contacts will be more equitable after adopting
311.
More specifically,
H2a: The association between SES and contacting will be weaker after adopting 311.
H2b: The association between SES and 311 contacting will be weaker than the
association between SES and non-311 contacting.
H2c: The association between demographic characteristics and contacting will be weaker
after adopting 311.
H2d: The association between demographic characteristics – race, age and sex – and 311
contacting will be weaker than the association between demographic characteristics and
non-311 contacting.
As previous literature has shown, perceived need can be a powerful explanatory variable
in understanding contacting behavior. I expect the same result in this study and hypothesize that
as 311 reduces the barriers traditionally associated with lower SES, perceived need will become
an even stronger motivating factor for initiating contact with local government.
H3a: Perceived need will have a strong positive association with contacting, especially
after 311.
H3b: Perceived need will have a stronger positive association with 311 contacting than
with non-311 contacting.
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Because of the strong connection between 311 and the provision of local services, I
expect having a stake in the local community to motivate residents to initiate contact with their
local government for services that impact their lives within their communities. As such, I
hypothesize the following:
H4: Having a stake in the community will have a stronger association with contacting via 311
than with non-311 contacting.

The success of an innovation such as 311 depends heavily on factors such as political,
administrative and other support in the implementation process. Also important for success is
how much the innovation is promoted among the public and other stakeholders to bring
awareness to the new avenue for contacting their government in order to encourage its use. I
conducted an analysis of the implementation process for the 311 systems to examine the
organizational culture and dynamics within city government to understand the context in which
the implementation process took place (Nightingale & Rossman, 2010, p. 329). I expect that
local governments that implement 311 using a strategy that incorporates management of the
change process, and that actively promote their 311 systems will see a greater impact on their
citizens’ contacting behavior.
I adapted the conceptual frameworks presented in Martinson and O’Brien (2010, p. 167)
and Rossman, Roman, Buck, and Morley (1999), cited in Nightingale and Rossman (2010, p.
330), to guide a qualitative evaluation of the 311 implementation process at the three study sites
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(see Figure 2).3 This framework helped determine what impact the implementation process had
on the contacting behavior observed after 311 implementation. In this framework, I explored the
motivations or factors that influenced the implementation process. I also examined the
components of the implementation itself, including the policy changes associated with the
decision to have a 311 system. These changes interplay with other components that developed
during the implementation process. The implementation process involves the relationships
between 311, and the city agencies and other stakeholders (such as city council members’ ward
offices) who partner with 311. The process also involves the technological changes that were
introduced, not only at the 311 center itself but also at the implementing partners (city
departments) because of their interrelationships with 311. The implementation process analysis
also examines how these technological innovations introduced organizational/internal culture
changes within the implementing agencies and partners, which needed to be managed to ensure
that the policy change was implemented successfully. At the other end of the conceptual
framework is a look at the outcomes that resulted from this implementation process, including
the facilitation or easing of citizen access to government to encourage citizen contacting.
Therefore, I explore the following proposition about the implementation process:
P1: 311-related outcomes (contacting rates and patterns) will reflect the effectiveness of the
implementation of the 311 innovation.
I assess the “effectiveness” of each city’s management of its 311 implementation change process
using the eight factors for managing implementation of change proposed by Fernandez and
The Martinson and O’Brien (2010, pp. 166-167) framework was an example developed for evaluating a food
assistance program. The elements of the framework were adapted as necessary to apply to an evaluation of the 311
implementation process.
3
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Rainey (2006) as a set of evaluative criteria. The factors (criteria C1-C8) are as follows
(Fernandez & Rainey, 2006):
1. C1: “Ensure the need” – leaders develop a clear vision that convincingly explains that the
proposed change is necessary (p. 169)
2. C2: “Provide a plan” – leaders outline a coherent strategy for executing the change (pp.
169-170)
3. C3: “Build internal support for change and overcome resistance” – leaders work with
internal partners and stakeholders to ensure buy-in for the initiative (pp. 170-171)
4. C4: “Ensure top-management support and commitment” – there is high level political
and/or administrative support for the initiative (p. 171)
5. C5: “Build external support” – leaders work with external partners and stakeholders to
ensure support for the initiative (pp. 171-172)
6. C6: “Provide resources” – make adequate financial and other resources available to
support the implementation (p. 172)
7. C7: “Institutionalize change” – leaders ensure changes take root and become a permanent
part of the organization’s operations and procedures (pp. 172-173)
8. C8: “Pursue comprehensive change” – ensure a coherent and complete implementation of
the initiative by avoiding a piece-meal approach to implementation that compromises the
integrity of the entire initiative (p. 173)
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SES
• Income
• Education

Demographics
• Race/ethnicity
• Age
• Sex

Psychological
Engagement
• Political efficacy
• Interest in government
• Awareness/knowledge

Other Social or
Political Involvement
• Meeting attendance
• Volunteering
Stakeholding
• Home ownership
• Have minor children
• Plans to move
• Residency tenure

Contact Local
Government

Perceived Need
• Services rating

Figure 1. Integrated contacting framework. Based on the model developed by Thomas and Melkers (1999).

31

Motivations

Implementation

Performance of Initiative

External Factors

• Use of 311/CRM system

• Pressure for more efficient
service delivery
• 911 system overload
• Technological advances
• Demographics

Organizational or Institutional
Factors
• Political support
• Administrative support
• Community/public support

Outcomes

Policy
Changes

Stakeholder Satisfaction
Partnering
Arrangements

Organizational
Changes
Technological
Innovations

• Staff of city agencies
• Elected officials
• Communities
Initiative Outcomes
• Citizen contacting
• Customer service

Figure 2. Conceptual framework for implementation analysis of 311 case study. Adapted from the conceptual frameworks in
Martinson and O’Brien (2010, p. 167), and Rossman et al. (1999), cited in Nightingale and Rossman (2010, p. 330).
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Summary
Public participation refers to a wide range of acts and involves a variety of different
participants. The range of acts that qualify as public participation has grown over the last few
decades. Theoretically, the participation sphere is defined by a number of dimensions that allow
us to group participatory activities into modes or mechanisms of participation. The focus of this
study is one of these modes: contacting. Citizen-initiated contacting differs from most types of
participation because of its instrumental value – the contactor takes the initiative to act because
he or she perceives there to be some need for a good or service that can be met by government.
Empirically, the study of participation generally, and of contacting behavior specifically,
has been heavily influenced by the socioeconomic status (SES) model, though the success of the
traditional SES model has been mixed. Despite some well-known critiques of the SES model
(see, for example, Leighley, 1995), researchers continue to see the utility of SES variables in
models of contacting behavior (see, for example, Thomas & Melkers, 1999). However, these
more recent studies stress the indirect role of the SES variables and focus on the explanatory
mechanisms behind participation and, as such, highlight the primary effects of other factors such
as perceived need (see, for example, Thomas & Melkers, 1999). This dissertation study seeks to
empirically analyze what impact the introduction of the 311 technology has had on these
explanatory mechanisms. It also seeks to explore possible explanations for any observed effects
of the technology that might be attributed to how it was implemented in the city government.
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CHAPTER III: DATA AND METHODS
This dissertation adopts a mixed methods research design that uses both quantitative and
qualitative research methodologies to study the 311 phenomenon in local governments. Johnson
and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p. 17) define mixed methods research as “the class of research where
the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods,
approaches, concepts or language into a single study.” This approach to research is informed by
what Creswell (2009, p. 10) calls a “pragmatic philosophical worldview,” which has value for
“focusing attention on the research problem in social science research and then using pluralistic
approaches to derive knowledge about the problem.” Mixed methods users “look to the what
and how to research” (Creswell, 2009, p. 11, emphasis in original). Mixed methods research
gives the researcher freedom in that it has the advantage of benefiting from the strengths of both
quantitative and qualitative approaches, while limiting the weaknesses of both (Creswell, 2009;
Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Additionally, combining the two research paradigms produces
more comprehensive knowledge (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 21).

Research Design
I applied the framework developed by Creswell et al. (2003), cited in Creswell (2009, p.
209), to develop a sequential explanatory mixed methods design with multiple cases (see Figure
3). The sequential design includes the mixing strategy of “embedding” to combine the
qualitative and quantitative findings. In Figure 3, I use mixed methods notation (Creswell, 2009,
p. 209) for various aspects of the design. The notation is explained in the subsequent discussion.
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Figure 3. Sequential explanatory mixed methods design with multiple cases. Adapted from the framework of Creswell et al. (2003), as
adapted and cited in Creswell (2009, p. 209).
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Step I: Case Selection
First, I defined my unit of analysis to be a city that has implemented 311. I selected three
American cities as cases for a multiple-case study to ensure robustness of my results (Yin,
2003a, p. 135). As Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2013) state,
Multiple-case sampling adds confidence to findings. By looking at a range of similar and
contrasting cases, we can understand a single-case finding, grounding it by specifying
how and where and, if possible, why it carries on as it does. We can strengthen the
precision, validity, stability and trustworthiness of the findings.
(p. 33, emphasis in original).
There is no standard recommendation as to the number of cases to include in a multiple-case
research project (Miles et al., 2013, p. 34; Yin, 2003b). However, I posited that three wellchosen cases could provide the richness of contexts to allow meaningful comparisons while
keeping the dissertation manageable.
As O’Byrne (2015) notes, there is no current, comprehensive data set on 311 systems. As
such, I was unable to compile a sampling frame that consists of the universe of 311 systems in
the country. I employed a strategy whereby I developed a set of criteria that would allow me to
sample local governments to compile a variety of cases (Martinson & O’Brien, 2010, p. 171).
My criteria for the local governments were as follows:
1. Must have been operating 311 systems for at least a few years to have an established
history of use (at least two years); and
2. Must conduct regular (either annual or biennial) citizen or resident surveys, with at least
one survey being conducted in the one or two years prior to implementing 311 and at
least one survey being conducted a year or two after implementing 311.
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As previously mentioned, notable studies on 311 include Nam (2012), O'Byrne (2015)
and a series of reports by the ICMA. Of key importance to this study is the ICMA, which has
conducted a number of case studies on 311, mostly geared toward a practitioner audience. 4 I
made contact with Ms. Cory Fleming, who is the 311/CRM program director at the ICMA and
co-author of several of the Association’s studies. I held an informal Skype meeting with Ms.
Fleming on April 28, 2014 to discuss the ICMA’s work on 311 and the data needs of my study.
Ms. Fleming, whose position with the ICMA gives her access to several networks of local
governments, and 311 practitioners and scholars, agreed to assist with the data collection.
Ms. Fleming conducted brief surveys at meetings of two professional associations for 311
directors and managers held in May of 2014 to gather data that helped in determining which
local governments met the two criteria. The two associations were the Association of
Government Contact Center Professionals (AGCCP) and the 311 Synergy Group. Ms. Fleming’s
surveys yielded 19 responses, of which nine met both criteria. Analysis of the survey responses
showed that several of the represented local governments were medium-sized cities, all of whom
implemented 311 in the early to mid-2000s. Attempts to contact these jurisdictions for data
access were successful in three cases. These cities were the City and County of Denver,
Colorado, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Kansas City, Missouri. Table 1 provides a summary
overview of the three study sites.5 Each of the cities implemented 311 in 2006 and so faced
similar external economic and other environmental conditions. Furthermore, the three cities
were similar in terms of other economic characteristics—such as median household income,
household poverty rates—and their populations’ educational attainment (see Table 1). However,
The ICMA operates a Center for Sustainable Communities, which runs a project dedicated to 311/CRM Consulting
Services: http://icma.org/en/results/sustainable_communities/projects/technical_assistance
5
I do not report the latest available data. Instead, I report characteristics as at 2010 in order to use as complete a set
of official data (US Census data) available on the study contexts for a period as close to the implementation period
as possible.
4
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Table 1 also shows that they provide enough variation in relevant characteristics—specifically
racial and other demographic profiles, and government structure—to represent diversity in cases
for an enriched multiple-case study (Martinson & O’Brien, 2010).
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Table 1
Study Cities’ Characteristics (Year 2010)

Population
% White
% Black
% Hispanic or Latino
Median age in years
% Foreign-born
% White
% of Population aged 5 plus whose
home language is not English
% of Population aged 5 plus whose
English speaking proficiency level is
below “very well”
% of Population aged 25 plus with at
least a high school diploma
Median household income in $
% of Families below the poverty line
Governmenta

Denver

Minneapolis

Kansas City

600,158
68.9
10.2
31.8
33.7
16.6
60.0
27.7

382,578
63.8
18.6
10.5
31.4
15.1
33.3
19.6

459,787
59.2
29.9
10.0
34.6
7.5
39.7
11.6

13.5

10.0

5.5

84.0

87.9

86.4

45,501
14.8
Mayor-Council,
with a “strong”
mayor

46,075
16.4
MayorCouncil, with
a “weak”
mayor

44,113
13.7
CouncilManager

Note. Data sources: Population to median age: US Census Bureau, 2010, Profile of general
population and housing characteristics. % Foreign-born to % of Families below the poverty line:
US Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community Survey, Selected characteristics of the
native and foreign-born populations.
a
Sources: Denver - City and County of Denver (2016); Minneapolis - City of Minneapolis (2015);
Kansas City - City of Kansas City (2016).
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Step II: Data Collection, Analysis and Interpretation Strategy
Given that the focus was on determining the quantitative effects first and then
determining what role the implementation process may have had on those outcomes, a sequential
design was used in Step II of the framework (Figure 3). In the version of the sequential design
represented in Figure 3, the quantitative (“QUAN”) phase (including both data collection and
methods) comes first–both in time and weight–before the qualitative (“qual”) phase of the study
(Creswell, 2009, pp. 206-207).6 The “mixing” of the quantitative and qualitative data occurs
only during the interpretation phase, where I “embed” the latter data type within the broader
study (Creswell, 2009, pp. 207-208). This process is discussed in detail below. In Step II of the
design, I outline my strategy for inquiry at the case level, which was executed separately for each
city. In the strategy, the quantitative phase, which includes its data collection and data analysis
using quantitative methods, is discussed before the qualitative phase, which includes the
qualitative data collection and data analysis using qualitative methods.

Quantitative phase.
The purpose of the quantitative phase in this study is to determine the underlying
mechanisms that explain the phenomenon of citizen-initiated contacts. Quantitative research
methodology offers several benefits to a study. It produces numerical estimates, facilitates
testing hypotheses, and has strong claims to external validity if appropriate sampling techniques
are used (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 19).
Using “mixed methods notation” (see Creswell, 2009, pp. 209-210), the quantitative aspects of the study are
labeled “QUAN,” with uppercase letters used to denote their priority in the sequence and heavier emphasis in the
design. The qualitative aspects of the study are labeled “qual,” with lower case letters used to denote their auxiliary
function in the design.
6
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Quantitative data: Citizen/resident survey data.
In the quantitative phase, I used secondary survey data (with closed-ended questions)
from each of the three cities. In each case, the citizen or resident surveys were conducted by an
external party–a survey consulting firm–on behalf of the city. I contacted the cities for the
survey instruments for surveys conducted in the years of interest (pre- and post-311 periods). If
there were pertinent contacting questions in those surveys, I emailed the city for access to the
individual (that is, respondent) level survey data. Before submitting the survey data files to me,
the cities ensured that all data had been de-identified and stripped of any personal identifiable
information to protect the privacy of survey respondents. The unit of observation in this phase of
the study is the individual survey respondent.
See Table 2 for an overview of the data. Each survey used random sampling techniques
to sample adults who reside within the city limits. For consistency, I chose 2005 as the pre-311
period for each city. That year was also the last year before 311 implementation. I also chose
2008 to designate as the post-311 period in each city in order to ensure: (1) that a sufficient
length of time had elapsed for the 311 system to be fully implemented, and (2) some
comparability across the three cases by possibly controlling for certain external factors or
“history” (Bingham & Felbinger, 2002, p. 22).7 I do not extend the post-311 analysis beyond
one period in order to keep the analysis manageable. However, this decision is limiting in that it
does not allow trend analysis.
Due to the nuances of each survey instrument and differences in questions and/or
question wording, the data coding procedures and variable operationalizations (from Figure 1)
differ across the three cases. Therefore, I document these decisions and procedures separately in
In evaluation research, “history” is one of the “threats to internal validity” of a study design (Bingham & Felbinger,
2002, p. 21). History refers to “events that occur during the time of the program that provide rival explanations for
changes in the target or experimental group” (Bingham & Felbinger, 2002, p. 22).
7

41

a series of individual city tables (that is, Tables 3 to 5). See Appendices A to C for the list of
specific survey questions used to construct the variables and description text in Tables 3 to 5,
respectively.

Table 2
Overview of Cities’ Citizen or Resident Survey Data
Denver

Minneapolis

Pre-311
Year
Initial sample size
Final sample size

2005
1,017
702

2005
1,277
1,046

Post-311
Year
Initial sample size
Final sample size

2008
941
667

2008
1,258
984

2008
4,748
4,031

National Research
Center

National Research
Center

ETC Institute

Survey firm

Kansas City8

Even though 2005 survey data were available for Kansas City, due to data limitations, a pre-311 quantitative
analysis could not be conducted for the city. Details are provided in Chapter 6.
8
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Table 3
Variable Descriptions for Denver Quantitative Data
Variable9

Description

Dependent Variables
311 Contact

Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if anyone in the
respondent’s household had called 311 within the past year and
0 otherwise.

City Contact

Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent contacted
city personnel in the past year and 0 otherwise.

Total Contact

Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent is coded
1 on either one or both of the previous two contact dummy
variables, that is, someone in the respondent’s household had
contacted via 311 or the respondent had contacted the city and
0 otherwise.10

Non-311 Contact

Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent is coded
1 on the Total Contact variable but coded 0 on the 311 Contact
variable and 0 otherwise.

Independent Variables
Socioeconomic Status
Income: Low Income
(reference group), Middle
Income, High Income

A group of three income dummy variables corresponding to
income categories of <$50,000, $50,000 - $99,999, and
$100,000 and over, each taking the value of 1 if respondent’s
household income falls into the category and 0 otherwise.

See Appendix A for the 2005 and 2008 Denver survey questions used to construct these variables and the
description text.
10
There is a slight difference in the wording between the 311 Contact and City Contact survey questions that
introduces a complication in the analysis: the 311 Contact question asks about the respondent or an individual from
their household, while the City Contact question only asks about the respondent’s contacting with no mention of
their household. This complicates what the Total Contact variable captures and affects the comparison between this
variable in 2008 and the Total Contact variable in 2005 when there was no 311 or 311 question. I acknowledge this
as a potential limitation of this study.
9
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Variable9

Description

Demographics
White

Race dummy variable that takes value 1 for whites and 0 for
everybody else.
Age: Young Adult (reference A group of three age dummy variables corresponding to
group), Older Adult, Seniors respondent age groups of 18-34, 35-54, and 55 and over, each
taking the value of 1 if respondent’s age falls within the range
and 0 otherwise.
Perceived Need
Services Rating

Stakeholding
Home Owner
Have Minor Children
Psychological Engagement
Interest in Government
Political Efficacy

Other Social/Political
Involvement
Meeting Attendance
Volunteer

Four-point summary rating scale of the quality of 27 city
services, with 1 for “Excellent,” 2 for “Good,” 3 for “Fair,”
and 4 for “Poor.” (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.9001 for 2005 and
0.9021 for 2008).
Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the respondent owns
his or her home and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if individuals younger
than 18 years live in the respondent’s home and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if, in the past year,
someone in the respondent’s household had viewed a televised
meeting on city affairs and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent’s opinion
on the issue of the city government “listening to citizens” was
“Strongly agree” or “Somewhat agree” in 2005 or “Excellent”
or “Good” in 2008 and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if, in the past year,
someone in the respondent’s home participated in a meeting
about city affairs and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if, in the past year,
someone in the respondent’s home had volunteered in the city
and 0 otherwise.

Note. Sources: The City of Denver 2005 Citizen Survey (National Research Center, 2005a) and
The City of Denver 2008 Citizen Survey (National Research Center, 2008a).
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Table 4
Variable Descriptions for Minneapolis Quantitative Data
Variable11

Description

Dependent Variables
311 Contact

Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent had
contacted 311 within the past year and 0 otherwise.

City Contact

Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent had
“contacted the city” within the past year and 0 otherwise.

Total Contact

Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent is coded
1 on either one or both of the previous two contact dummy
variables, and 0 otherwise.

Non-311 Contact

Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent is coded
1 on the Total Contact variable but coded 0 on the 311 Contact
variable and 0 otherwise.

Independent Variables
Socioeconomic Status
Income: Low Income
(reference group), Middle
Income, High Income

A group of three income dummy variables corresponding to
income categories of <$50,000, $50,000 - $99,999, and
$100,000 and over, each taking the value of 1 if respondent’s
household income falls into the category and 0 otherwise.

Demographics
White

Race dummy variable that takes value 1 for whites and 0 for
everybody else.
Age: Young Adult (reference A group of three age dummy variables corresponding to
group), Older Adult, Seniors respondent age groups of 18-34, 35-54, and 55 and over, each
taking the value of 1 if respondent’s age falls within the range
and 0 otherwise.
Male
Sex dummy variable that takes value 1 for men and 0 for
women.

See Appendix B for the 2005 and 2008 Minneapolis survey questions used to construct these variables and the
description text.
11
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Variable11
Perceived Need
Services Rating

Stakeholding
Home Owner
Have Minor Children
Psychological Engagement
Interest in Government
Political Efficacy

Description
Four-point summary satisfaction rating scale of 16 city
services, with 1 for “Very satisfied,” 2 for “Satisfied,” 3 for
“Dissatisfied,” and 4 for “Very dissatisfied.” (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.8176 for 2005 and 0.8389 for 2008).
Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the respondent owns
his or her home and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if individuals younger
than 18 years live in the respondent’s home and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent answered
that he or she was either “Very likely” or “Somewhat likely” to
use at least one of six listed options to engage the city about a
matter that interests the respondent and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent’s opinion
about the options for resident engagement that the city makes
available is either “Very good” or “Good” and 0 otherwise.

Note. Sources: City of Minneapolis 2005 Residents Survey (National Research Center, 2005b)
and City of Minneapolis 2008 Residents Survey (National Research Center, 2008b).
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Table 5
Variable Descriptions for Kansas City Quantitative Data
Variable12

Description

Dependent Variables
311 Contact
Independent Variables
Socioeconomic Status
Income: Low Income
(reference group), Middle
Income, High Income
Demographics
White
Male
Perceived Need
Services Rating

Stakeholding
Home Owner
Have Minor Children
Residency Tenure
Psychological Engagement
Interest in Government

Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent contacted
311 within the past 12 months and 0 otherwise.
A group of three income dummy variables corresponding to
income categories of <$60,000, $60,000 - $99,999, and
$100,000 and over, each taking the value of 1 if respondent’s
household income falls into the category and 0 otherwise.
Race dummy variable that takes value 1 for whites and 0 for
everybody else.
Sex dummy variable that takes value 1 for men and 0 for
women.
Five-point summary satisfaction scale for the quality of 20 city
services, with 1 for “Very satisfied,” 2 for “Satisfied,” 3 for
“Neutral,” 4 for “Dissatisfied” and 5 for “Very dissatisfied”
(“Don’t know” responses recoded as 4) (Cronbach’s alpha =
0.8812).
Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the respondent owns
his or her home and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if individuals 19 years or
under live in the respondent’s household and 0 otherwise.
Interval level variable capturing the number of years
respondent had been a resident of the city.
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent answered
that he or she is likely to participate in a group discussion on
local affairs and 0 otherwise.

See Appendix C for the 2008 Kansas City survey questions used to construct these variables and the description
text.
12
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Variable12
Political Efficacy
Awareness

Description
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent was
“Very satisfied” or “Satisfied” with the amount of public input
into city affairs and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if respondent was
“Very satisfied” or “Satisfied” with Kansas City’s attempts at
sharing information about city affairs with its residents and 0
otherwise.

Note. Source: 2008 City of Kansas City, Missouri Citizen Survey (ETC Institute, 2008).

Quantitative data analysis methods.
I tested hypotheses H1 through H4 using several statistical techniques. First, I used
descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis (cross-tabulations) to explore any differences in
contacting rates across relevant groups with characteristics of interest in the data sets. I
conducted difference of proportions tests to test hypothesis H1. In addition to the bivariate
analysis, I also used the framework outlined in Figure 1 to explore hypotheses H2 to H4. In the
framework, the dependent variable is a binary indicator taking the value of one to denote contact
(of some form) with local government and zero otherwise. The empirical strategy replicates the
model and approach in Thomas and Melkers (1999, p. 678) and is as follows:
contacti = β0 + β1 SESi + β2 Demographicsi + β3 Perceived Needi + β4 Stakeholdingi +
β5 Psychological Engagementi +β6 Other Involvementi + εi

EQ(1)

I used various measures of the variables included in the model in the estimations for each
city, depending on data availability, choosing from the set detailed in Figure 1. The
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dichotomization of the dependent variable (contact) in equation 1 means that logistic regression
is an appropriate estimation technique (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 575). Where individual sampling
weights were included in the survey data files, 13 I used these when performing the statistical
analyses, including the logistic regressions. 14
I estimated a series of logistic regressions using equation 1:
1. In the first set of logistic regressions, the dependent variable was Total Contact. I
estimated the model for the pre-311 period and then separately for the post-311
period. This allowed me to estimate the effects of the independent variables on Total
Contact in each period separately. I then combined the two periods’ data sets to
estimate an interaction model, which produced identical results to the two separate
logit estimates, but had the added benefit of providing the differences in the effects
across the periods and their statistical significance.
2. In the second logistic regression, the dependent variable was 311 Contact. I
estimated this model only on the post-311 period data.
3. In the third logistic regression, the dependent variable was Non-311 Contact. I
estimated this model only on the post-311 period data.
I conducted inference using t-tests. I generated probability effects from each of the main logistic
regression models. These probability effects were calculated by the “average partial effect” or
APE (also known as the “average marginal effect” or AME) method (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 314).
The APE of an independent variable calculates, for each individual in the sample, the marginal
or partial effect of the independent variable at the individual’s actual values on all the remaining
Weights were included in the Denver and Minneapolis files but not in the Kansas City file.
Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009, pp. 105-109), I used the sampling weight as a probability weight or
“pweight” in Stata for weighted estimation.
13
14
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independent variables, and then averages these partial effects over the entire sample of
individuals (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009, pp. 333-334; Drukker, 2010; Williams, 2011). Although
I present the logistic regression coefficients, for ease of interpretation of the variables’ effects, I
discuss the probability changes instead. I transformed the logit coefficients into the APE
probability changes using Stata’s “margins” command (Drukker, 2010). The logistic analyses
served to test hypotheses H2 to H4 only. In reporting the results, I focus mainly on discussing
the independent variables of interest as they pertain to the hypotheses, although I report the full
model results in the tables.

Qualitative phase.
Since the main focus of this study is on the impact of 311 implementation on contacting
behavior, the research explored the process of implementation and the context in which the
system was implemented to provide understanding of how the technology became a more or less
effective tool for contacting local government. According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p.
20), qualitative research has the advantage of being able to “describe, in rich detail, phenomena
as they are situated and embedded in local contexts.” Case studies are particularly useful for
studying implementation processes and getting a comprehensive picture of the study context
(Martinson & O’Brien, 2010, pp. 163-164; Yin, 2003a, p. xi). The qualitative phase of this study
focused on conducting an explanatory case study for “…explaining how events happened” (Yin,
2003a, p. 5).
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Qualitative data.
Document review.
I conducted an extensive review of documents pertaining to the history and
implementation of the 311 system in each case study city. I reviewed a wide variety of sources,
including newspaper articles, city government press releases, city reports on citizen satisfaction,
external reports on the city’s 311 system, city budget documents, government and technology
industry reports on 311 systems, and academic studies.
First, the review helped trace out a chronology of events leading up to and around the
time of 311 implementation. It also helped to identify key players in the adoption and
implementation process as potential interviewees in the second qualitative data collection
strategy—the interview. After constructing a history of 311 implementation, I determined what
gaps still remained in my knowledge and used those to inform my next data collection strategy—
the interview. The document review was an iterative process. After conducting the interviews,
any issues that the interviewees raised that needed further clarification or details led to another
round of document review.

Primary data collection using in-depth semi-structured telephone interviews with key
informants.
I used in-depth semi-structured interviews, conducted via telephone, to gain insights from
experts about the 311 implementation process in their city. DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree (2006)
note that in health care, in-depth interviews with individuals are a useful strategy for
“reconstructing perceptions of events and experiences” (2006, p. 316). I opted to conduct the
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interviews via telephone because the prospective interviewees were geographically dispersed.
The telephone provided a fast, convenient and affordable alternative to the in-person interview
for collecting the information (Burnard, 1994).

Sampling strategy:
I used purposive nonrandom sampling to identify potential interviewees within each case
(city) (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006; Tongco, 2007). As this is the second level of sampling
(of individuals within a case) after sampling cases, this is also an example of a “multilevel
sampling” strategy (Creswell, 2009, p. 218). Information from the document review stage was
useful in compiling an initial list of the most knowledgeable 311 experts in each city. These
“key informants” (Tongco, 2007) included public officials, such as city government leaders and
elected officials, 311 call center management and staff, and employees in other city agencies that
had dealings with 311.
The criteria for identifying the appropriate experts included that (1) they had been part of
the city government in one of the capacities listed above during the time of 311 implementation
and (2) they were familiar with how the 311 implementation process unfolded in their city
government. The prospective interviewees were not required to be current employees of the city.
Given that this project is backward-looking and it had been almost 10 years since the cities
implemented 311, it would have been difficult to find a sufficient number of informants who
were still employed with the city and willing to participate in the study. The time lapse since
implementation was another reason why random sampling of city employees would not have
been feasible. Once a key informant was identified, he or she was asked to suggest other
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knowledgeable persons who might be willing to share their expertise, thereby allowing for a
snowball sampling strategy thereafter (Noy, 2008). This sampling strategy has advantages and
disadvantages that are discussed later.

Institutional Review Board approvals:
In December 2015, Georgia State University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) gave
approval to conduct the interviews (see Appendix D for IRB approval letter). 15 I used an IRBapproved recruitment email (see Appendix E for copy of recruitment email) to reach out to
potential interviewees who were identified through the document review. Once the potential
interviewee agreed to participate in the study, I followed up by email or telephone to schedule
the interview for a time most convenient for him or her. Each interview was scheduled for half
an hour.
Prior to their scheduled interview, each interviewee received, via email, a copy of the
IRB-approved informed consent document, detailing the procedures in place to ensure
confidentiality (see Appendix F for copy of informed consent document). The informants were
promised that their identity would be kept confidential in order to protect them and to encourage
candid responses from them, especially when discussing potentially sensitive or less flattering
issues such as challenges their city may have faced during the implementation process. The
IRB-approved study application included a Waiver of Documentation of Consent to protect the
identity of the interviewees, and a requirement to obtain consent orally (which would be audiorecorded) from each interviewee before proceeding to the interview questions. An interview
An amendment to the study application to permit replacing one of my original three planned study cities with an
alternative, due to data constraints, was approved by IRB in March 2016. No other aspect of the original study
application was altered.
15
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protocol guided the interview process and ensured consistency in the interview format across
interviewees and cities (Adams, 2010; Creswell, 2009, p. 183).
Although the interview portion of the study was designated Human Subjects Research,
the interview questions did not focus on soliciting any personal or individual level information.
Rather, the questions focused on the organizational or institutional level—that is, the
interviewee’s knowledge about his or her city and the city’s experience with implementing a 311
system. The interviews were conducted using an IRB-approved list of interview questions (see
Appendix G for interview questions) that focused mainly on aspects of the 311 implementation
process, including the goals or motivations behind implementing the 311 system, the level of
political and administrative support for the initiative, and the level of marketing or promotion for
the innovation. The questions were adopted from the interview questions used by Nam and
Pardo (2012) in their qualitative study of Philadelphia’s Philly311 center, and supplemented and
adapted as necessary based on the conceptual framework in Figure 2.

Overview of interviews:
Fourteen interviews were conducted between December 2015 and March 2016. Tongco
(2007, p. 152), citing Bernard (2002), notes that there is no established bound on the number of
interviewees to include when sampling purposively—the important consideration is getting the
required data. The deliberate bias of the sampling strategy meant that the sample consisted of a
set of interviewees who could provide trustworthy data (Tongco, 2007, p. 154). Once the
interviews yielded sufficient information to fill in the gaps in knowledge left after the initial
document review, and the interviews were no longer bearing new information, no further
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interviewees were pursued.16 Table 6 shows a breakdown of the sample across the three cases.
To protect the identity of interviewees, no additional information (such as demographic data and
job title) are reported on the sample.17
The 14 interviews generated 260 minutes of audio recording. Immediately following
each interview, I transcribed the recording as completely as possible, but not fully; for example, I
omitted extraneous or side discussions, sensitive comments that may violate confidentiality and
discussions about potential interviewees whom I may contact. This process yielded 72 pages of
text from the 14 interviews.

Table 6
Interview Characteristics

Number of persons contacted
Number of interviewees
Number of minutes of audio recording
Number of pages of transcripts

Denver

Minneapolis

Kansas City

Total

8
4
77
20

11
4
50
31

9
6
133
21

28
14
260
72

This was despite having received IRB approval to conduct up to 60 interviews, as indicated in the informed
consent document in Appendix F.
17
This is an added precaution to ensure confidentiality. On the one hand, the cities employ thousands of people,
which should make identification of individuals difficult. According to the latest budget documents, Denver’s
appropriations in its 2015 budget was for 10,992.2 full-time equivalent (FTE) positions and 704.8 temporary
positions (City and County of Denver, 2015a). Minneapolis’s 2015 Council Adopted Budget budgeted for 4,875.9
FTE positions (City of Minneapolis, 2015). Kansas City’s 2016 adopted budget appropriated for 6,857.5 FTE
positions (City of Kansas City, 2015). However, the group of 311 experts may be reasonably small that individuals
from this group may be more easily identified if further details are reported about them.
16
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Qualitative data analysis methods: coding of interview transcripts.
The purpose of the qualitative coding and analysis method was to develop a richer
understanding of the study context. This approach provided a context for understanding the
quantitative analysis results. I followed the method outlined by Burnard (1991)—which is
informed by both grounded theory and content analysis approaches—to analyze the transcripts
from the semi-structured open-ended interviews.
Because the number of pages of transcripts was relatively small and manageable, I handcoded hard copies of all the transcripts rather than relying on Computer Assisted Qualitative
Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). I started the analysis by reading through the transcript and
making notes in the margins about themes that emerged from the discussion. This process was
partly guided by the topical areas in the interview questions, using those topics as a “start list of
codes” for “deductive coding,” while remaining open to any new themes that may emerge in
“inductive coding” (Miles et al., 2013, p. 81). The coding was an iterative process in which the
content was reviewed several times, refining the themes and developing categories and subcategories for the data until “saturation,” that is, until the process no longer generated new
themes (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006, pp. 317-318).
The analysis of the thematic coding entailed looking for patterns across the transcripts
within each case. The analysis is presented to offer an explanation of how the implementation
process took place in each city. To do so, the findings are reported by interweaving insights on
the themes (in the form of commentary) with quotes from the informants, which also served as
supporting evidence for the discussion (Burnard, 1991, p. 464).
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Interpretation by embedding.
The final phase of Step II in the research design was the “embedding” of the qualitative
analysis findings within the broader quantitatively-heavy analysis in order to interpret the
quantitative results (Creswell, 2009, p. 208). That is, the quantitative and qualitative components
were kept separate for the most part and only “mixed” during the interpretation of the findings by
using an “embedding” approach. Creswell (2009, pp. 207-208) outlines three approaches to
“mixing” the quantitative and the qualitative components in a mixed methods design: integration,
connecting and embedding. “Embedding” is the term used to denote the mixing strategy in the
instance of a sequential design in which the quantitative component comes first (Creswell, 2009,
p. 208). In an embedding strategy, the quantitative component serves as the main source of data
while the qualitative data has a subsidiary place in the study (Creswell, 2009, p. 208).
Even though in the research design the quantitative phase preceded the qualitative phase,
for presentation purposes, I reverse the order of the two sets of findings. In the following three
chapters, for each case, I present the qualitative findings first in order to set the context for the
case. Although the discussion here does not directly relate to any of the hypothesis, it is
important for first understanding the context in which the 311 implementation took place. The
presentation of the qualitative findings first therefore helps with broadly framing the discussion
on the case study. I then narrow down to the quantitative results in a separate section. The
embedding mixing strategy adopted here required that the two sets of data be kept separate until
the interpretation phase. After presenting the quantitative findings, I then circle back to explore
the quantitative results in-depth through the lens of the previously reported qualitative findings.
During this interpretation phase, I paid particular attention to any surprising or anomalous
quantitative results. I looked to the qualitative findings to see what explanations they offered for
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those quantitative results. The discussion here focuses on what aspects of the implementation
process, as mapped out by the qualitative findings, contributed to the quantitative outcomes and
how they did so in each city.

Step III: Cross-Case Analysis Strategy
The final stage of the methodology was a “research synthesis” in which I integrated the
results at a higher level (Yin, 2003a, p. 145). This deeper level of analysis was instrumental in
exploring proposition P1. First, I present a summary of the preceding findings from the three
cases. For the qualitative findings, I use the Fernandez and Rainey (2006) framework to draw an
assessment of the cities’ implementation processes. I offer a comparison of the quantitative
findings across the three cases. Then, I offer a cross-case analysis and discussion of these
combined findings. This step consolidates knowledge from this study of the impact of 311 on
contacting.
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CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS ON DENVER
This chapter presents the results of the analysis for the City of Denver. It begins with the
qualitative findings. The chapter then proceeds to the quantitative analysis. The chapter closes
with a discussion that mixes the findings from the two analyses.

Qualitative Findings
Denver’s 311 Call Center went live on July 7, 2006 (Lent, 2006). The office of Mayor
John Hickenlooper announced the arrival of the non-emergency number in Denver by issuing a
press release, with the mayor quoted as saying that the system “will revolutionize Denver’s
approach to customer service by enabling residents and businesses to reach a live,
knowledgeable person with just one call to City Hall” (Lent, 2006). The mayor’s involvement
with Denver’s 311 system dates back to its conception (Major, Scheidegger, Gonzales, & Phelan,
2011). The mayor was elected to office for his first term in 2003 with a commitment to a core
set of principles that included efficiency and accountability (Lazenby, 2006). The mayor saw the
311 system as an essential component of his broader agenda for improving the way city
government operates. According to Denver interviewee 103, “He [Hickenlooper] was a very
forward-thinking mayor and had a vision of what 311 would be during and even after he left
office.” Denver interviewee 104 expressed similar sentiments about the mayor’s vision, stating,
“The actual implementation started upon the new administration of Mayor Hickenlooper. It was
his vision to engage…have more citizen engagement and transparency.” In this capacity as
promoter of 311 for Denver, the mayor could be viewed as a policy entrepreneur.
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From the very beginning, Denver implemented a fairly comprehensive 311 system. The
city’s system went beyond just the three-digit line and offered a variety of contact channels,
including online access, email, fax and walk-in service (Lent, 2006). The service was offered
every day from 6 am to 11 pm and operated with an initial staff complement of 29 customer
service agents (Lent, 2006). Denver 311 used a translation service that allowed the system to
provide service in 182 languages (Lent, 2006). The 311 system was part of an integrated
customer relationship management system (Oracle PeopleSoft) that linked information
technology (IT) systems across city government (Lazenby, 2006, p. 26).

Goals of Denver’s 311 System
The mayor viewed 311 as an important tool for achieving efficiency and transparency in
city government (Major et al., 2011). The goals of the 311 system therefore included “better
customer service for Denver residents,” according to interviewee 101, which the system would
accomplish by replacing the city’s blue pages listing of 1,200 city government telephone
numbers (Lent, 2006) with the single, easily accessible three-digit number. Not only was it
daunting for residents to thumb through 1,200 numbers, but most people simply did not have the
understanding of the structure of city government, on which the listings were based, to know
how to maneuver the system efficiently, leaving residents frustrated in their attempts to contact
the city. The following example from interviewee 104 illustrates this point:
I always use the example of, let’s say, the dog pound. If you’re looking at the dog pound,
then you’d look up the dog pound or something related to animals. However, in our
instance, the dog pound resides under environmental health. So, you’d have to know to
go to environmental health to find the dog pound (Denver interviewee 104).
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The 311 number therefore brought ease of access to government that was intended to contribute
positively to residents’ customer service experience during contacts. Furthermore, maintaining
such a large listing of telephone numbers was costly for the city in terms of print expenses. It
was also costly in terms of human resources as each of the city’s 53 agencies had to allocate staff
time to taking and responding to resident calls. The consolidation of city government numbers
through a centralized 311 center resulted in efficiencies as the center staff, trained to have an
understanding of the structure of city government, could efficiently address resident queries.
Centralizing city contacting relieved agency staff to focus on core agency functions.
According to interviewee 102, another goal was “to improve the accountability and
engagement of city employees with the citizens.” The 311 system’s feature of providing
residents with a tracking number for their service requests gave users the ability to follow up on
their requests and to hold the city accountable for unmet requests. This tracking feature proved
beneficial not only directly to residents, but also indirectly through its impact on the city
government, as noted by interviewee 103:
Having the ability for the mayor or for city council or for the various agencies to
understand the needs of our constituents, to understand their requirements, I think there’s
lots of incredibly useful data that we are constantly getting from our constituents on each
interaction that we have (Denver interviewee 103).

A final goal for the 311 system, stated by the mayor, was to redirect non-emergency calls away
from the city’s overburdened 911 system (Lent, 2006).
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Steps in the Implementation Process
According to the interviewees, prior to the launch in July 2006, Denver engaged in
extensive preparations as part of the implementation process, that included learning from the
experiences of previous implementers such as Baltimore; Chicago, which adopted in 1999 (City
of Chicago, 2010-2016b); and New York City, which adopted in 2003 and is the largest in the
nation (City of New York, 2013). This learning from previous adopters is consistent with “social
learning theory” (Boehmke & Witmer, 2004) and the “leader-laggard model of diffusion” (Berry
& Berry, 2007). The administration also made tangible commitments toward the implementation
of the 311 system by establishing the post of chief information officer to oversee the city
government’s technology infrastructure, which included the new 311 system (Lazenby, 2006).
Initially, Technology Services was responsible for implementing 311, and the center was housed
under the General Services Department of the city government (City and County of Denver,
2006b). This initial placement did not appear to be very conducive to the effective operation of
the 311 system. However, shortly thereafter, the city underwent an organizational restructuring
in which it consolidated its information and technology services into the Technology Services
Agency that operated as its own entity and reported to the mayor. Three-one-one was moved to
this agency, where it appeared to receive more institutional support:
Originally, we started under General Services and we were like the red-headed stepchild
under the porch. Nobody really knew what we were about. People were very confused
about what we do… I think it makes a better fit for us to be under Technology Services.
We are a super user of technology….And so we feel that we get a lot more technical
support by being under Technology Services because they’re in the same field and they
get what we do. So we tend to get a little bit more importance when there’s an outage or
a system failure, people are responding to us right away because they know the business
that we’re doing and they know that being offline creates a lot of issues for residents and
they want to bring us back online as soon as possible (Denver interviewee 103).
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The preparations also included a “soft launch” period from February 2006, during which
Technology Services redirected calls from a select number of participating city agencies into the
311 system (Lazenby, 2006). This period allowed the city to test the system prior to the July
launch (City and County of Denver, 2006a, p. 256). The interviewees noted that the city also
prepared for launch by engaging cellular service providers and entering into agreements with
them to ensure 311 accessibility for their users. The city was able to reach agreements with most
of the providers by the date of the launch and completed agreements with the remaining
providers soon afterwards.

Marketing the 311 System
According to the interviewees, Denver did not have a paid marketing campaign, but it did
engage in a substantial public education campaign to publicize 311 to its residents. The city
enjoyed widespread press attention for the new initiative:
We did get quite a bit of print and television coverage when we opened the 311 office –
we didn’t pay for any of it, but I am guessing most channels (four stations) covered some
aspect of going live. We had two daily newspapers who also covered it (Denver
interviewee 101).

From the city’s end, despite the challenge of not having a budget for a paid campaign, it found
creative ways to make 311 visible to the public, including displaying 311 on the side of city
vehicles, on billboards and by including 311 information on printed city documents, such as
garbage pickup notices and property tax bills. The city also printed flyers and made 311
mementos in the form of magnets.
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The city’s marketing efforts also involved enlisting other organizations and groups to
assist in spreading the message about 311. The city worked with council members to reach out
to their constituents. City government employees and officials also met with neighborhood
organizations (such as Denver’s registered neighborhood organizations – RNOs) and attended
neighborhood meetings as part of the community outreach efforts. The city also reached out to
other service providers such as United Way, which uses 211, for assistance with the promotion
strategy.18
The city of Denver experienced few challenges with its external messaging to the public
about 311. However, despite the aggressive marketing effort, unaware or recalcitrant residents
could continue to use the old city government telephone numbers for assistance. The city had a
backstop in the event that this occurred: it automatically forwarded incoming calls to some of the
old numbers into the 311 system so that callers could not bypass the 311 system.
One complication to the city’s efforts to publicize its 311 system was a concern that the
messaging might reach persons in other cities and counties, who are not served by the 311
system. For that reason, the city made limited use of television and radio for advertising 311 in
order to avoid attracting out-of-jurisdiction viewers and listeners who might be misled to call
into the 311 system. However, in the view of one interviewee, this did not necessarily harm the
effectiveness of the city’s message of bringing awareness to 311:
I am not sure paid television advertising would have made a huge impact on the longterm use of 311 but maybe. My view is more that when reinforced and people are
reminded over time, they adapt and begin to use new systems like 311 – often people
don’t even think about it until they need to call their government, which is likely not very
often. So, reinforcement of the message through multiple channels (on city vehicles, in
city mailings, on city letterhead, reminders in earned media, social media, etc.) can
accomplish that objective without spending tax payer money on the most expensive
medium available. And, that last point is probably why I lean toward earned media
211 is an N11 access code used for accessing “community resources and volunteer opportunities” (Mid-America
Regional Council, n.d., What is United Way 2-1-1?).
18
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instead of paid media – these are tax dollars and spending them on advertising has to
have very clear benefits for elected officials to justify it. Even in hindsight, I think a
sustained, deliberate, ongoing campaign to keep 311 in front of people’s minds is the best
way to continue to increase its use and value. I also think emphasizing the use of the
Web should be part of the sustained effort as well (Denver interviewee 101).
With the launch of 311, one key consideration for the city was to avoid confusion among
the public about the use of 911. The campaign was careful to point out that 911 was still the
number to call in emergencies while 311 was the number to call for all other inquiries.

Challenges in the Implementation Process
The main threats to the success of Denver’s 311 system seemed to originate from within
city government itself. While some segments of city government embraced the new system and
welcomed the opportunity to take advantage of its features to improve their operations, others
were less enthusiastic about the changes the new system brought. To varying degrees, the city
faced pushback and lack of cooperation from some departments – from both heads and staff – as
well as from some members of the city council. The main reason for the resistance was, as
Denver interviewee 104 states in a nutshell, “People are territorial.”
With respect to the city departments, for several reasons, there was a reluctance to
relinquish control over their customer service functions. With the centralized call center service
provided by 311, individual departments would lose control over the quality of the customer
service that their respective customers would receive. According to interviewee 104, “Other
agencies saw it as somebody interjecting themselves into their business so they weren’t as
acquiescent to the idea.” There was also the fear that the organizational change would result in
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additional work for the departments, as they would have to abandon their own processes and
adjust to a new way of doing things. Related to this concern are the technical challenges
involved in trying to make different department-specific technologies work with the new 311
technologies. The following comment from interviewee 102 captures these concerns:
Each of the departments felt very proud about the service that they provide to the public
and that they didn’t want to be removed from their customers. They wanted to be able to
take the calls and make sure the calls were resolved within their department and that it
was all documented. They had their own processes and systems and people who did that
and they were afraid that it wouldn’t be done as well if they were one step removed by
having 311 take the initial calls. And then also, they were worried that just with the
diversity of city services, that it would be very difficult for one call center to be able to
answer so many different questions (Denver interviewee 102).
Some departments simply failed to see the benefit of having a centralized customer
service and data collection system and so tended to be less committed to contributing to the
effort: “We had agencies that kind of didn’t understand the benefit of having a tool or one place
to exchange or get information or see full case life-cycle” (Denver interviewee 103). The staff
response was, in some cases, a reaction to feeling threatened by the new system. Denver
interviewee 101 comments on the necessity for the city to act to address this staff concern:
We did an announcement through the mayor that guaranteed no employee would lose
their job because we were implementing 311. And I think that was really important
because the very people you were relying on to help you implement this had some fears
and I think you had to get rid of their fear for them to truly work hard and not be
threatened by what you’re trying to do (Denver interviewee 101).
Departments and agencies were not the only ones who failed to see the value of the
311/CRM tool for improving city operations. Surprisingly, the city faced some resistance or
rather lukewarm reception of 311 from some city council members. In their case, the concern
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was over missing opportunities to visibly render service to their constituents in need and in
return obtain their constituents’ gratitude and allegiance in the form of election votes:
We had a few council members over the years want their residents to call them directly…
In the past there was about four or five that were a little bit not so keen to use [311] or tell
their constituents about [it] or if they did, they did so in a reserved tone so their residents
or their constituents knew, ‘Well, the council person really wants me to contact them
directly’ (Denver interviewee 103).
As with the other aspects of the implementation process, leadership from the mayor
appeared to play a part in addressing some of these challenges: “There was a little bit of handholding and the mayor had to intervene in some instances to tell people that this was really going
to happen and they needed to participate; it wasn’t an option not to” (Denver interviewee 104).
In addition to the mayor’s intervention, those charged with ensuring the success of the
implementation process made a conscious effort to allay the fears and concerns of those who
were more reluctant to go along with the change:
So we worked with each of the agencies to understand what calls they got most
frequently and came up with ‘frequently asked questions’ and the answers to those. We
also looked at how many of them were resolved on a first call versus had to go through
several iterations before the issue could get resolved. And then we did a lot of
documentation and a lot of training of the reps (Denver interviewee 102).
It helped the implementers make their case to their less cooperative colleagues in the government
to show the value and benefit that making use of the 311 system could bring to them and their
departments:
What we found is we had a lot of workers who were answering the same questions every
day, 90 percent of their day. And our sell was these are experts in their field and they’d
be better off spending their time on complex issues and solving those for our citizens
instead of the routine questions. And it made workers feel, I think, more valued and
respected and helped us identify what are the issues that should be managed by a call
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center and what are the issues that should be managed by the department, which was a
critical part of the work (Denver interviewee 101).
One concern about how 311 was implemented that may have impacted the public’s use of
the system is the requirement to collect detailed information from users. The issue here is that
privacy concerns, stemming from an inclination to distrust government, may discourage the
public from making use of the 311 system:
Understanding that government is always seen as big brother so when you go to your
customer, you have to realize that your customer wants to remain anonymous and trying
to make people give their name, address and phone number and all the particulars about
themselves is not something that the general public is comfortable with when they make
calls to the city. People, when they come in to government, there’s a certain trepidation
about how much information they are willing to give to government because they’re not
sure if there is retribution involved. They want to be able to get help but they don’t
necessarily want the help in a form that’s going to put them in the spotlight (Denver
interviewee 104).

Summary
Denver managed to launch its 311 system on time but the process still faced some
challenges. Strong city leadership by the mayor was a big factor in guiding Denver’s 311
implementation. Since the idea and the decision to adopt the technology came from the mayor,
who operated in a city government where the mayor’s office exercised considerable powers, with
oversight of city operations, it appeared to be a relatively smooth process from the
conceptualization stage to the launch in July 2006 and beyond. The mayor had the authority to
bring in the necessary human expertise on technology matters to lead the implementation process
and the authority to direct the necessary agencies to provide the administrative and other support
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necessary to carry out the process. However, there were limits to what political authority could
command from city government.
Far more challenging than the technical process or the external marketing for the 311
system was managing the internal dynamics surrounding this innovation. The 311 system
represented a major cultural shift for city government. It was vital to the effectiveness of the 311
system to cajole and ease certain segments of the city government into using the new system and
into the new organizational culture that it ushered into the government.
Some argue that Denver’s 311 system has never been fully implemented. In support of
this claim, they cite, for example, that some of the 53 agencies are still not part of 311 and also
the continued use of unsupported legacy systems by some departments. They suggest that one
possible explanation for the “incomplete” implementation is waning political and administrative
support for 311 resulting from changes in city leadership.19 If true, this suggestion serves to
further highlight the impact that the mayor at the time had on the initial implementation of 311 in
Denver and the role that strong political leadership can have in bringing innovation to city
government.

Quantitative Findings
The quantitative analysis helps to determine statistically the impacts of the introduction
of 311 in a local government context on contacting behavior for various socioeconomic and
demographic groups of interest. First, I present some descriptive statistics and summarized
cross-tabulations. I then analyze the findings using logistic regressions.
19

Hickenlooper left the mayor’s office in 2011.
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Descriptive Statistics for Denver
Sample characteristics.
Table 7 shows the distribution of the survey respondents in the final samples across the
two periods. Between 2005 and 2008, the percentage of residents contacting government rose by
one third (from 57.5 percent to 75.4 percent). A difference in proportions test indicates that this
difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This provides statistical evidence in
support of hypothesis H1.
Table 7 also shows differences in the income distribution between the two periods. There
was a significantly higher proportion of high income individuals in the 2008 sample while the
2005 sample had a significantly higher proportion of middle income earners. Whites made up a
majority of the sample in both periods, increasing their share in the sample by 5.7 percentage
points in 2008 but the difference in their shares between the two periods is statistically
insignificant. Young adults were the largest age group in 2005 but their share of the sample
decreased by 6.3 percentage points in 2008, while the proportion of older adults and seniors
increased by 3.1 percentage points each. The decline in the proportion of young adults was
statistically significant at the 0.1 significance level. The mean services rating (the measure of
perceived need) remained about the same between 2005 and 2008, decreasing by only one-tenth
of a percentage point to 2.5 percent in 2008. Home owners made up 62.1 percent and 59.8
percent of the 2005 and 2008 samples, respectively. Respondents who lived in households with
minors made up about one-quarter of the sample in each period.
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Table 7
Denver Survey Respondent Characteristics, Pre- and Post-311 Implementation (%)
Variables

2005

2008

Difference
(2008 - 2005)

Total Contact
Income
Low income: <$50,000
Middle income: $50,000 - $99,999
High income: $100,000 or more
Race
White
Minority
Age
Young adult: 18-34
Older adult: 35-54
Senior: 55+
Services rating (mean)
Home owner
Have minor children

57.5

75.4

17.9***

52.1
33.3
14.6

51.1
27.7
21.3

-1.0
-5.6*
6.7***

66.4
33.6

72.1
27.9

5.7
-5.7

42.9
37.7
19.4
2.6
62.1
25.7

36.6
40.8
22.5
2.5
59.8
24.8

-6.3*
3.1
3.1
-0.1*
-2.3
-0.9

702

667

No. of observations
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Contacting rates within groups.
One of the key points of interest in this study is whether participation rates differ among
groups with different characteristics and how those rates differ pre- and post-311 implementation.
The results in Table 8 present some preliminary bivariate analyses of this issue. First, the third
column of the table shows only positive 2008-2005 differences for all groups, indicating that all
groups experienced an increase in their rate of contacting in the post-311 period. All the
differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level except for the difference for the high
income group, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 8 shows that in the pre-311 period, contacting rates differed substantially among
the three income groups, with the high income group out-contacting the low income group by a
margin of 21.2 percentage points (72.0 percent - 50.8 percent). The rate of contacting for both
groups (and for the middle income group, too) increased by statistically significant amounts
between the two periods. However, the rate of increase for the low income group outpaced that
for the high income group so that, by the post-311 period, the high income-low income
difference in contacting rates narrowed to 12.0 percentage points. Each difference in contacting
rates for each pair of income groups in 2008 is smaller than the difference in contacting rate for
the corresponding pair of income groups in 2005.
Table 8 shows that a majority of whites (60.3 percent) contacted in 2005 and that
proportion grew by 17.0 percentage points to 77.3 percent in 2008. In comparison, a little more
than half (51.8 percent) of minorities in the 2005 sample contacted but that share increased by
18.6 percentage points to 70.4 percent, narrowing the white-minority contacting advantage.
Older adults experienced the largest increase (20.6 percentage points) in contacting rate to
become the age group with the highest contacting rate in 2008. The differences in contacting
rates between each pair of age categories narrowed between 2005 and 2008 except for the older
adult-senior gap, which widened marginally by 0.9 percentage point.
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Table 8
Contacting Rates within Groups in Denver, Pre- and Post-311 Implementation (%)
Key Independent Variables
Income
Low income: <$50,000
Middle income: $50,000 - $99,999
High income: $100,000 or more
Race
White
Minority
Age
Young adult: 18-34
Older adult: 35-54
Senior: 55+
Home ownership
Home owner
Renter
Have minor children
Yes
No
No. of observations

Contact in 2005

Contact in
2008

Difference
(2008 – 2005)

50.8
61.5
72.0

71.4
76.7
83.4

20.6***
15.2***
11.4**

60.3
51.8

77.3
70.4

17.0***
18.6***

60.4
57.3
51.3

75.2
77.9
71.0

14.8***
20.6***
19.7***

62.8
48.7

78.2
71.2

15.4***
22.5***

55.9
60.0

80.2
73.8

24.3***
13.8***

702

667

Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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311 contacting versus non-311 contacting rates within groups.
Table 9 explores differences among groups in their use of 311 as a method for contacting
versus non-311 methods for contacting city government. Overall, 41.6 percent of the sample
responded that they had contacted 311 while 33.8 percent of the sample indicated that they used
non-311 channels to make contact with the city government. Furthermore, with the exception of
the high income group and renters, every group was more likely to contact via 311 than via non311 channels (see difference column of Table 9). Though not conclusive, this evidence is
suggestive that 311 may have been responsible for the higher total contacting rates observed in
Tables 7 and 8.
Table 9 shows that the two lower income groups had higher rates of 311 contacting than
of non-311 contacting. Meanwhile, the high income group was 8.8 percentage points more
likely to engage in a non-311 form of contacting than in 311 contacting. The difference between
each pair of income groups in their 311 contacting rate was smaller than the difference in their
non-311 contacting rates except for the low income-middle income pair.
Almost half (48.2 percent) of minorities contacted 311 while only 39.1 percent of whites
contacted 311. While whites had a similar rate of non-311 contacting as 311 contacting,
minorities had a substantially lower rate of non-311 contacting–only 22.3 percent of minorities
engaged in non-311 contacting. So, while whites contacted via non-311 channels at a higher rate
than minorities, the white-minority gap in 311 contacting was not only smaller but in the
opposite direction as well. Although each age group had a higher likelihood of using the 311
channel as opposed to non-311 channels for contacting, seniors were by far the most likely to do
so, being 20.0 percentage points more likely to use 311 than non-311 channels. Also, they had
the highest rate of 311 contacting among the age groups. The gaps between each pair of age
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groups in their 311 contacting rates were not consistently narrower than the gaps in their non-311
contacting rates.
Home owners were not only more likely to contact via 311 than via non-311 channels
but they were also more likely than renters to contact 311. Renters were about equally likely to
use either channel. A similar pattern held between those from households with minors and those
from households without minors. Those living with minors had a higher rate of 311 contacting
than those living without minors and that former rate was also higher than their rate of non-311
contacting.
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Table 9
Contacting Rates within Groups in Denver for 311 and Non-311 Contacting (%)
Variables
Overall contacting rate
Income
Low income: <$50,000
Middle income: $50,000 - $99,999
High income: $100,000 or more
Race
White
Minority
Age
Young adult: 18-34
Older adult: 35-54
Senior: 55+
Home ownership
Home owner
Renter
Have minor children
Yes
No

311
Contacting

Non-311
Contacting

Difference
(Non-311 – 311)

41.6

33.8

-7.8

41.7
44.7
37.3

29.6
32.0
46.1

-12.1
-12.7
8.8

39.1
48.2

38.2
22.3

-0.9
-25.9

38.3
42.5
45.5

36.9
35.5
25.5

-1.4
-7.0
-20.0

45.7
35.5

32.5
35.7

-13.2
0.2

49.7
38.9

30.4
34.9

-19.3
-4.0
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Logistic Regression Analysis20
Pre- and post-311 total contacting.
With the availability of 311 for contacting the city in 2008, citizens had a convenient way
to access virtually any part of city government. Total contacting in 2008 should display a more
equitable pattern of participation, with any previously existing differences in contacting across
socioeconomic and demographic groups being reduced or wiped out post-311 adoption. The first
three columns of Table 10 show the effect of the independent variables on the logit coefficients
(log-odds of total contacting) in the pre-311 (2005) and post-311 (2008) years, together with the
difference in the logit coefficients between the two years (in the third column). The logit
coefficients in Table 10 are most helpful for highlighting the differences in the effects of the
variables on total contacting between the 2005 and 2008 models. However, for ease of
interpretation of these effects, I discuss the probability effects--for the same two models-presented in the last two columns of Table 10, instead of the logit coefficients.
In 2005, controlling for all the other variables in the model, there remained a statistically
significant difference (at the 0.1 significance level) in contacting between the highest and lowest
income groups. On average, high income earners were 11.1 percentage points more likely to
contact the city than low income earners (the reference group). For the demographic
characteristics, while there was no statistically significant racial difference in contacting, there
were significant differences among age groups. Older adults and seniors were less likely than
young adults (the reference group) to contact. These results were statistically significant at the
0.05 and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. On average, older adults and seniors were 11.1
percentage points and 18.4 percentage points, respectively, less likely to contact in 2005 than
For the sake of brevity, all discussions of coefficients are interpreted as partial effects, with the remaining
independent variables in the model held constant unless otherwise stated.
20
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young adults. In 2008, all the socioeconomic and demographic effects were smaller than in 2005
and none of these effects was statistically significant. For example, the age effects for 2008
indicate that older adults were now 1.0 percentage point more likely to contact than young adults
and seniors were now only 2.4 percentage points less likely to contact than young adults. The
pattern of weakening effects for the socioeconomic and demographic variables between 2005
and 2008 points to a more equitable pattern of contacting in the post-311 period and supports
hypotheses H2a and H2c.
Residents’ perception of a need in their community should motivate contacting and,
given the lower level of effort required when 311 facilitates access to city government, perceived
need should be a powerful predictor of contacting post-311. The evidence for perceived need, as
measured by the services rating variable in this framework, is moderate. Whereas the services
rating did not have a statistically significant effect on contacting in 2005, it was a significant
predictor of contacting in 2008 (at the 0.1 significance level). For each one-point perceived
deterioration in service quality (that is, one-point increase in the services rating scale towards
“poor”), on average, the probability of contacting increased by only 5.5 percentage points in
2005 but by 11.4 percentage points in 2008. In other words, the stronger the perceived need, the
higher the probability of contacting and the effect appeared stronger post-311. One possible
interpretation of the stronger post-311 result is that as awareness and knowledge of 311 grow,
needs may exert a stronger influence on contacting. The results for the services rating effect
provide support for hypothesis H3a.
The interest in government variable was a statistically significant (at the 0.01 significance
level) factor in contacting in 2005 but not in 2008. In 2005, those who had an interest in
government affairs were almost 15 percentage points more likely to contact the city than those
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who did not have an interest in government. Meeting attendance was another significant
indicator of contacting behavior. In 2005, those who attended public meetings were 10.5
percentage points more likely to contact than those who did not and the result is statistically
significant at the 0.1 significance level. In 2008, meeting attendance was associated with a 12.2
percentage point increase in the likelihood of contacting and the result is statistically significant
at the 0.01 significance level.
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Table 10
Factors Influencing Total Contact in Denver in 2005 and 2008, Logistic Regression Results

VARIABLES

Model 1
2005

Middle income

0.14
(0.59)
High income
0.50*
(1.65)
White
0.40
(1.58)
Older adult
-0.51**
(-2.04)
Senior
-0.84***
(-3.03)
Services rating
0.25
(0.92)
Home owner
0.67***
(2.70)
Have minor children
-0.073
(-0.27)
Interest in government 0.66***
(3.06)
Political efficacy
-0.015
(-0.063)
Meeting attendance
0.47*
(1.86)
Volunteer
0.32
(1.50)
Constant
-1.32*
(-1.65)
No. of observations

Logit Coefficient
Difference
Model 2
2008
0.13
(0.44)
0.48
(1.54)
0.37
(1.18)
0.058
(0.21)
-0.14
(-0.39)
0.66*
(1.94)
0.20
(0.73)
0.26
(0.77)
0.38
(1.56)
-0.27
(-1.02)
0.75***
(2.62)
0.043
(0.18)
-1.38
(-1.52)

-0.015
(-0.039)
-0.022
(-0.049)
-0.029
(-0.071)
0.57
(1.51)
0.70
(1.59)
0.41
(0.95)
-0.46
(-1.25)
0.33
(0.78)
-0.27
(-0.84)
-0.25
(-0.72)
0.28
(0.73)
-0.28
(-0.87)
-0.066
(-0.054)

667

1,369

702

Probability Change (%)
Model 1
Model 2
2005
2008
3.3

2.3

11.1

8.0

9.0

6.7

-11.1

1.0

-18.4

-2.4

5.5

11.4

15.0

3.5

-1.6

4.3

14.7

6.6

-0.3

-4.7

10.5

12.2

7.2

0.8

Note. Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A comparison between 311 contacting and non-311 contacting in 2008.

I present separate logit models for 311 contacting and non-311 contacting in Table 11 to
determine whether the pattern of effects differs for the two types of contacting in 2008. 21 Model
1 shows that there were no statistically significant differences between either of the two upper
income groups and the low income group in their likelihood of contacting 311. This is evidence
to support the claim of equity in 311 contacting. However, model 2 shows that, on average,
being in the high income group increased the probability of engaging in non-311 contacting by
14.2 percentage points compared to being in the low income group and the difference was
statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. In sum, the income effects between the two
models lend weak support to hypothesis H2b.
On average, compared to being a minority, being white offered no significant advantage
in 311 contacting but made a significant difference (13.4 percentage points) in the probability of
non-311 contacting. Whites’ advantage in non-311 contacting was statistically significant at the
0.05 significance level. The race equality in 311 contacting and inequality in non-311 contacting
provides strong statistical evidence in support of hypothesis H2d. Age was not a significant
predictor of either type of contact as there were no statistically significant differences between
either of the two older groups and young adults (the reference group) in their probabilities of
engaging in either 311 or non-311 contacting. Neither were there clear patterns in the group
differences as we move from 311 contacting to non-311 contacting. The age results, therefore,
do not provide evidence in support of hypothesis H2d.
The services rating variable did not have a statistically significant effect on either 311
contacting or non-311 contacting. However, the effect of perceived need was in the expected
I also ran a multinomial logit model for comparison (see Appendix H for multinomial logit results). The APEs
were nearly identical for most of the independent variables and close for the remaining independent variables.
21
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direction for both 311 and non-311 contacting. The findings on perceived need provide no
support for hypothesis H3b.
Both measures of stakeholding had the expected effects on each type of contacting.
While both home ownership and having minors in the household had a substantive effect on the
probability of 311 contacting (10.9 percentage points and 9.5 percentage points, respectively),
only the home ownership effect achieved statistical significance at the 0.1 significance level.
Neither of the stakeholding variables had a statistically significant effect on non-311 contacting.
In fact, after controlling for the other independent variables in the model, each stakeholding
variable had a negative effect on the probability of non-311 contacting. The results on home
ownership and having minors in the household provide only some support for hypothesis H4.
Additionally, the models show that interest in government was a statistically significant
factor in 311 contacting (at the 0.05 significance level). Those who had an interest in
government were 12.7 percentage points more likely to contact via 311 than those who did not
have an interest in government. Interest in government might be important because that interest
increases the likelihood of learning about 311. However, the interest in government variable did
not have a statistically significant effect on whether or not the individual contacted via non-311
channels. Volunteering had a statistically significant effect (at the 0.05 signifiance level) on the
likelihood of contacting 311. Volunteers were 10.2 percentage points more likely to contact 311
than non-volunteers. The volunteer variable also had a statistically significant effect (at the 0.1
significance level) on contacting via non-311 channels; however, the effect was, surprisingly, to
lower the likelihood of non-311 contacting by 9.7 percentage points.

82

Table 11
Factors Influencing 311 and Non-311 Contacting in Denver in 2008, Logistic Regression Results
VARIABLES
Middle income
High income
White
Older adult
Senior
Services rating
Home owner
Have minor children
Interest in government
Political efficacy
Meeting attendance
Volunteer
Constant

Model 1: 311 Contact
Logit
Probability
Coefficient Change (%)
0.15
(0.55)
-0.29
(-0.98)
-0.26
(-0.91)
-0.019
(-0.068)
0.11
(0.35)
0.23
(0.76)
0.49*
(1.84)
0.42
(1.54)
0.56**
(2.54)
-0.31
(-1.21)
0.31
(1.24)
0.45**
(1.96)
-1.65*
(-1.90)

No. of observations

667

3.5
-6.4
-5.8
-0.4
2.6
5.2
10.9
9.5
12.7
-6.9
7.2
10.2

Model 2: Non-311 Contact
Logit
Probability
Coefficient Change (%)
-0.064
(-0.24)
0.64**
(2.11)
0.67**
(2.35)
0.054
(0.20)
-0.28
(-0.79)
0.35
(1.21)
-0.34
(-1.21)
-0.28
(-1.00)
-0.29
(-1.25)
0.089
(0.33)
0.24
(0.87)
-0.46*
(-1.96)
-1.63*
(-1.93)

-1.3
14.2
13.4
1.1
-5.7
7.4
-7.1
-5.7
-6.1
1.9
5.1
-9.7

667

Note. Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Summary
The quantitative analysis on Denver yielded statistical support for several of the
hypotheses. Others were only weakly supported while a few were rejected altogether due to lack
of supporting evidence. Many of the initial effects and patterns seen in the preliminary
descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis carried over to the logistic analysis. Table 12
summarizes the evidence presented in testing the hypotheses.
The results provide evidence that contacting rates increased significantly in the post-311
period compared to rates in the pre-311 period (hypothesis H1). Furthermore, the rate increases
were across all groups. The next most important hypotheses are those that address the equity
implications of 311 (hypotheses H2a to H2d). SES had the expected effect of being a weaker
predictor of contacting post-311 (hypothesis H2a) but offered only weak evidence in terms of
whether its impact on 311 and non-311 contacting differed significantly (hypothesis H2b). For
the demographic variables, race provided the strongest evidence of equalization of access for
total contacting post-311 (hypothesis H2c) and for 311 contacting relative to non-311 access
(hypothesis H2d). However, the age measure performed well for hypothesis H2c but not so for
hypotheses H2d. The findings on the effect of perceived need on total contacting were consistent
with the literature (hypothesis H3a); however, the findings did not show a differentiation in its
effects for 311 versus non-311 contacting (hypothesis H3b). Finally, home ownership showed
the anticipated strong positive effect on 311 contacting compared to non-311 contacting, lending
support to hypothesis H4. However, the other measure of stakeholding, having minors in the
household, offered only weak evidence in support of the hypothesis.
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Table 12
Summary Results on Hypotheses from Quantitative Phase (Denver Case)
Hypotheses Description

Status

Evidence

H1

Post-311 contacting rates will be
higher than pre-311 contacting rates.

Confirmed

-Table 7: total contact rate difference of 17.9 percentage
points, significant at the 0.01 level
-Table 8: pre-post contacting differences for all groups
showed increase and significant at the 0.05 or 0.01
significance levels

H2a

The association between SES and
contacting will be weaker after
adopting 311.

Confirmed

Table 10: supported

H2b

The association between SES and 311
contacting will be weaker than the
association between SES and non-311
contacting.

Weak evidence

Table 11: some/weak evidence

H2c

The association between demographic
characteristics and contacting will be
weaker after adopting 311.
Race
Age

Confirmed
Confirmed

Table 10: supported
Table 10: supported - strong evidence
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Hypotheses Description
H2d

The association between demographic
characteristics – race, age and sex –
and 311 contacting will be weaker
than the association between
demographic characteristics and non311 contacting.
Race
Age

Status

Evidence

Confirmed
Rejected

Table 11: supported - strong evidence
Table 11: evidence does not support hypothesis

H3a

Perceived need will have a strong
positive association with contacting,
especially after 311.

Confirmed

Table 10: supported

H3b

Perceived need will have a stronger
positive association with 311
contacting than with non-311
contacting.

Rejected

Table 11: evidence does not support hypothesis

H4

Having a stake in the community will
have a stronger association with
contacting via 311 than with non-311
contacting.
Home owner
Have minor children

Confirmed
Weak evidence

Table 11: supported
Table 11: some/weak evidence
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Interpretation: Discussion of the Quantitative and Qualitative Findings
This chapter has presented quantitative evidence of the effect of the 311 implementation
in Denver on contacting patterns, with strong evidence which suggests that there were significant
equity effects on contacting post-311 implementation. These quantitative results represent the
main findings for the Denver case. The qualitative findings gave insights into the
implementation process itself and highlighted some challenges as well as strategies that the
implementers used to address those challenges. In this section, I discuss how this qualitative
analysis enriches the quantitative findings by linking the quantitative results to the city’s actual
311 implementation and management practices.
The strong political support that Denver’s 311 system received, particularly from the
mayor’s office, was critical for elevating 311’s profile in the city. The elevated profile for 311
during implementation appeared to aid the city’s efforts to bring public awareness to the
innovation as a facilitator of access to city government. The multi-faceted and extensive public
education campaign may have ensured that a diverse cross-section of the city’s population
became aware of 311 and been more likely to engage with the city via that contact channel. The
city’s effort to work with neighborhood organizations to publicize 311 within their communities
also appears to have contributed to widely disseminating the message of 311 to the city’s
residents. Put together, these offer plausible explanations for the quantitative analysis findings
of high rates of contacting in the post-311 period, and particularly for 311 contacting, as seen
amongst such groups as minorities and those with a stake in their communities - home owners.
Denver implemented 311 with a supporting CRM system behind it from the outset. The
city also undertook an extended soft launch to test the 311/CRM system prior to launch. The
structure of the 311 operations also included extended service hours for getting in contact with
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the city. These were critical features of Denver’s 311 implementation process that may have
ensured that the city was well-prepared to engage with its residents in this new way and to do so
effectively by the time 311 was officially launched and open to the public. Effective engagement
in this context means being able to serve residents’ needs efficiently and with a high standard of
customer service. It also means giving the residents a means to hold the city accountable in their
engagement in order to give the public confidence that the new system was really working for
them. Residents’ ability to track their requests through the city government was an important
feature for ensuring accountability in the engagement process and engendering confidence to
make greater use of 311.
Both the quantitative and the qualitative findings lend support to the claim that the city of
Denver’s 311 implementation process was effective and facilitated the city’s success in meeting
the goals (such as ease of access) set out for 311. The extensive public education efforts
surrounding 311 and the political and administrative support that the initiative received appear to
have been the biggest contributing factors to the success of the implementation and its
subsequent impact on contacting. This may be a useful finding to local governments that are
interested in engaging their residents in the local government administrative process and, more
importantly, in providing a convenient channel to government that is equitable.
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CHAPTER V: FINDINGS ON MINNEAPOLIS
This chapter presents the qualitative and quantitative findings for the City of Minneapolis.
These findings are presented separately. The chapter also includes a discussion at the end which
interprets the quantitative results in light of the qualitative findings.

Qualitative Findings
The findings draw from information gathered from reviewing documents, particularly a
comprehensive 2008 case study report on Minneapolis’s experience in establishing its 311
system, prepared by the City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group for the US Department of
Justice’s COPS program (The City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group, 2008). The findings
are also informed by and greatly enriched by the experiences of the four Minneapolis key
informants.
Minneapolis launched its 311 system on January 4, 2006 (The City of Minneapolis and
The Macro Group, 2008, p. 10). According to interviewee 301, the idea to consider 311
originated from a city council member who was exposed to the innovation at a national
association meeting of elected officials where 311 systems had been discussed. The council
member returned to Minneapolis and proposed the idea to the city. The council member,
therefore, was a policy entrepreneur for the adoption of the innovation, by spreading the idea
from his national network to his jurisdiction. The city employed the services of an external agent
to conduct a process assessment of city operations, which highlighted deficiencies in the city’s
service delivery system and gave urgency to the need for a 311 system (The City of Minneapolis
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and The Macro Group, 2008, p. 19). In the weak mayor-strong council government of
Minneapolis, the proposal to adopt 311 proceeded because it received majority support from the
city council.
Although the idea to innovate by implementing a 311 system did not originate from the
mayor’s office, the office quickly became a major champion of the initiative as well. One
interviewee said of the initiative: “They [the mayor’s office] were strong behind it” (Minneapolis
interviewee 304). Another interviewee described the significance of the role played by the
mayor’s office as follows:
He [the mayor] would be disappointed that the initial idea [for 311] came from a council
member but it really did. But he took that and he was the champion of this the whole
time. So, all of the time that this project was underway he was the one that really gave it
the public voice and the importance of doing it and helping within the city […] The
mayor was really the public voice and that is important on a massive transformation in a
city like this (Minneapolis interviewee 301).

The finding that the mayor was a strong proponent of the 311 initiative is consistent with the
finding from the O’Byrne (2015, p. 102) Minneapolis case study that the mayor was a “policy
entrepreneur” in the 311 adoption process.

Goals of Minneapolis 311
The application that the City of Minneapolis submitted for grant funding from the
Department of Justice’s COPS program for the 311 initiative indicated that the city was
motivated by a number of reasons to implement a 311 system (The City of Minneapolis and The
Macro Group, 2008, pp. 13-15). According to interviewees, the most important goals for the
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city’s 311 system included a focus on improving resident interaction with the city through better
customer service. The city recognized that its existing means for residents to make contact were
unsatisfactory. In the words of interviewee 301, “That link that residents had with city
government was kind of messy at best and frustrating at worst.” This messiness and frustration
stemmed primarily from the fact that the city had many telephone numbers that residents had to
go through when accessing the government, often with callers being transferred from one
department to another, including, according to The City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group
(2008, p. 114), when attempting to access different parts of police services. In the words of one
interviewee:
A lot of times, we really felt that people would get what some folks call ‘the city hall
shuffle.’ I think that was a phrase coined, I think, by Baltimore 311. And we really felt
that that was happening more than it should and by having 311 be the central
clearinghouse, people, all they had to know was call 311 and we’ll help figure out who to
talk to if it’s not right with the 311 customer service representatives (Minneapolis
interviewee 302).
According to the interviewees, the goal of improving resident access to city government
dealt with the city’s “front door.” Also important to the city was how its back-end processes
functioned. The city hoped that implementing 311 and the associated CRM system would result
in process improvements at the department level, thereby making the city’s service delivery more
efficient. More long-term, the goal was to produce performance indicators to be able to practice
performance measurement and management:
This was never about just a front door to the city. This was always about what the
connection to the back-end of the city would drive in business process improvement.
This was always about correcting, reforming our systems and our processes, not just
about satisfying the front door to the resident – that was a big piece. But we knew that
the system would drive how we delivered services so much better. And that takes years
after it’s been implemented (Minneapolis interviewee 301).
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…maybe second or third to citizen access as being the main reason for starting 311 was
the idea that as 311 came up and became operational and developed, the job - the work
order system and so forth - we knew it would force all of the departments who were
involved to do some process improvement. And we really felt that that was appropriate.
If we had process improvement and if we had milestones for how long a particular kind
of work would need to be taken care of, we could start measuring how well the city was
doing for the tax payer. We really felt that was very, very important to take care of that
for the tax payer (Minneapolis interviewee 302).
The final major motivating factor for implementing 311 was to ease pressure on the city’s
911 emergency system. Between 30 and 40 percent of the calls to the Minneapolis 911 number
were non-emergency calls (The City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group, 2008, p. 59).

Steps in the Implementation Process
Once the decision to implement 311 had been made, the city’s Business Information
Services department (similar to the Information Technology or Technology Department in most
cities) became the lead department responsible for implementation in the initial phases. This
department falls under the authority of the city coordinator. The city ultimately created a 311
call center division that, together with the 911 call center division, fell under the 911/311
department, which was headed by an assistant city coordinator, who in turn reported to the city
coordinator (Fleming, 2008; The City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group, 2008). However,
several years later, the city reorganized 311 into its own separate (from 911) line of service, but
retained its reporting to the city coordinator (City of Minneapolis, 2015, pp. 191-192). The
rationale for this reorganization was to avoid the misperception that 311 was simply an
instrument of 911 and to emphasize that 311 was meant to service all city departments:
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I think that [separation of 311 and 911] was partly to recognize that it wasn’t just a police
or fire or EMS [emergency medical services] organization at 311. It was serving all city
departments and all facets of city government – almost all (Minneapolis interviewee 302).
It [911/311] was split up because it wasn’t a good fit. […] They’re call centers that do
completely different things and they measure their success on different metrics so it’s not
a good mix (Minneapolis interviewee 303).
In the preparation phases, the city consulted with other jurisdictions that had prior
experience with implementing 311, including Baltimore (The City of Minneapolis and The
Macro Group, 2008, p. 10). At various stages in the implementation process, the city instituted
“soft launches” where it tested parts of the 311 system with a few service requests (The City of
Minneapolis and The Macro Group, 2008). However, part-way through implementation, the city
decided to change CRM software provider due to problems they experienced with the initial
software (The City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group, 2008). As noted by interviewee 304,
this decision affected the implementation timeline and left little time for a final thorough soft
launch that would have allowed for extensive testing of the 311 system before the January 4,
2006 start date:
There were a few shortcuts taken that, in retrospect, I wish we hadn’t let them get by with
because we didn’t have what you call a long time to do a soft launch or anything. It was
kind of directly into the nitty-gritty almost immediately (Minneapolis interviewee 304).
Other than the effect of the unanticipated change in software provider, interviewee 303
noted that the city implemented 311 gradually, with a simple arrangement, which they felt was
more appropriate as it was easier to manage than a more complex system. Three-one-one
provided services via several channels besides the telephone, including email and online access
(The City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group, 2008, p. 16). The initial 311 system was set to
operate Monday to Friday, 7 am to 11 pm (The City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group,
93

2008). The limited hours were due in part to fiscal constraints. It would be several years before
the city would extend 311 service to weekends and one interviewee felt this was a limitation to
the 311 service:
The bad thing [about the tight fiscal environment], perhaps, was that initially, 311 was
envisioned to be a 7 by 24 kind of a department and we started with a [limited weekday
schedule]. And we all felt that longer hours or more days would be an even more
important service and it wasn’t until years later that 311 finally had weekend service
(Minneapolis interviewee 302).

Marketing the 311 System
In the weeks leading up to the launch of 311, the city of Minneapolis engaged in a
massive public education initiative that included both external and internal components (The
City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group, 2008). The internal effort included providing
training to relevant city employees on the 311 system and educating all employees about the
system and what it could do for the city (The City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group, 2008).
Interview 301 provided highlights of the internal employee education initiative:
One of the things we did early that I think served us very well is we pulled 500 people
together into a massive day-long orientation. This was very early in the project so this
was to give them a sense about possibility and to show them videos of other cities and to
show resident satisfaction issues and to have people talk about change. So we really paid
a lot of attention to how to handle that transition (Minneapolis interviewee 301).
The external effort was a multi-faceted campaign that included messages on city and
public transit vehicles, posters at transit stops and in some city correspondence with residents
(The City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group, 2008, pp. 85-92). Interviewee 303 added that
the promotion efforts also included direct, in-person community outreach, including attending
events and distributing 311-related mementos. The ICMA report on Minneapolis 311 also
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documents the city’s efforts to work through community organizations to spread the word about
311 (Fleming, 2008, p. 10). Interviewees noted that the message had to be constant, consistent
and widespread because it involved a significant change in the mind-set of the public. However,
the city found that the public’s familiarity with 911 was an asset that they could tap into to ease
the public into using 311 in a similar manner:
So, first of all, just to do basic education of dialing three numbers to answer anything that
you want to ask is a big challenge in a city of half a million people. And if it hadn’t been
for 911, which is, in some respects - at least in the United States people know that those
three numbers get you something really important - in some respects, it was nice to play
off of, ‘Here’s what you call for an emergency, here’s what you call for everything else.’
And we did do that and I think other cities have done that and it’s because it’s not
common to go to your phone and dial three numbers (Minneapolis interviewee 301).
One significant aspect of the Minneapolis education campaign was its extensive efforts to
make the information widely accessible to the city’s diverse population:
And so that very basic education thing is the first big challenge. And then the second one
that I’d put right behind it is the diversity of a large city and the fact that there are 83
languages spoken in Minneapolis public schools. And we had seven official languages in
the city and there was a council action about all important city communications had to be
translated into all seven languages so that includes, Oromo and Somali and Hmong and a
lot of very unique languages. And so, if in fact the point of 311 is to broadly service
everyone that has a right to any city question being answered efficiently and effectively,
then you simply have to reach into every community and try to make that as pervasive as
possible (Minneapolis interviewee 301).
The effort to reach as broad a cross-section of the city’s residents as possible reflects the city’s
broader policy of inclusivity and equal access. In fact, a 2003 city council resolution led to the
creation of the city’s limited English proficiency (LEP) plan in 2004, which sought to ensure
more equitable access to city services for residents with limited English language ability (City of
Minneapolis, 2004, p. 3). Furthermore, during the implementation of 311, the city was also
cognizant of and sensitive to the possibility that some segments of the population were less
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inclined to have any involvement with government. Thus, making access to the government
equal for all groups was an important goal to the city:
We did feel and try to pay attention to the fact that we thought some communities were
less prone to call the authorities. And that was true of the Hispanic community, we felt.
Definitely true of the Hmong community, we felt. And so we never necessarily solved it.
We were aware of the fact that we probably weren’t getting as much phone traffic from
some of those ethnic groups as others. We definitely, definitely tried (Minneapolis
interviewee 302).
Interviewee 302 noted that one issue the city had to deal with in its marketing strategy
was educating the public about which services fell under the purview of the city. There were
calls and requests to 311 that came from outside the city and could not be addressed by
Minneapolis. Also, there were calls that originated from within Minneapolis but which pertained
to suburban or county services, for which the city did not have responsibility.

Challenges in the Implementation Process
The decision to implement 311 in Minneapolis passed because it had strong initial
institutional and political support from elected officials. However, as implementation progressed,
a number of obstacles emerged. These obstacles ranged from technical challenges - the main one
being changing CRM provider during project implementation - to resistance from some
department staff and lukewarm support from some of the city’s elected officials. Over time,
those responsible for the implementation process adopted strategies in an attempt to adapt to
these challenges and galvanize support for the initiative.
Implementing 311 in Minneapolis represented a significant culture change in many of the
departments. Prior to 311, several of the city’s departments did not have in place applications for
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organizing their work. One interviewee shared an anecdote to illustrate the informal process in
place within one department for handling service requests:
[Department name redacted] had no real application or anything behind them. I
remember the anecdotal story they said, ‘Oh yeah, they get their service requests over the
phone and they write them on a scrap of paper and put them in a cigar box on top of the
filing cabinet and then the person who comes in grabs them.’ That’s how bad it was
(Minneapolis interviewee 304).
Implementing such a sweeping organizational change that fundamentally alters the departments’
processes and the way they operate required significant adjustments on the part of the
departments and their staff. Some department staff were apprehensive about the changes that
implementing 311 would usher in:
The administrative part of [department name redacted] was on-board. It was like pulling
teeth trying to get some of the lower managers and especially the workers, they saw it as,
‘You’re going to double our work’ […] because they very seldom got calls unless they
got transferred on from the council or something like that about individual services that
were needed to be done… They were afraid because they were being held to an SLA
[service level agreement] on [these services] (Minneapolis interviewee 304).
Indications are that most of the other city departments, particularly those that had a
history of using applications to manage their work processes were more accepting of the change
to have 311 take over their individual call taking duties because they saw efficiency gains in
being able to concentrate on service delivery. However, a few others were reluctant to roll their
numbers into 311 because of concern that 311 would lead to a separation between their customer
service and service delivery, which would ultimately affect accountability:
It [getting buy-in from some city departments] was not easy. It wasn’t not easy because
necessarily of pushback, although we experienced a few instances of pushback. It’s not
easy because it is extraordinarily complex to take a department that did those things
sometimes adequately, other times poorly, and say that we’re pulling out that front door
from your department and putting it elsewhere. And in the future you will be deliverers
of the service but you won’t be the interfacers with the public - that’s going to be
completely pulled out. […] They felt like they were losing control. […] So, yes, there
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was some pushback but the hard part wasn’t from the pushback. The hard part was really
developing an entirely new way of working and thinking within city government
(Minneapolis interviewee 301).
Staff were concerned about experiencing changes in their job descriptions as 311 technology
alters the way their departments function:
Oh, yeah, [it was challenging] because you’re changing folks’ jobs. They’re no longer
answering the phone and so then they’re saying, ‘Well, what am I going to do?’ Well,
there’s always something to do in city government. That isn’t a problem. But it’s the
fact then that their job is changing so there’s resistance to doing that (Minneapolis
interviewee 303).
From the perspective of the interviewees, the reluctance, however, appears to have been
short-lived as the departments and their staff quickly realized the benefits of working with a
centralized call center:
It didn’t take really that long for people to realize how effective it could be and that if
they work together with that new front-facing group of people [at 311], they really got to
focus on pure delivery (Minneapolis interviewee 301).
In an effort to ensure staff cooperation in this new initiative, the city had to allay staff concerns
about job security in the midst of the changes:
Originally, we talked about the layoffs that would be necessary to help pay for 311, and
in the end the city backed off on doing a lot of layoffs. So even if there were people in
the departments that used to play that front-facing role, we didn’t kind of go through and
do a lot of firing. And that helped, you know, that it wasn’t about laying people off and
getting those salary savings in order to pay for 311. Some of that had happened but we
tried to manage that within attrition and just changing… a lot of people their jobs were
redefined within those departments (Minneapolis interviewee 301).
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One interviewee believed that the tightening fiscal situation in which the departments operated in
the mid-2000s may have been a contributing factor in the departments’ willingness to embrace
311 as a partner in service delivery:
There was considerable fiscal pressure on the departments to do the same amount of stuff
with perhaps less people and resources and so that, to some extent, I think prompted
some of the departments to rely on 311 to offload their work order processing and their
call answering. And so 311 was there as a place to rely on for those departments who
were so strapped that they had to cut out some ability to do those things that 311 took
over. So that was a good thing (Minneapolis interviewee 302).
One interviewee offered an example of a department that had initially shown reluctance about
using the 311 system but ended up embracing it when it found the system useful in making a
case for securing additional resources for the department. The interviewee believed that the
integrated 311/CRM system offered insights into department performance, which may have
ultimately influenced a resource allocation decision:
Oddly enough, after a couple of years, I think it was in 2008 when the economy really
tanked and everybody’s budget went down, they [the department] were able to get a onetime influx of money for [their work] because they could take the reports and prove that
they were getting many more reports of [service needs] than they were able to fix with
the resources that they had. So, it was funny because, after that, [the department] turned
around. They were a lot more willing to take the calls and organize their work around it.
And they were finding it was easier to get more done (Minneapolis interviewee 304).
Despite what appeared to be generally high levels of support for 311 from the city’s
elected officials, some interviewees noted that, at times, there was a little hesitation among some
of these officials. This was especially the case with newer members of the city council who had
difficulty seeing the value of a centralized gateway to city government:
There was definitely some nervousness amongst some of them [city council members]
that the 311 might supplant their own offices for citizen access (Minneapolis interviewee
302).
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The city’s internal education efforts played a major role in securing the support of elected
officials (The City of Minneapolis and The Macro Group, 2008, p. 93). The strategy, as in the
case with the departments, was educating the stakeholders on the potential benefits to them of
cooperating with 311 and dispelling their fears:
In the end, we really had to work those 13 relationships with the 13 city council members
closely on this. And in the end what we really sold this on is, while they surely were in
those positions and when things went well, they were praised, but they also understood
how often things didn’t go well in that connection with residents. And so their pain was
great enough; that’s one reason that they wanted to certainly try to make it better overall.
The second reason, of course, is that serving their residents well in their wards is really
their chief role. So if that’s the argument that’s being made, it’s hard for them to argue
against. But the third one was, because with 311 you get this huge power of data and
reporting, we negotiated the set of information and reports that they would get regularly.
And the level of sophistication about what they knew about who was calling in their ward,
from their ward and what those topics were and how that was reported to them was way
more sophisticated than they ever had prior to that, even if their own office was taking
the calls. So they saw that qualitative bump into the information that they would have.
And the fourth one that I really think was actually very important: we made a
commitment that if a resident said they wanted to talk to the council member, we didn’t
ask any questions. We forwarded them to the council member. Because the last thing we
wanted this to be perceived as is that we’re trying to get in the way of residents’ ability to
get to that council member. Sometimes, it was the resident that felt like it was a block
more than the council member worrying about it being a block. There are a number of
residents who would be regular callers, who were, I think, also a little bit nervous about
loss of access (Minneapolis interviewee 301).
The city’s education and partnering strategy with elected officials appeared to elicit support
among these officials:
From time to time we’d find a city council member who was really negative or really
nervous at first back in ’06, who kind of came around and said, ‘Hey, this is great. It’s
helping us out. We’re able to deal with the sticky constituent questions, not the routine
things that 311 takes care. So that’s a good balance.’ I think it turned out to be popular
amongst the city council members, generally (Minneapolis interviewee 302).
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Summary
Like many other cities that have implemented 311, Minneapolis was motivated to
undertake this technological innovation because of a desire to better serve its residents and
achieve efficiencies in departmental operations. Like most later adopters of 311, the city took
inspiration from early adopters, including Baltimore, and attempted to learn from their
experiences. Despite extensive planning, the city still faced some challenges in its
implementation of 311. Interviewees noted that, in the ensuing years, 311 use in Minneapolis
grew and the system continues to be an integral part of the city’s engagement efforts with its
residents and of the city’s service delivery systems.
The city’s challenges in ensuring that 311 is an effective tool in their administrative
process include the unique challenge of being able to reach a very diverse ethnic population to
ensure equitable access to the city. Meeting this challenge has been facilitated by the city’s
official position and broader policy of inclusivity. As expected, internal dynamics from the
organizational change associated with innovating in city government proved to be a challenge to
the implementation process. However, the implementers of 311 tried a variety of strategies to
manage that change process and, in the opinion of the interviewees, with time, as the benefits of
311 became more apparent, that challenge appeared easier to manage:
So, there’s a proving ground that has to occur once this gets implemented, that shows
people that, in the end, the calibre of service - the efficiency of it, the responsiveness, the
data, the reporting, the transparency, all of those things are hugely enhanced from almost
any experience that they’d ever had before in that kind of connection. And once they’ve
seen that, you’ve got all the support you need. But getting to that point, where it really
proves itself, that’s hard work (Minneapolis interviewee 301).
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Quantitative Findings
The quantitative section of this chapter focuses on exploring the descriptive, bivariate and
logistic regression results from Minneapolis’s survey data. The discussion here considers the
statistical evidence as they pertain to hypotheses H1 to H4.

Descriptive Statistics for Minneapolis
Sample characteristics.
Table 13 presents the characteristics of the samples from the 2005 and 2008 Minneapolis
Resident Satisfaction Surveys. The rate of contacting remained stable between the pre- and post311 implementation periods. The increase of 0.2 percentage point in contacting rates between
the two periods was not statistically significant. This marginal increase does not provide support
for hypothesis H1.
Respondents in the lowest income category (annual income below $50,000) made up a
majority of the sample in both periods. However, their share declined by 5.1 percentage points
in 2008. The loss in share was taken up by the high income group in the sample while the share
of middle income earners remained steady.
The proportions of whites and minorities in the samples remained largely unchanged
between the pre- and post-311 implementation periods. Whites were a majority in both periods,
making up about 71 percent of the samples. Young adults were the largest age group in 2005 but
the group experienced a statistically significant decline (5.5 percentage points) in their share in
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2008. Older adults increased their share in the sample from 37.4 percent in 2005 to 42.2 percent
in 2008. The sample was roughly evenly split between males and females in each period.
The mean of the services rating variable was 2.1 in each period. Home owners made up
almost 56 percent of the sample in each period. A little over 36 percent of the sample in 2005
had minors in their household while a slightly smaller percentage – 34.2 percent – lived in
households with minors in 2008.

Table 13
Minneapolis Survey Respondent Characteristics, Pre- and Post-311 Implementation (%)
Variables

2005

2008

Difference
(2008 – 2005)

Total Contact
Income
Low income: <$50,000
Middle income: $50,000 - $99,999
High income: $100,000 or more
Race
White
Minority
Age
Young adult: 18-34
Older adult: 35-54
Senior: 55+
Sex
Male
Female
Services rating (mean)
Home owner
Have minor children

41.3

41.5

0.2

58.0
30.8
11.2

52.9
30.7
16.4

-5.1*
-0.1
5.2***

71.3
28.7

71.1
28.9

-0.2
0.2

44.2
37.4
18.5

38.7
42.2
19.1

-5.5***
4.8*
0.6

50.0
50.0
2.1
55.7
36.2

50.8
49.2
2.1
55.6
34.2

0.8
-0.8
0.0
-0.1
-2.0

1,046

984

No. of observations
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Contacting rates within groups.
In addition to knowing whether there were changes in the overall rate of contacting
between the pre- and post-311 implementation periods, it is important to know how contacting
varied by group. In Table 14, I present a bivariate analysis that examined contacting rates for
various groups in the sample. Surprisingly, Table 14 shows that eight of the 14 groups had lower
rates of contacting in the post-311 period. However, none of these declines was statistically
significant.
The six remaining groups each experienced an increase in their contacting rate. These six
included the only two groups to have a statistically significant difference (at the 0.1 significance
level) in their contacting rate post-311: seniors and females. Seniors increased their contacting
rate by 7.0 percentage points to overtake young adults in 2008. Females increased their
contacting rate by 6.5 percentage points to surpass males in 2008. These significant increases
are important from an equity perspective. An additional two groups from the six that increased
their contacting rates may be described as traditionally less active participants: low income
earners and minorities. Again, the increased participation rates for these groups, particularly in
the midst of the declines, is important to highlight from the equity perspective. The final two
groups that experienced an increased rate of contacting in 2008 were renters and respondents
from households without minors. In each of those cases, though, their counterparts (home
owners and those in households with minors, respectively) retained their contacting advantage
over them in 2008.
These results provide weak evidence that contacting rates increased. This is consistent
with the marginal increase in the overall contacting rate presented in Table 13. The results in

104

Tables 13 and 14 together are not sufficient to confidently declare that contacting rates increased
in the post-311 implementation period as the evidence is weak (hypothesis H1).
There was no clear pattern in how the gaps in contacting rates between each pair of
income groups changed across the two periods. The racial gap narrowed by 1.7 percentage
points between 2005 and 2008. The relative positions of the sexes were not only reversed but
widened considerably. Whereas in 2005 males were 2.9 percentage points more likely than
females to contact, in 2008, they were 9.6 percentage points less likely than females to contact.
In this bivariate analysis, as with income, there are no clear patterns in how the relationship
between age and contacting changed between the two periods.
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Table 14
Contacting Rates within Groups in Minneapolis, Pre- and Post-311 Implementation (%)
Key Independent Variables
Income
Low income: <$50,000
Middle income: $50,000 - $99,999
High income: $100,000 or more
Race
White
Minority
Age
Young adult: 18-34
Older adult: 35-54
Senior: 55+
Sex
Male
Female
Home ownership
Home owner
Renter
Have minor children
Yes
No
No. of observations

Contact in 2005

Contact in 2008

Difference
(2008 – 2005)

38.5
46.0
43.2

40.8
43.9
39.3

2.3
-2.1
-3.9

43.8
35.3

43.5
36.7

-0.3
1.3

40.3
45.9
34.8

38.1
44.5
41.7

-2.1
-1.3
7.0*

42.8
39.9

36.8
46.4

-6.0
6.5*

47.3
33.8

46.2
35.7

-1.1
1.8

45.6
38.9

43.2
40.6

-2.4
1.7

1,046

984

Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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311 contacting versus non-311 contacting rates within groups.
In Table 15, I summarize the bivariate relationship between the key independent
variables and each of the two types of contacting that took place in 2008. Table 15 shows that,
in 2008, there was more contacting via non-311 channels than via 311. However, the difference
in channel usage was small (1.6 percentage points). This pattern holds for most groups, except
the high income group, older adults and men.
Contacting rates among income groups were more similar for 311 contacting than for
non-311 contacting, suggesting that SES may have had a weaker effect on 311 contacting than
on non-311 contacting. Surprisingly, there was a much larger racial gap (in favor of whites) for
311 contacting (5.7 percentage points) than for non-311 contacting (1.1 percentage points). A
similar pattern holds for age groups, where the differences among the age groups were smaller
for non-311 contacting compared to 311 contacting. Women used both 311 and non-311
channels at a higher rate than men, but the gap was smaller in the case of the 311 channel.
Home owners had higher rates of contacting for both 311 and non-311 contacting than
renters. The difference between the two groups was larger for 311 contacting than for non-311
contacting. Furthermore, home owners had a slightly lower rate of 311 contacting than of non311 contacting. A similar pattern existed between respondents who lived in households with
minors and those who did not. Those who lived with minors had a 0.6 percentage point lower
likelihood of contacting via 311 than via non-311 channels.
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Table 15
Contacting Rates within Groups in Minneapolis for 311 and Non-311 Contacting (%)
Variables
Overall contacting rate
Income
Low income: <$50,000
Middle income: $50,000 - $99,999
High income: $100,000 or more
Race
White
Minority
Age
Young adult: 18-34
Older adult: 35-54
Senior: 55+
Sex
Male
Female
Home ownership
Home owner
Renter
Have minor children
Yes
No

311 Contacting

Non-311
Contacting

Difference
(Non-311 – 311)

20.0

21.6

1.6

20.2
19.5
20.0

20.6
24.4
19.3

0.4
4.9
-0.7

21.6
15.9

21.9
20.8

0.3
4.9

16.6
23.0
20.0

21.5
21.5
21.8

4.9
-1.5
1.8

18.5
21.4

18.3
25.0

-0.2
3.6

22.8
16.4

23.4
19.3

0.6
2.9

21.3
19.2

21.9
21.4

0.6
2.2
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Logistic Regression Analysis22
Pre- and post-311 total contacting.
Table 16 presents the results from the logit analysis. The first two columns show the
logit coefficients – the effect of the independent variables on the log-odds of contacting – in
2005 and in 2008, respectively. The third column shows the difference in the effects between the
two years. The last two columns show the probability changes – the APE – associated with the
logit coefficients in the first two columns.
Income was not a significant predictor of contacting in either 2005 or 2008. This result
does not support hypothesis H2a. It is noteworthy, though, that the probability changes in 2008
indicate that both middle and high income earners were, on average, 5.6 percentage points and
9.3 percentage points, respectively, less likely to contact than low income earners. In 2005,
middle income earners were 0.3 percentage point more likely to contact than low income earners,
on average, and high income earners were only 3.3 percentage points less likely to contact than
low income earners.
Race was a statistically significant factor (at the 0.1 significance level) in contacting in
2005 but lost its significance in the post-311 period. In 2005, on average, being white rather than
a minority resulted in a 7.7-percentage point increase in the probability of contacting. By 2008,
that white advantage dropped to 5.2 percentage points. The age differences in contacting were
not statistically significant in either period. While in 2005 sex was not a statistically significant
predictor of contacting, in 2008, it was significant at the 0.05 significance level. The strength of
this change in the sex effect from 2005 to 2008 is further evidenced by the statistical significance
For the sake of brevity, all discussions of coefficients are interpreted as partial effects, with the remaining
independent variables in the model held constant unless otherwise stated.
22
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(at the 0.05 significance level) of the difference in column three. In terms of probability effects,
whereas in 2005 men were, on average, 3.1 percentage points more likely to contact than women,
by 2008, they were, on average, 8.1 percentage points less likely to contact than women. Among
the demographic variables, only race contributes conclusive evidence towards confirming
hypothesis H2c.
The services rating variable had the anticipated strong positive association with
contacting in 2005. The variable was statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level in
2005. In 2005, on average, for each one-point increase in need (that is, as satisfaction with
service quality deteriorated towards “very dissatisfied”), the likelihood of contacting increased
by 13.1 percentage points. The variable’s effect changed in unexpected ways in 2008—it lost
statistical significance as a predictor of contacting and had a small negative effect instead.
Furthermore, column three shows that this decline in the effect of the services rating variable on
contacting between the two periods was statistically significant at the 0.1 significance level.
These findings provide evidence against hypothesis H3a.
Other statistically significant variables in the models were the psychological engagement
variables. Interest in government and political efficacy were statistically significant factors (both
at the 0.05 significance level) in the likelihood of contacting in 2005 but only political efficacy
had a statistically significant effect in 2008 (at the 0.01 signifiance level). In 2005, those who
had an interest in government were 15.6 percentage points more likely to contact the city than
those who did not have an interest in government. By 2008, that probability difference had
increased to 24.7 percentage points. In 2005, survey respondents who felt politically efficacious
were 7.7 percentage points more likely to contact the city than respondents who did not feel
politically efficacious.
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Table 16
Factors Influencing Total Contact in Minneapolis in 2005 and 2008, Logistic Regression Results

VARIABLES

Model 1
2005

Middle income

0.014
(0.076)
High income
-0.14
(-0.58)
White
0.34*
(1.70)
Older adult
0.10
(0.57)
Senior
-0.34
(-1.61)
Male
0.13
(0.88)
Services rating
0.57**
(2.30)
Home owner
0.55***
(3.02)
Have minor children
0.22
(1.25)
Interest in government 0.72**
(2.02)
Political efficacy
0.33**
(2.05)
Constant
-3.06***
(-4.19)
No. of observations

Logit Coefficient
Difference
Model 2
2008
-0.24
(-1.21)
-0.41
(-1.58)
0.22
(1.10)
0.19
(0.97)
0.019
(0.087)
-0.35**
(-2.19)
-0.020
(-0.079)
0.44**
(2.20)
0.085
(0.45)
1.21***
(4.03)
0.0089
(0.052)
-1.61**
(-2.40)

-0.26
(-0.96)
-0.27
(-0.74)
-0.11
(-0.39)
0.093
(0.35)
0.36
(1.16)
-0.48**
(-2.19)
-0.59*
(-1.66)
-0.11
(-0.42)
-0.14
(-0.53)
0.49
(1.04)
-0.32
(-1.37)
1.44
(1.46)

984

2,030

1,046

Probability Change (%)
Model 1
Model 2
2005
2008
0.3

-5.6

-3.3

-9.3

7.7

5.2

2.4

4.5

-7.6

0.4

3.1

-8.1

13.1

-0.5

12.8

10.1

5.2

2.0

15.6

24.7

7.7

0.2

Note. Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A comparison between 311 contacting and non-311 contacting in 2008.
Table 17 shows separate logit models for 311 contacting and for non-311 contacting. 23
Overall, the pattern of SES and demographic effects in Table 17 do not speak to more equity in
311 contacting compared to non-311 contacting. Whereas the income differences in non-311
contacting were statistically insignificant, there was a statistically significant (at the 0.1
significance level) difference between the middle income and low income groups in their
likelihood of engaging in 311 contacting. The two income group differences in 311 contacting
were larger than those for non-311 contacting. Although the evidence does not support
hypothesis H2b’s assertion of equity in terms of decreasing SES effects, it is important to note
that the 311 contacting differences were in favor of the lowest income group.
Whites had no statistically significant advantage over minorities in their likelihood of
contacting either by 311 or by non-311 means. However, the probability difference between
whites and minorities in the likelihood of 311 contacting was 4.9 percentage points while it was
only 0.3 percentage point for the likelihood of non-311 contacting. Similarly, age group
differences were not statistically significant for either type of contacting but the effects were
larger in the case of 311 contacting. The race and age effects do not support hypothesis H2d.
The female advantage in 311 contacting was not statistically significant but was significant at the
0.05 significance level for non-311 contacting, thus providing some statistical support for
hypothesis H2d.
The perceived need variable (services rating) provides no evidence to support hypothesis
H3b. The services rating variable had the unexpected effect of lowering the probability of 311

See Appendix I for corresponding multinomial logit model. Since the multinomial logit results are nearly
identical to the logit results in Table 17, I do not discuss them here.
23
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contacting while increasing the likelihood of non-311 contacting. However, neither of these
effects was statistically significant.
Of the two stakeholding variables, the effects of home ownership were consistent with
hypothesis H4 while having minor children in the household does not provide as conclusive
evidence. There was a statistically significant difference (at the 0.1 significance level) between
home owners and renters in their likelihood of contacting 311. Home owners were 6.1
percentage points more likely than renters to contact 311. The home ownership probability
effect for non-311 contacting, though in the same direction, was only 4.0 percentage points and
statistically insignificant. Although living with minors increased the likelihood of contacting
311 by 2.5 percentage points but decreased the probability of non-311 contacting by 0.5
percentage point, the effects were not statistically significant.
Interest in government was a significant variable in both the 311 contacting and non-311
contacting models. Those who had an interest in government were 13.3 percentage points more
likely to contact the city via 311 than those who did not have an interest in government. This
result is statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level. For non-311 contacting, having an
interest in government increased the probability of contacting by 11.5 percentage points
compared to not having an interest in government. The effect is statistically significant at the
0.05 significance level.
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Table 17
Factors Influencing 311 and Non-311 Contacting in Minneapolis in 2008, Logistic Regression
Results
VARIABLES
Middle income
High income
White
Older adult
Senior
Male
Services rating
Home owner
Have minor children
Interest in government
Political efficacy
Constant

Model 1: 311 Contact
Logit
Probability
Coefficient Change (%)
-0.45*
(-1.90)
-0.43
(-1.22)
0.33
(1.23)
0.34
(1.39)
0.11
(0.39)
-0.13
(-0.67)
-0.087
(-0.25)
0.40*
(1.65)
0.16
(0.67)
1.15***
(2.80)
0.14
(0.68)
-2.78***
(-2.78)

No. of observations

984

-6.9
-6.7
4.9
5.3
1.6
-2.0
-1.4
6.1
2.5
13.3
2.2

Model 2: Non-311 Contact
Logit
Probability+
Coefficient Change (%)
0.073
(0.31)
-0.17
(-0.63)
0.016
(0.067)
-0.041
(-0.18)
-0.059
(-0.22)
-0.37**
(-1.97)
0.053
(0.19)
0.24
(1.01)
-0.032
(-0.15)
0.85**
(2.22)
-0.12
(-0.58)
-2.05***
(-2.72)

1.2
-2.8
0.3
-0.7
-1.0
-6.1
0.9
4.0
-0.5
11.5
-1.9

984

Note. Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Summary
The quantitative analysis for Minneapolis did not confirm most of the hypotheses. Table
18 summarizes the evidence evaluated in testing the hypotheses. First, it was surprising to note
that there was little difference in contacting rates pre- and post-311 implementation. However,
returning to the equity focus of this study, the two instances of significant changes – seniors and
females – offer some interesting results on this issue.
The expectation that 311 would be associated with reduced SES and demographic
differences in contacting was not borne out in the data except in the case of race. Among the
disconfirming evidence, there were some interesting observations. For instance, although the
results did not show equity in contacting in 2008 among income groups, it was interesting to find
that the lowest income group was more likely than either of the upper income groups to engage
in contacting. This higher likelihood of contacting for the lowest income group carried over to
311 contacting as well. These suggest, perhaps, that 311 had a profound effect in encouraging
participation by lower income earners. There is some evidence to suggest that 311 may have
likewise had an effect on racial minorities in that it raised their likelihood of participation
relative to their white counterparts. Sex differences were also interesting even though they did
not confirm the hypotheses. Post-311, sex differences in all types of contacting were in favor of
females.
After controlling for the effects of the other independent variables in the framework,
perceived need did not appear to be a contributor to contacting in Minneapolis post-311. The
results from the stakeholding analysis were inconclusive. The stakeholding hypotheses were
upheld with the home ownership measure but not with the minor children measure.
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Table 18
Summary Results on Hypotheses from Quantitative Phase (Minneapolis Case)
Hypotheses

Description

Status

Evidence

H1

Post-311 contacting rates will be
higher than pre-311 contacting
rates.

Weak evidence

-Table 13: total contact rate difference of 0.2 percentage
point was statistically insignificant
-Table 14: most pre-post contacting differences for groups
showed decrease but the only two statistically significant
changes were increased rates for seniors and females

H2a

The association between SES and
contacting will be weaker after
adopting 311.

Rejected

Table 16: evidence does not support hypothesis (although
both middle and high income earners had lower
probabilities of contacting in 2008)

H2b

The association between SES and
311 contacting will be weaker
than the association between SES
and non-311 contacting.

Rejected

Table 17: evidence does not support hypothesis (311
contacting most likely for low income group)

H2c

The association between
demographic characteristics and
contacting will be weaker after
adopting 311.
Race
Age
Sex

Confirmed
Rejected
Rejected

Table 16: strong evidence
Table 16: evidence does not support hypothesis
Table 16: evidence does not support hypothesis (instead,
strong reversal of male-female gap in 2008)
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Hypotheses
H2d

Description
The association between
demographic characteristics –
race, age and sex – and 311
contacting will be weaker than the
association between demographic
characteristics and non-311
contacting.
Race
Age
Sex

Status

Evidence

Rejected
Rejected
Confirmed

Table 17: evidence does not support hypothesis
Table 17: evidence does not support hypothesis
Table 17: strong evidence

H3a

Perceived need will have a strong
positive association with
contacting, especially after 311.

Rejected

Table 16: evidence does not support hypothesis

H3b

Perceived need will have a
stronger positive association with
311 contacting than with non-311
contacting.

Rejected

Table 17: evidence does not support hypothesis

H4

Having a stake in the community
will have a stronger association
with contacting via 311 than with
non-311 contacting.
Home owner
Have minor children

Confirmed
Weak evidence

Table 17: strong evidence
Table 17: some/weak evidence
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Interpretation: Discussion of the Quantitative and Qualitative Findings
Most of the results from the quantitative analysis for Minneapolis were unexpected and
did not confirm the hypotheses. The qualitative findings provided insights into the study context
and how Minneapolis’s implementation process unfolded. These findings may now offer the
opportunity to interpret the main (quantitative) findings from the study of the Minneapolis case.
By the accounts discussed here, the interviewees perceived 311 implementation in
Minneapolis to be successful. However, the quantitative analysis performed in this chapter does
not suggest that the success necessarily translated into this study’s anticipated outcomes as
measured through the quantitative data used in this study. Instead, the quantitative results
showed a surprising amount of consistency between the pre- and post-311 periods, with
variations in only a few instances. With respect to the low contacting rates in 2008, interviewee
303 offered some insights, noting that contacting rates fluctuate regularly and may be influenced
by the amount of advertising being undertaken at that point in time, thereby hinting that the 2008
period may, perhaps, have been a period of low promotion and hence low visibility for 311:
When 311 was first operational, advertising money was available. Since advertising is
generally not used, unless it is in the form of a public service announcement, an overall
downward contact trend has occurred, and did occur since the call center inception in
2006 (Minneapolis interviewee 303).
The constancy in the findings between 2005 and 2008 was also noted in the National
Research Center (NRC) report of the Minneapolis 2008 survey results (National Research Center,
2008c). Of relevance to this study is the Center’s contingency table analysis finding that
awareness of the city’s 311 number was at only 59 percent for the original sample of 1,258 adults,
(National Research Center, 2008c, p. 23). The report further noted that certain groups –
including some of the demographic groups defined similarly in this study – had a lower
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likelihood of reporting having knowledge of 311, including minorities, young adults and renters
(National Research Center, 2008c, p. 23). Minorities had one of the lowest awareness rates
among the socioeconomic and demographic groups analyzed in the report: 46 percent (National
Research Center, 2008c, p. 67). The low levels of awareness with 311 provide a plausible
explanation for the surprisingly low 311 contacting rates and the unexpected effects observed in
the analysis. The 311 messaging did not appear to have penetrated some of these groups as
expected, at least by 2008. Interviewee 303 offered one possible explanation - that these groups
were more likely to have had shorter residencies in the city and therefore been less likely to have
a reason to contact the city. Also, the challenges of educating the diverse population of
Minneapolis highlighted in the qualitative analysis may have been difficult to overcome.
The perceived successful implementation of 311 in Minneapolis may have been
translated into other outcomes not captured in this study – such as more responsive 911
operations, as documented elsewhere (see, for example, The City of Minneapolis and The Macro
Group, 2008). The NRC’s findings indicate that, perhaps, the city had more success in achieving
its goal of better customer service. Even though the quantity of contacts did not increase, it
appears that the quality of contacts improved in 2008. Contactors in 2008 reported higher levels
of satisfaction with all aspects of their interaction with the government personnel they last
engaged with, and the increase in rating was statistically significant for 5 of the 6 aspects rated
(National Research Center, 2008c, pp. 25-26). Also, 80 percent of those who contacted via 311
gave either a “good” or “very good” rating on the “ease of getting in touch with the employee”
compared to 75 percent of those who contacted via non-311 channels (National Research Center,
2008c, p. 27). Among contactors, 311 agents were rated among the most professional city staff,
receiving higher satisfaction scores than staff of the 911 center and staff of the police department,
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and rated only 3.0 percentage points behind the staff of the fire department (National Research
Center, 2008c, p. 2).
While this study of Minneapolis did not find evidence of increased contacting post-311
implementation, there is evidence to suggest that 311’s effects may have been on other outcomes.
Findings reported elsewhere show that 311 implementation may have influenced positive
outcomes such as increased satisfaction with the quality of residents’ contacts with the city. The
lack of an effect on contacting rates and the lack of awareness of Minneapolis 311 suggest that
either the initiative took longer to take root in the city or that the period chosen for this project to
study the post-implementation effects may have been too short. This study does not analyze
subsequent years to investigate whether the effects change over time. This is a limitation of the
study. In the period studied here, the city’s public education efforts may not have yielded the
outcomes expected in this study but the outcomes noted elsewhere suggest that other aspects of
the implementation process, such as the city’s management of the internal change dynamics, may
have borne fruit.
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CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS ON KANSAS CITY
The third findings chapter begins by presenting the qualitative findings from the
document review and six interviews with key informants on Kansas City’s 311 system. The
chapter proceeds to present some quantitative findings for Kansas City. It concludes with a
discussion that incorporates the qualitative findings into the quantitative findings.

Qualitative Findings
Kansas City has a track record of using technology to facilitate citizen access to city
government services that dates back to the early 1970s (Eichenthal, Fleming, & Keshav, 2009, p.
3). The city established what was known as the Action Center – a centralized point of access
that residents could call, long before the advent of modern centralized call center technologies
(Eichenthal et al., 2009). According to Kansas City interviewee 202, the center was intended to
be a “one-stop shop” and materialized from the city’s desire to facilitate residents’ access to the
city, as part of efforts to improve citizen engagement. The Action Center was housed in the city
manager’s office and used a paper system in which agents answered calls and typed callers’
requests for forwarding to the appropriate city departments for resolution. The receiving
departments would then type the requests into their systems. Over time, the Action Center
became increasingly inefficient and ineffective in its operations. Technologically, the Action
Center system was not integrated with the systems of the city departments. In fact, over time,
departments developed their own technologies, specific to their functions and they operated
independently of each other, resulting in inefficiencies (Kansas City interviewee 201).
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According to interviewee 201, the road towards a 311 system for Kansas City began in
the early 2000s when the city manager’s office undertook an initiative called Kansas City
Government Optimization (KC-GO). KC-GO aimed to improve city operations, by developing
private sector-inspired strategies, for some of its major departments (City of Kansas City, 2003,
p. 546; Kansas City interviewee 201). This ambitious program required high quality data to
facilitate the development of benchmarks for assessing progress and for decision making. The
city quickly realized that such data were not available for Kansas City.
The birth of Kansas City’s 311 system was due to the confluence of two main factors: (1)
the outdated Action Center and (2) the need for quality data for performance management
(Kansas City interviewee 201). According to Eichenthal et al. (2009), by virtue of its role in city
operations, the city manager’s office took the lead in transforming the Action Center and pooling
together other city customer service functions into what became Kansas City’s 311 system. In
the words of Kansas City interviewee 204, “the city manager’s office is where that conversation
really started.” Although the principal impetus for the innovation came from the city manager’s
office, the interviewees noted that initiative received widespread support from the mayor and the
city council: “Certainly, the mayor was so very supportive of this work. We brought the press in
when we launched it to have her make the first 311 call” (Kansas City interviewee 202). As
interviewee 203 noted, “The mayor, city manager and a handful of city council members were all
very supportive of this effort. The primary individual was the city manager because he was
responsible for managing all of our citizen interaction and operations of the city.” According to
interviewee 203, “the city manager was a good intermediary, mediator with the council
members.”
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A 2009 ICMA report (Eichenthal et al., 2009) documents the chronology of events and
the features of the system around the time of launch. The report notes that in October 2006 the
city launched its 311 number and in January 2007, it started using the Oracle PeopleSoft
customer relationship management system as well (Eichenthal et al., 2009, p. 3). The city
implemented 311 with 36 customer service agents and, in addition to the telephone line, residents
had a choice of several other channels for contacting the service: fax, email and the Web
(Eichenthal et al., 2009, p. 2). The center operated on a weekday schedule of 7 am to 8 pm and
weekend schedule of 8 am to 5 pm (Eichenthal et al., 2009, p. 3).

Goals of Kansas City’s 311 System
The central goal for Kansas City’s 311 system was to improve the city’s service delivery.
There were two components to this goal: (1) obtain data for performance management and (2)
simplify the contacting process for residents to improve the quality of customer service:
So after about a year of studying and looking at other cities, we determined we would go
with the 311. So, I mean, it still enabled our residents to have the one phone number but
at the same time a big generator of why we chose to do 311 was because we really
wanted data. We really valued having that data (Kansas City interviewee 201).
The goal was to be more responsive to citizens and to make it easier for them to tell us
about issues and problems that they were having and then for us to be able to use that
data to deal with those issues and hoped that it would improve citizen satisfaction with
services (Kansas City interviewee 206).
Additionally,

The city saw difficulty in the number of phone numbers that citizens were able to call to
get work done. It required us to look at combining a central place for contact while the
work continued to be done in the various departments of the city. So, we saw just a lot of
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conflict: somebody would have to call two or three or four different numbers to get
something done and we wanted to alleviate that problem (Kansas City interviewee 203).

Kansas City took a long-term view of the customer service relationship, to use that and
the data obtained through the 311 system to set the stage for deep and meaningful engagement
with its residents:
A big emphasis was for customer service. Not just so much how a call-taker answered
and talked on the phone. But kind of resonate engagement aimed at customer service so
that we would be able to communicate with our residents not only on that one issue that
they may have reported, but city-wide that we could communicate with our residents to
say, ‘here’s what’s going on in your neighborhood; here are some issues that you have in
your neighborhood.’ Because we would have our data to help target that (Kansas City
interviewee 201).

Furthermore, the city hoped that 311 would help relieve the 911 system of some of its nonemergency calls (City of Virginia Beach Department of Management Services, 2011, p. 25).

Steps in the Implementation Process
After the decision was made to move to the 311 model for handling resident contacts, the
city’s implementers examined other cities’ 311 implementation in an effort to learn from their
experiences with 311 systems – an example of “social learning” (Boehmke & Witmer, 2004).
The 311 center was organized as a division in the city manager’s department. This
organizational structure appeared to be most beneficial for the effectiveness of the 311 system:
There are times that the lead 311 person needs to use a hammer to get things done. And
being that the division is in the city manager’s department, I would suggest to you that it
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works most effectively being located where it is. I mean, the mayor’s office would not
have the time or the resources to do the follow-up that the manager’s department has to
do sometimes with regard to the status of certain cases... I, quite frankly, don’t believe
that under our model, it will work as well anywhere else in city government (Kansas City
interviewee 202).

The importance of operating with the authority of the city manager’s office backing 311 to
support its work in coaxing departments to improve operations is echoed by other interviewees:
It [the 311/CRM system] has shined a light on areas where we have conflicts,
inefficiencies... So it’s highlighted organizational deficiencies that it’s been important to
have the city manager’s office behind trying to resolve those conflicts and issues as they
come up because, again, he has that authority. And then the other piece of it is the longer
term view that the data coming out of our customer relationship management offers an
opportunity to streamline and improve city services even when there’s not that sort of
conflict. So, having the city manager and the city manager’s office behind efforts to
focus on that data and utilize performance management strategies to improve city
services has been really important (Kansas City interviewee 205).
I think probably that was the best way to do it [house 311 in the city manager’s
department] given the structure of the city government there with the city manager. The
city manager is very powerful in that government. You couldn’t have it housed in a
particular department and have it hold the other departments accountable. You could
probably house it in a budget office or something like that but that wouldn’t make much
sense. So, I think that, ultimately, it was probably where it needed to be in the city
manager’s office (Kansas City interviewee 206).

The organizational structure of 311 appeared to have been advantageous in another
respect. Being so close to the city manager seems to have made not only political capital
available to the program but also material resources as well:
Over time, it’s become clear that, especially as it becomes more established, 311 is really
an essential service. And so, over time, has required additional resources within a very
short timeframe. And so being able to prioritize those – since the city manager is sort of
the ultimate authority over the budget – I mean it has to go through the mayor and
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council but, you know, administratively, he has the ability to modify things in the budget.
So, from a resource standpoint, that’s been important (Kansas City interviewee 205).

Marketing the Kansas City 311 System
Kansas City undertook a big marketing campaign to introduce 311 to its residents. The
city’s marketing strategy was largely a community-based approach. This approach was driven
by the city’s goal of encouraging involvement that would ultimately develop into meaningful
engagement with its residents. The city staff mostly socialized the public in their own
neighborhoods, a “grassroots…boots-on-the-ground sort of approach” (Kansas City interviewee
201).
The city has a neighborhood and housing department that keeps abreast of neighborhood
leadership developments, which facilitated the grassroots marketing strategy. The marketing
campaign was able to tap into this well-established system of community leaders to be able to
address community meetings to inform them of how 311 could serve their communities. Among
the programs that the city had for engaging with neighborhood leaders was what was known as a
“lunch and learn,” in which they brought community leaders together to discuss ways that they
could best partner with the city by using the 311 system to tackle issues in their communities.
This on-the-ground approach to engagement allowed the city to meet the specific needs of their
constituents, including, in some cases, privacy concerns:
In some cases, some neighborhoods wanted to be able to track cases centrally that they
had entered but didn’t necessarily want a person’s name associated with them because, in
some cases, there’s privacy concerns. They don’t want somebody to be able to see that
they entered a case. So, we would create a customer record for the neighborhood
association so that we could both enter the cases with the neighborhood association as the
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customer and then also we could easily run reports for them to tell them all the cases that
they had open and the status (Kansas City interviewee 205).
We’ve always tried to communicate with residents on their preferred method. So we put
together this paper form and we encouraged neighborhoods to hand those forms out so
that members of a neighborhood could have like on their block watch programs and those
sort of things, not just report crime but they could report any type of issue that they saw.
They could write them on those forms, they could bring the forms back to their
neighborhood organization, then the neighborhood organization could submit the forms
all at one time or however they prefer to do it. So, it gave the neighborhood sort of an
overall glimpse of everything that was coming in from different residents. And it also
allowed us then to communicate back directly to the neighborhood. People don’t want to
give their name when they report. They want to report anonymously for fear of
retaliation or something. So, they could still get communication but we would deal with
it through the neighborhood. So, that way, it really kind of helped strengthen the
neighborhood approach to addressing the issues (Kansas City interviewee 201).
Another component of the city’s outreach efforts was partnering with other non-profits such as
the United Way, which uses 211, to be a resource for spreading the word to their clients about
311 services.
Interviewees indicated that the city made some use of media in its marketing campaign.
There were television ads in which elected officials promoted 311. Some city staff spoke on the
radio about the 311 system. Additionally, the city made some use of the local newspaper to get
publicity, as the paper was conveniently located in the city’s building. The city also published
informational brochures and produced instructional videos detailing the contact and request
process and posted those on the city’s channel. These videos were essential for dispelling some
misconceptions among the public about how the 311 system operated:
There was a little bit of the concept of the 311 – because it was still called the Action
Center (and we’ve since dropped that for this very reason) – that the staff in the 311
Action Center would be the people performing the actual action. Like, if I called in to
report the missed trash, the person I spoke to was going to get off the phone, get in their
truck and come pick up my trash. A lot of our marketing was to get them to understand
the process: you’re just calling a call center (Kansas City interviewee 201).
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Other conventional visual means for publicizing the 311 system included advertising on buses,
billboards, posters and bumper stickers.
The city was cognizant of the fact that other cities had fallen into difficulties over
residents’ confusion as to when to use 911 and when to use 311. In an effort to avoid such issues
in Kansas City, the city made sure to emphasize the difference between the two systems during
its public education campaign. Internally, the city conducted staff training on using the new 311
system (Kansas City interviewee 204).

Challenges in the Implementation Process
Despite the city’s planning, institutional support and marketing efforts, Kansas City faced
several challenges in implementing the 311 system. There were two main sources of the
implementation challenges. The first source, ironically, was the legacy of the Action Center.
The second source of challenges was the internal culture change associated with introducing the
new system into the city government.
Whereas one would have expected the existence of the Action Center to ease the
transition process to a 311/CRM system, according to one interviewee, its purported history of
inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the public’s consciousness may have tainted the public’s
perception of the 311 system. The public’s apparent negative perception of the new system,
without giving it the benefit of the doubt, may have been problematic because it appeared to be
preventing them from using the system initially. Part of the problem seemed to stem from the
city naming the new 311 system, “the 311 Action Center.” The city therefore faced the challenge
of changing public perception about the new system:
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What we had to face was – and part of it was because we had kept the Action Center
name – ‘I had called them before and they did not do anything.’ We had to go up against
that a little bit. There was not a new set of expectations from our residents that had used
it before because, even though it was a different number that they called, in their mind, it
was still the same old Action Center. So, we battled that. That was really about for two
years. Our usage was… I mean, some of the numbers rolled over automatically but what
we found in our surveys on the number of residents that were using us, it was not very
high. We tried to eliminate the term ‘the 311 Action Center’ as part of our ploy to get
people to think of it a little bit differently and we just went with ‘the 311 Call Center’
(Kansas City interviewee 201).
Another impact that the Action Center legacy had on the 311 implementation process was that, in
some cases, the staff who were brought over from the Action Center to the 311 center resisted
the changes in processes that the new model brought. In the words of interviewee 205, “There
were people who pushed back: ‘That’s not how the Action Center did it.’”
The Action Center staff were not the only agents within city government who resisted
some of the changes in processes that the 311 system introduced:
City departments wanted to maintain control over their own service requests or
communications with residents and their own data. There is sometimes a little bit of a
challenge in that there’s sort of a ‘keep your nose out of our business’ (Kansas City
interviewee 201).
That [working with different departments] was probably our biggest challenge. Our
government operated with different – and still operates with different departments but,
what was different is there was a lot of autonomy at the director level. The director ran
the department and each director felt like they ran their own entity. So, when it came
time to receive calls and be accountable to a call center, receive requests from a call
center and being accountable for that, they did not want to do that. So they looked for
work-around. So, we had a culture change that was very important that we had to go
through (Kansas City interviewee 203).
One possible reason for some departments’ initially less-than-enthusiastic response to 311 was a
concern that it was increasing their workload and exposing their resource constraints, which they
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felt affected their efficiency in addressing the service requests they received. This reaction may
also have been influenced by the economic and fiscal challenges at the time:
There was pushback and tension. A case number would be assigned and then when the
case was not dealt with within a certain time, you would go back to the department and
say, ‘What’s up with this?’ And the departments, […] they felt that we were holding
them accountable in new and different ways but we weren’t giving them adequate
resources. […] Legitimately or not, departments felt that this was certainly not helpful
and they did push back […] and the department folk said, ‘Yeah, that’s right. We know
[of these service problems]. We ran out of money for this year’s allocation [to address
these needs] three months ago. What would you like us to do?’ There was tremendous
tension and pushback from departments. On the one hand it is the normal sort of
challenges and struggles of bureaucracy in any government. On the other hand, they had
a very legitimate point. It’s just very, very difficult – particularly in the middle of a
recession – to get the resources you need in a city with a significant population of poor
people, much more so than in suburban cities. So, yes, there was tension, some of it was
bureaucratic in-fighting, some of it was a little bit legitimate (Kansas City interviewee
206).

The interviewees’ perception is that the resistance to using the new 311 system may have
affected the efficiency of the customer service operations:
I would say it [the challenge] was framed mostly around utilizing the software system
because, for many departments, it represented a brand new tool and many of them felt
like it added to their workload. I think in some cases, this was probably represented to
departments as external to their operations. Three-one-one is going to take the calls so
maybe that even releases you from some obligation because you don’t have to take the
phone calls (Kansas City interviewee 205).
What occurred in the beginning is they [some of the departments] would take care of the
problem but they would not notify when it was complete. So we started meeting with the
department directors to say how effective their response rates were. But they felt they
weren’t accountable for that because they were resolving the problem and we didn’t, at
the call center, have the close-out in a timely manner. So that was one of the biggest
things to address internally (Kansas City interviewee 203).
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The implementers attempted to manage the challenge of less cooperative departments by
elevating cooperative departments - that saw benefits from using 311 in the form of better
customer satisfaction scores on their citizen surveys and efficiency gains - to the role of “poster
departments” (Kansas City interviewee 201). Additionally, the efforts to stem the lack of
cooperation received administrative support from the city manager.
One interviewee felt that one department was a bit challenging to work with: the
Information Technology department. The issue in this case was that the department was seen as
taking a lead role in the implementation process that may have overreached its capacity:
The IT department felt that it had a responsibility to be the project lead, the project driver
as opposed to provide the necessary IT support. And in my humble opinion, the IT
department at that time was not qualified to do that because it had no idea how city
departments went about their work, how they went about resolution. They should have
recognized the fact that they were merely customers in the process (Kansas City
interviewee 202).

In addition to the reluctance of some department heads to use the new system, there was a
phase during which staff seemed to struggle to use the unfamiliar system. Despite staff training
prior to launch, the 311/CRM system software tested staff skills, and apparently, their writing
skills in particular. Providing details about cases in the CRM system was critical for
accountability and to the effectiveness of the customer service operations:
As you might imagine with a workforce that had a wide range of communication skill
sets, you had some people who could type very clean, nice messages and some people
would do some kind of broken sentence structure remarks in there. Because the public
could access those and see what the status of their case was and if they found something
that looked like it was kind of cryptically written, that wasn’t always flattering for the
city because you might have somebody who’s entering that information in who wasn’t
hired as a writer. They were hired as some type of a technician or some type of a laborer
(Kansas City interviewee 204).
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To tackle this challenge, the city developed standardized responses for cases (as far as was
possible) that employees could easily access from a menu. Interviewee 204 described another
challenge that became apparent during the adjustment phase: employees who were not yet
comfortable with using the system fell behind on their cases, which they would then pass along
to other departments that they felt may have responsibility over the matter. However, the design
of the CRM captured such instances of inappropriate offloading of cases, among other
inappropriate uses of the system.
The implementation challenge originating externally from the public dealt mainly with
the public’s failure to use the new three-digit number. Some residents continued to call the old
numbers for service, and departments were obliged to take and respond to these requests. With
the old systems continuing to run in parallel to the new 311 system, the efficiency of the entire
city customer service apparatus would have been reduced. The departments had to be strategic
in how they handled the direct calls from the public. Even though they did not turn away any
requests, they used the interaction with callers as an opportunity to gently educate them about the
311 system.
Another way that the public’s bypassing of the 311 system posed challenges during the
initial period was that they continued to turn to their council member’s office for their service
needs. In this case, instead of the council members’ offices referring their constituents to 311,
their well-meaning council aides often took it upon themselves to use their departmental contacts
to try to seek solutions for the constituents. This created several problems for 311:
The primary one being that that meant 311 didn’t have any awareness of the issue and so
if someone else was to call in on the same thing, we’re able to see there’s an existing case
for this and we don’t open a duplicate. But if someone else was to call, there’d be
nothing in the system, we would create a case and then the department would be doubly
notified of it. The other issue being that it kind of pushed back against the idea of having
standard process and timeframes (Kansas City interviewee 205).
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There was also concern that a few of the city council members were reluctant to embrace the
new 311 system out of a fear that it might weaken their position of authority in the eyes of their
constituents:
I think that they liked being able to be the broker, so to speak, of which street tree got cut
down, which dangerous building… They used the data when they needed to, to make
political points but I don’t think that they… I don’t think they liked it much. […]
Dealing with constituent complaints was a source of power and influence for them. They
whined and complained about dealing with constituent complaints but I think they
actually liked it (Kansas City interviewee 206).

According to the interviewees, this particular problem persisted for about the first two years of
the 311 program but has since been resolved through training of council aides about the value of
311 as a resource that benefits everyone, including themselves (Kansas City interviewee 205).
One of the technical hitches that the city had to deal with during implementation was
securing access to the 311 service for cellular phone users. The city had to negotiate agreements
with cell service providers. The challenge for the city was that the city’s cell service providers
wanted to secure financial benefits for their compliance in permitting cell access to 311:
We had to have agreements with all of our cell phone companies that if somebody dialed
311, it would re-route to our number. The cell phone companies wanted various financial
considerations and they wanted the business side instead of just agreeing to work with the
city in the public side. So, we had a number of organizations, companies that we had to
work with to get them on board. And that took probably from the time we implemented,
we did not have all the cell phone companies involved that would participate with us. So
it probably took another year before we got them all on board (Kansas City interviewee
203).

According to Eichenthal et al. (2009, p. 4), Kansas City 311 achieved comprehensive
(though not complete) coverage of city non-emergency services, as 311 was not responsible for
non-emergency requests that were related to police services. This was due to an artifact of the
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structure of city government. The Kansas City police department was the responsibility of a
separate board and not the city manager’s office (Eichenthal et al., 2009, p. 4; Kansas City
interviewee 201).

Summary
Kansas City’s implementation of 311 shows that, despite a city’s best intentions and best
efforts to implement the innovation, unforeseen challenges are still likely that can potentially
affect the effectiveness of the 311 system. Kansas City’s case also shows that with
administrative and staff commitment to the process, strategies can be devised to address these
implementation challenges. One interviewee opined that Kansas City government’s employees
were motivated to make the necessary improvements to their 311 system because of how
important it was to painting a positive image of the city:
I think that there’s an awareness that since 311 is very public facing and, in fact, is a
customer resource, that it reflects really poorly if it’s regarded as a broken system; if it’s
regarded as something where you can call but nothing gets done. There was a
recognition by departments and staff as well as the city manager that that was an issue
that needed to be addressed (Kansas City interviewee 205).
The 311 implementers and managers seemed to place a premium on ensuring access via
multiple channels of contact. Despite having technologically advanced methods such as Web
access to 311, the city felt it was important to keep low-tech options such as paper-based forms
and fax available, particularly for the sake of some segments of the population:
What we did was, part of it was meeting with the different neighborhood leaders and we
put together an actual – and that’s actually out on the 311 Web page too now – but we put
together a form (yes, it was paper) because we found that some, especially our older
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neighborhoods, where we had some of the more egregious issues, most of those residents
were older and still prefer pencil and paper as opposed to some sort of technology. […]
Over time, a number of the neighborhoods, they come back to us all different ways.
Some will fax them in, some will put them in a big packet and mail them. In other
neighborhoods that are a little more up on technology, when they are turned back in, the
neighborhood activists or leaders will go in and enter them in our online system. We’ve
really tried [to be comprehensive in our contact channels]. I mean we battle that now,
especially, because, you know, so many times someone will be like, ‘Oh, why do you still
have people fax? That’s outdated.’ It’s like, no; actually, we receive more service
requests that come in on our fax machine than we do on Twitter. We got to meet
everybody where they are (Kansas City interviewee 201).
To sort of streamline that [problem reporting to 311] for neighborhoods, we developed a
system where they could, in one fell swoop, notate all of the issues that they found in
their neighborhood or in a given block and then fax those in. Fax because that was just…
you know, some of our neighborhoods are still not (incredibly) using digital channels and
so they would fax it in and then we would enter all the cases for them (Kansas City
interviewee 205).
Even ten years on, 311 continues to be an evolving organism and with each cycle of
evolution, new challenges emerge. One aspect of this constant evolution is the evolving
technologies involved in 311, influenced by broader technological advancements in society.
This places 311 jurisdictions under constant pressure to keep up, to ensure that the customer
service experience of their residents lives up to the expectations set by their customer service
experiences in the private sector. Fair or not, these expectations are likely to have a bearing on
residents’ ratings of their customer service experiences with government:
I do think the role of technology in just managing requests has really changed in a couple of
ways. One is that there’s been a big evolution in customer relationship management systems.
I think when we procured ours, there were barely any and there were none that were
specifically engineered for government and now I think there’s a really broad range that are
engineered for government. And then the aspect of the different options: Web applications
and being able to enter service requests via Twitter and text. We’ve been able to evolve but
it’s very hard for us to keep up with the technology evolution outside and so even our Web
application, which we launched a couple of years ago, if we were a private company, we
would be refreshing that all the time but we don’t have internal resources that are focused on
that. And so, I do think that that’s a challenge because customers are starting to have
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expectations of the public sector agencies that mimic the customer service experiences
they’re having in the private sector but the technology resources are not the same (Kansas
City interviewee 205).

Quantitative Findings
Due to limitations in Kansas City’s Citizen Survey questions compared to the other two
cases in this study, it was not possible to conduct all the analyses conducted for Denver and
Minneapolis for Kansas City. In particular, because there was no overall or general contacting
question in either the pre- or post-311 periods specified for this study, there was no measure of
total contacting to analyze. This data limitation also meant that it was not possible to conduct
any pre-311 implementation analysis even though the city conducted a 2005 survey. Therefore,
the analysis here is limited to examining differences in the post-311 period and particularly in
311 contacting versus no contacting. This is a limitation to the three-case study strategy.

Descriptive Statistics for Kansas City
Sample characteristics.
Table 19 shows that in 2008, the contacting rate for 311 was 32.9 percent. The final
sample of 4,031 adults consisted of a majority (58.8 percent) with annual income below $60,000.
Whites were the majority racial group, making up 64.9 percent of the sample. There were
slightly more females than males in the sample–52.3 percent. The satisfaction rating for service
quality for Kansas City was on a re-coded five-point scale from 1 for “very satisfied” to 5 for
“very dissatisfied.” The mean services rating in 2008 on the re-coded scale was 2.8. A majority
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of the survey respondents (82.5 percent) were home owners. A little less than one-third of the
sample lived in homes with individuals who were 19 years or younger. 24 The data set captures a
third measure of stakeholding – residency tenure – which measures the number of years the
survey respondent had lived in Kansas City. The mean residency tenure was 33.3 years.

Table 19
Kansas City Survey Respondent Characteristics (%)
Variables

2008

311 Contact
Income
Low income: <$60,000
Middle income: $60,000 - $99,999
High income: $100,000 or more
Race
White
Minority
Sex
Male
Female
Services rating (mean)
Home owner
Have minor children
Residency tenure (mean in years)

32.9

No. of observations

58.8
23.5
17.7
64.9
35.1
47.7
52.3
2.8
82.5
29.9
33.3
4,031

The age categories did not permit having a cutoff at 17 years. Therefore, the “have minor children” measure in
the Kansas City model serves only as a rough proxy for the variable. This is a data limitation in the Kansas City
analysis as it makes the discussion here less comparable to the other two case studies.
24
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311 contacting rates within groups.
Table 20 is a summary of cross-tabulations of 311 contact with the key independent
variables of interest in this study. The table shows rates of 311 contacting for various groups
defined by the independent variables. For income groups, the middle income earners had the
highest rate of contacting – 36.5 percent. The other two income groups did not have markedly
different rates of 311 contacting; each contacted at a rate above 30 percent as well.
Whites and minorities contacted 311 at similar rates. While 32.7 percent of whites
contacted 311 in 2008, 33.2 percent of minorities made contact with 311. Females contacted 311
at a rate that was 3.2 percentage points higher than males’ rate of 311 contacting. Home owners
contacted 311 at more than one and a half times the rate that renters contacted 311: 35.3 percent
for home owners compared to 21.8 percent for renters. Households with minors and those
without contacted 311 at nearly identical rates: 32.8 percent for those with minors and 32.9
percent for those without minors.
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Table 20
311 Contacting Rates within Groups in Kansas City (%)
Key Independent Variables
Income
Low income: <$60,000
Middle income: $60,000 - $99,999
High income: $100,000 or more
Race
White
Minority
Sex
Male
Female
Home ownership
Home owner
Renter
Have minor children
Yes
No
No. of observations

311 Contact
32.1
36.5
30.8
32.7
33.2
31.2
34.4
35.3
21.8
32.8
32.9
4,031

Logistic Regression Analysis: 311 Contacting in 2008
The first column of Table 21 shows the logit coefficients for the model of 311 contacting.
The results show that several of the independent variables of interest had statistically significant
effects on the likelihood of contacting 311 in 2008. There was a statistically significant
difference (at the 0.05 significance level) between the lowest income group and the highest
income group in their likelihood of contacting 311. On average, being in the high income group
rather than the low income group lowered the probability of contacting 311 by 4.6 percentage
139

points. There was no statistically significant difference between the middle income group and
the low income group in their likelihood of contacting 311.
Among racial groups, there was no statistically significant difference in 311 contacting.
Neither was there a substantive difference in the probability of contacting for the two groups.
There was a statistically significant difference between the sexes at the 0.05 significance level in
their 311 contacting behavior. The APE shows that men were 3.1 percentage points less likely
than women to contact 311.
Perceived need (services rating) had a strong positive impact on whether a respondent
contacted 311. The effect was statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level. For each
one-point deterioration in satisfaction with the quality of services (increasing perceived need),
the probability that survey respondents contacted 311 increased by 8.0 percentage points.
Two of the stakeholding variables - home ownership and residency tenure - in the model
had effects on 311 contacting that were statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level. On
average, being a home owner as opposed to being a renter increased the likelihood of contacting
311 by 13.3 percentage points. This was the strongest APE in the model. Each additional year
of living in the city (that is, a 1-year increase in residency tenure) increased the probability of
contacting 311 by one-tenth of a percentage point. Those who lived with minors did not have a
statistically significant advantage in 311 contacting over those who lived without minors.
Of the three psychological engagement variables in the Kansas City 311 contacting
model, only interest in government was statistically significant. The variable is significant at the
0.01 signifiance level. Survey respondents who expressed interest in government were 11.8
percentage points more likely to contact the city using the 311 system than respondents who did
not have an interest in government.
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Table 21
Factors Influencing 311 Contacting in Kansas City in 2008, Logistic Regression Results
VARIABLES

Logit Coefficient

Probability
Change (%)

Middle income

0.082
(0.95)
-0.22**
(-2.20)
0.0065
(0.085)
-0.15**
(-2.11)
0.38***
(5.38)
0.68***
(6.54)
0.040
(0.51)
0.0048***
(2.76)
0.54***
(7.69)
0.036
(0.34)
0.052
(0.57)
-2.70***
(-10.4)

1.8

High income
White
Male
Services rating
Home owner
Have minor children
Residency tenure
Interest in government
Political efficacy
Awareness
Constant
No. of observations

-4.6
0.1
-3.1
8.0
13.3
0.8
0.1
11.8
0.8
1.1

4,031

Note. Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Summary
Although limited in scope due to data constraints, the quantitative analysis for the Kansas
City case offered some interesting insights into patterns of 311 contacting in 2008. None of the
research hypotheses could be directly tested here. Instead I will offer some comments on the key
findings in the quantitative analysis.
There was evidence of some equity in the 311 contacting pattern in 2008. Of note is the
almost identical likelihood of contacting for whites and minorities after controlling for the other
characteristics in the model. When there were inequities in the likelihood of contacting, they
favored groups that are traditionally thought of as less activist, that is, lower income earners and
females. Arguably, from an equity perspective, this may be an acceptable “second best” result.
The effects of perceived need and two of the stakeholding variables were consistent with
expectations from the literature. The inability to detect an effect for the minor children variable
in this model may be due to a measurement problem. The measure used here potentially
includes households with no minors but that have adults aged 18 and/or 19 years. However, the
minor children measure of stakeholding is generally found to be a less potent influence on
contacting than the home ownership measure (see, for example, Thomas & Melkers, 1999).

Interpretation: Discussion of the Quantitative and Qualitative Findings
Without the pre-311 analysis or a measure of non-311 contacting in the post-311 period,
it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions about the possible impact of 311 implementation
on the outcomes of interest. The discussion here will offer some tentative conclusions about how
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311 implementation in Kansas City may have influenced the 311 contacting patterns seen in the
quantitative analysis.
On the surface, Kansas City’s 311 contacting rate in 2008 appears modest. Considering
the initial challenges 311 faced with having to overcome the stigma of being associated with the
ineffective and antiquated Action Center, an almost one-third contacting rate for the city within
two years of implementation was a substantial achievement. The fact that the city’s messaging
seemed to have resonated even more with socioeconomic and demographic groups that,
generally, are known to be less activist is also a notable outcome.
The strong effects of the perceived need and two stakeholding variables were striking.
Kansas City’s “boots-on-the-ground” approach to promoting 311 among the public during and
around the implementation period may have played a role in fostering an attitude of contacting
among residents who had a strong stake in the community. The city’s partnership with
neighborhood organizations and leaders to bring 311 to them, in their communities, and to share
the results of their contacting efforts with them in reports, may have increased community
stakeholders’ interest in using this channel for contacting. It likely created a mental association
of 311 with their lives in their immediate community that made it a reasonable success as an
accessible means of contacting the city. Also, the strong positive effect of the interest in
government variable on 311 contacting may have been because having an interest in government
may have made awareness of the 311 service more likely in the first place.
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CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION
In this chapter I offer a synthesis of the research findings from the preceding three cases.
I provide a brief summary of the key results from each of the three cases and offer a comparative
analysis of the three cases. The discussion will also inform an assessment of proposition P1 –
that 311-related outcomes (contacting rates and patterns) will reflect the effectiveness of the
implementation of the 311 innovation.

Summary of Qualitative Findings from the Three Cases
The qualitative analyses in the three cases revealed some common themes from the
implementation experiences of the three cities. Table 22 summarizes the key findings on the
components or structure of the implementation processes. The table shows that, apart from the
many similarities in the processes, there were some differences that were influenced by
environmental factors, such as the city’s organizational structure/form of government and
demographic characteristics, which may have made a difference in the outcomes of their
implementation.
Once the cities had decided to innovate by adopting the 311 model, the initiative received
political support from the political authority who had most responsibility for city operations in
their unique context. The structure of the government also resulted in differences in the
organization of the 311 centers, with the centers being housed so as to report to the mayor in
Denver, to the city coordinator in Minneapolis and to the city manager in the case of Kansas City.
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The cities shared the same goals for their 311 systems, including a strong emphasis on
enhancing the resident’s experience with government by easing access to services and improving
the quality of customer service. By implementing comprehensive 311/CRM systems, the cities
also hoped to improve government operations from the “back-end” by capitalizing on the vast
and rich new sources of data that they could capture through the new system. Finally,
consideration for 911 efficiency was yet still another important factor in the implementation.
The qualitative findings gave insights into the extensive planning that went into the
implementation of 311 in the three cities. Among them were the cities’ efforts to learn from best
practices in other cities that had previously implemented a 311 system. Baltimore, as the leading
311 system in the country, received a great deal of interest from the cities.
The governments invested heavily in introducing the innovation to their respective cities,
both internally, within city government, and externally with their residents. They used similar
marketing strategies to reach their constituents, although the mix of strategies appeared to vary a
bit. Interviewees from Kansas City and Denver emphasized their grass-roots/neighborhood
approach more so than the interviewees from Minneapolis.
The common implementation challenges came from the internal messaging within the
governments. The 311 innovation was not just a discrete or standalone policy change within the
government. It ushered in technological changes, changes in inter-departmental relations and
required an organizational culture change in departments and offices to ensure an effective
implementation. These challenges proved difficult to manage but the cities each found strategies
for encouraging internal cooperation, efforts that benefitted from the political support of the
innovation’s champions. In addition to this common challenge, interviewees from Minneapolis
and Kansas City noted additional challenges pertaining to their unique circumstances. In
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Minneapolis, the city’s education efforts struggled to break through to its diverse population,
while in Kansas City, the Action Center’s unflattering legacy appeared to have left a negative
impression with residents that the 311 implementers had to work to overcome.

146

Table 22
Comparison of Qualitative Findings across the Three Case Studies
Theme

Denver

Minneapolis

Kansas City

Main source of political support
after decision to adopt

Mayor’s office

Mayor’s office

City manager’s office

Organization of 311

Initially under General
Services. Later under
Technology Services Agency,
reporting to the mayor’s
office.

Under city coordinator’s
authority

Under city manager’s
authority

7 days a week, 6 am – 11 pm

Monday – Friday, 7 am – 11
pm

Monday – Friday, 7 am – 8
pm;
Saturday – Sunday, 8 am – 5
pm.

Goals
Ease of access to government
services
Better customer service
Improve efficiency of
government service
delivery/performance
monitoring/measurement
Alleviate pressure on 911
Learning from other 311 cities
before implementation
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Theme
Marketing and education efforts
Advertising
Community outreach
Main implementation challenges

Denver

Minneapolis

Kansas City










 Managing internal culture
change dynamics within city
government
Educating city’s diverse
population
CRM provider change due to
technical difficulties

 Managing internal culture
change dynamics within city
government
Overcoming Action Center’s
legacy of ineffectiveness

Managing internal culture
change dynamics within city
government
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Table 23 presents an assessment of how the three cities managed the implementation
process and the organizational change associated with it, based on the criteria developed from
Fernandez and Rainey (2006). The differences in the implementation strategies across the three
study sites translated into the cities meeting the eight criteria in a variety of ways. While all
three cities appeared to have met criteria C1-C6 (in their own way), the analysis did not find
evidence that they satisfied criteria C7 and C8.
For criteria C1 and C2, the assessment shows that the leaders of the initiative and
implementers made efforts to communicate the need for and potential value of 311 to partners
(departments and other stakeholders), which also contributed towards meeting criteria C3. When
challenges arose in obtaining cooperation from partners during implementation, the presence of
committed leadership and champions in each city (criteria C4) helped smooth over those
obstacles. The main external stakeholders that the cities prioritized were the residents. While
the cities engaged in a diversity of approaches to reach residents, the discussion from the
interviewees seemed to suggest that this was least challenging or most successful for Denver and
Kansas City, and most challenging for Minneapolis, given the composition of latter’s population
(C5). While all three cities implemented in the mid-2000s – a period of fiscal challenges and
pressures – they appeared to have made efforts to provide the necessary funding support to the
311 initiative. In addition to financial support, the cities all ensured that they placed the 311
system, organizationally, in a position within city government that would have granted the
system access to other resources that it might require; whether it be technical support or
political/administrative authority (C6).
Criteria C7 and C8 are more long-term considerations. Still, within the two-year
assessment window of this study, there is some evidence that these criteria were more difficult to
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manage and may have required a longer time period to address. Despite the cities’ intentions to
implement 311 as comprehensively as possible, all three cases were left with segments of the
local government that, for one reason or another, were not subsumed under the 311 system and
so continue to operate as before. However, there were some positive developments related to the
last two criteria that are worth noting. For example, Kansas City made efforts to institutionalize
use of data obtained from the 311/CRM system, beyond just improving customer service, by
using it in the budget process, thereby having a more long-lasting and far-reaching impact on
local government operations (Eichenthal et al., 2009). In terms of structuring the 311 system’s
operations to ensure “completeness” (C8) in the sense of wider availability of the system, while
all three systems offered a variety of channels of contact, in terms of the calling hours for the
centers, Minneapolis had the fewest number of hours of live service.
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Table 23
Assessment of Implementation Processes across the Three Case Studies
Criteria

Description

Denver

Minneapolis

Kansas City

C1

Make sure that the
change is needed

Mayor came into office with an
agenda for improving city
government operations and had
a vision that was recognized by
the government for achieving
this goal

The process assessment
conducted before
implementation highlighted
problems in the city’s service
delivery system and a need for
a solution

Outdated Action Center and a
need for data to improve city
operations underscored the
need to implement 311

C2

Have a plan for
managing change

Mayor’s strategy for improving
efficiency and accountability
included a clear role for 311 for
achieving these goals

Outlined in the grant
application to the COPS
program for 311
implementation funding.
Goals, objectives and
deliverables were outlined (The
City of Minneapolis and The
Macro Group, 2008)

Part of an outlined city strategy
towards developing a
performance measurement
system

C3

Galvanize support
within the
organization

 Working to allay staff
concerns about the changes
associated with introducing 311
by, for example, assuring
employees of job security
 Working with agencies to
show how 311 can meet their
needs

 Massive organized
introduction to 311 for
employees across the city
 Allaying employee fears by
not resorting to layoffs to fund
311

 Having “poster departments”
to help encourage other
departments to see the potential
value of 311 to them
 City manager as an
intermediary with the city
council
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Criteria

Description

Denver
Mayor provided strong support,
acting both as a policy
entrepreneur and a champion
during implementation

Minneapolis

Kansas City

C4

Obtain leadership
support

The mayor championed the
initiative throughout the
implementation process

Powerful city manager with
authority over city department
operations led the initiative

C5

Obtain support from Working with neighborhood
external partners
organizations

Community outreach through
community organizations

“Boots-on-the ground”
approach to community
outreach

C6

Ensure adequate
resources are
available to support
implementation

Provided technical support (for Challenge from technical
example, placing 311 in
issues/software vendor switch
Technology Services so it could during implementation
receive the necessary attention)

Housing 311 within city
manager’s department ensured
it was well-placed to access
resources: financial and
political

C7

Ensure the change
takes hold in the
organization

Some old legacy systems
remained

Some old legacy systems
remained

Some old legacy systems
remained but efforts were made
to integrate 311 into city
budgeting processes
(Eichenthal et al., 2009)

C8

Ensure a complete
implementation

Not all agencies have been
rolled into the city’s 311
system

 Not all agencies have been
rolled into the city’s 311

Not all non-emergency requests
are handled by 311; police
continue to handle most that are
related to police services

 Initially, relatively limited
service hours
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Summary of Quantitative Findings from the Three Cases
Tables 24 and 25 present a qualitative overview of the key quantitative results from the
three findings chapters. The summaries show that Denver’s analysis provides the most
consistent support of this study’s hypotheses. Between the two cases for which total contacting
data were available for analysis, Denver had the highest rates of total contacting in both the preand post-311 implementation periods (50.8 percent and 71.4 percent compared with 41.3 percent
and 41.5 percent for Minneapolis). For the first hypothesis, the evidence from Denver showed
that there was a significant increase in total contacting rates after 311 was implemented, while
the evidence from Minneapolis showed no statistically detectable difference in total contacting
rates in the post-311 implementation period. For 311 contacting rates, again, the Denver data
showed the highest rates of contacting (41.6 percent) followed by Kansas City (32.9 percent) and
then Minneapolis (20.0 percent).
The equity implications at the heart of this study hinge critically on the effects of SES
and demographic variables on contacting – both on total contacting and on 311 contacting. The
summary tables show that 311’s strongest equity effects were not likely to come along income
lines – the sole measure of SES in this study. The demographic variable with the most consistent
equity effect was race. With the exception of the rejection of hypothesis H2d in the case of
Minneapolis, race differences in contacting during the post-311 implementation period were
weakened or eliminated. In the case of the post-only analysis in Kansas City (Table 25), the lack
of a race difference in 311 contacting lends some additional support to the discussion of racial
equity, although, without the pre-311 analysis for comparison, it is more difficult to make the
link to the introduction of 311. Still, the racial equity in 2008 is noteworthy. The age variable
did not provide any meaningful results in terms of affecting contacting patterns. The sex
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variable generated some interesting results in the two cases (Minneapolis and Kansas City)
where it was available for inclusion in the analysis. In both cases, the models failed to show
equity along sex lines but in these instances, the results showed the sex differences were in favor
of females. Though not the ideal outcome expected in this study, the shift in favor of females
may be considered a meaningful finding as it reveals a reversal of traditional positions for men
and women. The results may be evidence to suggest that 311 possibly helps equalize
participation across venues. If men (as is traditionally argued) have higher rates of participation
in other venues, 311 provides an opportunity for women to gain some ground in the participation
arena over their male counterparts.
The results for perceived need were not consistent across the cases. While in the cases of
Denver and Kansas City there was evidence that perceived need had strong positive effects on
contacting that were consistent with expectations based on the literature, the variable did not
have the expected effect of being a stronger predictor of 311 contacting than of non-311
contacting in either Denver or Minneapolis. Home ownership produced the strongest and most
consistent evidence on the impact of stakeholding on contacting via 311. Having minor children
failed to generate any conclusive results.
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Table 24
Comparison of Quantitative Findings across the Denver and Minneapolis Case Studies
Hypotheses

Description

Denvera

Minneapolisa

H1

Post-311 contacting rates will be higher than pre-311
contacting rates.



?

H2a

The association between SES and contacting will be weaker
after adopting 311.





H2b

The association between SES and 311 contacting will be
weaker than the association between SES and non-311
contacting.

?



H2c

The association between demographic characteristics and
contacting will be weaker after adopting 311.
Race
Age
Sex








H2d

The association between demographic characteristics – race,
age and sex – and 311 contacting will be weaker than the
association between demographic characteristics and non311 contacting.
Race
Age
Sex












H3a

Perceived need will have a strong positive association with
contacting, especially after 311.
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Hypotheses
Description
H3b
Perceived need will have a stronger positive association with
311 contacting than with non-311 contacting.
H4

Having a stake in the community will have a stronger
association with contacting via 311 than with non-311
contacting.
Home ownership
Have minor children

Denvera


Minneapolisa



?


?

Note. aKey: “” indicates hypothesis was confirmed; “” indicates hypothesis rejected; and “?” indicates inconclusive evidence.
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Table 25
Qualitative Summary of Kansas City Quantitative Findings on 311 Contacting
Variable
Income

Effecta
?

Race

Comment
Some possibly positive equity implications

no effect

Positive equity implication

Sex (Male)

-ve

Unexpected

Perceived need

+ve

Consistent with expectations

Home owner

+ve

Consistent with expectations

Have minor children
Residency tenure

no effect
+ve

Possible measurement problem
Consistent with expectations

Note. aKey: “?” indicates inconclusive result; “no effect” indicates statistically insignificant
effect; “-ve” indicates statistically significant negative effect; and “+ve” indicates statistically
significant positive effect.

Cross-Case Analysis
The combined qualitative and quantitative findings from across the three case studies
paint a holistic image of how 311 may have impacted certain outcomes of interest – contacting
rates and equity – and how aspects of the 311 implementation process and the management of
the implementation process itself may have influenced those outcomes. The findings show that
the most successful outcomes, as measured in this study, were found in the Denver case. The
qualitative analysis of Denver’s implementation process provides plausible explanations for its
relative success compared to the other two cases. This result provides some evidence in support
of proposition P1.
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Denver appeared to face either the fewest challenges or the most tractable challenges in
its experience with implementing 311. The qualitative evaluation showed that all the cities had a
major challenge in managing the internal changes brought on by introducing 311 to their city
governments. Minneapolis and Kansas City, though, faced additional constraints that were
beyond their control. Minneapolis had the added challenge of dealing with software problems
and educating a diverse minority population. Kansas City had to overcome the unflattering
association with the city’s old Action Center, at least during the period covered in this study.
These additional factors likely slowed the rate at which the idea of using 311 for contacting
spread in those two cities, compared to the Denver case.
The mix of the approaches used in the education strategy also appears to have been
important for mobilizing certain groups or segments of the population to contact. Denver and
Kansas City appear to have had more success with mobilizing at the community level - again,
this approach may have been facilitated by having more homogeneous populations or minority
populations than in the Minneapolis case. Involving communities as part of the education efforts
may have influenced the strong and consistent effect of contacting by home owners, those who
had a high stake in the quality of services provided in their local community.
Additionally, the structure of the 311 systems themselves may have also had a bearing on
the outcomes observed. Denver had the widest availability, as measured by operating hours,
while Minneapolis had the most limited. This may plausibly have determined directly the
amount of contacting that took place, at least via the telephone channel.
The Fernandez and Rainey (2006) criteria proved useful for identifying the features of
each city’s implementation process and for assessing whether each city met the criteria for
successfully managing the implementation process. However, the criteria fell short of providing
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an explanation for the differences in outcomes observed among the cities. Other factors, such as
the structure of the 311 systems, appear to have been relevant factors in determining the
differences in outcomes (such as contacting rates) among the cities.
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CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION
Summary
This study has uncovered and quantified some possible effects of the introduction of 311
technology in local government on the public’s contacting of government. However, these
outcomes are not guaranteed for jurisdictions and are dependent on key features of the
implementation process and its management. The implementation process may itself be affected
by contextual factors unique to the implementing city and may or may not be within the control
of the government.
Of the three study sites analyzed, the Denver case showed the strongest and most
consistent outcomes. The city’s strong implementation, which included such elements as strong
political and institutional support for the 311 innovation, a strong marketing and education
campaign that targeted communities and a strong change management strategy, contributed
positively to the contacting outcomes. While the other two cities had some of these same
components, they were also subject to other contextual factors that likely limited the impact of
their 311 systems on the contacting outcomes in the period studied in this research.
The results supported most of the hypotheses and were consistent with the literature on
contacting, particularly in the case of the strongest implementation – Denver – where contacting
rates increased significantly and there were several indications of significant equity effects in
contacting among socioeconomic and demographic groups after 311 implementation. Even in
the case of the other two cities, there was some evidence of a movement towards more equity in
contacting. When there was not equity, the changes in contacting post-311 showed some
interesting and striking reversals among traditionally activist versus less activist groups. While
these do not qualify as “equity” in the sense of equal access, an argument can be made that this
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represents an acceptable second best outcome in that, they may allow for an equalization of
participation across types of participation venues. Kansas City’s limited case study analysis also
provided some evidence of equity (among racial groups) in the post-311 period.

Limitations
Some limitations to this study’s design, data and findings would affect generalizing
beyond this sample and are acknowledged. First, the study design relied on a simple pre- and
post-311 implementation design that used only one period of data before and one-period of data
after implementation. This design limits the study’s ability to establish a strong trend in
contacting patterns. For example, it does not allow the study to determine whether the changes
observed between those two periods were sustained or whether they were merely aberrations in
the short data series.
Second, the study design relied heavily on secondary quantitative data obtained with
different survey instruments both within cases and across cases. Different question wording
across years, even within the same city, may affect the comparability of concepts and variables.
A case in point was the difficulty of capturing households with minor children using the Kansas
City survey. Another limitation of using survey instruments that were not specifically designed
for the purposes of this study is that it was not possible to have consistent measures of some
variables, including the psychological engagement variables, resulting in disparate measures. Of
relevance to the current study also is the fact that the scope of the 311 analysis was limited by the
wording of the 311 contacting questions, all of which made specific reference to calling or
contacting via telephone, omitting other available 311 channels at the time (such as online
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access), thereby making it impossible to obtain a complete measure of 311 contacting. Including
these omitted channels could substantially change the results of the analysis of contacting rates,
for example. Also, although two of the surveys were conducted by the same firm, they tended to
be tailored to the specific city. Furthermore, the three-case study design suffered from not
having the complete set of data for the third case – Kansas City. The partial analysis of the
Kansas City case limited the amount of evidence available to confirm the reliability of the
study’s results.
Third, this study had a narrow focus on a limited set of outcomes pertaining to 311
implementation. The study examined 311’s impact on contacting rates and equity but not on the
quality of the contacts. The overview of the independent bivariate findings in the NRC (2008c)
Minneapolis survey report showed that quality of contact may have been an important outcome
of the 311 process and warrants closer examination in a multivariate model. Had quality been
included as another outcome measure in this study, perhaps the final assessment of the
Minneapolis case may have been different.
Finally, a word of caution about the discussion in the qualitative sections. The sampling
strategy for the informants relied partly on recommendations from earlier informants to help
identify other potential interviewees. Informants may have been inclined to recommend
individuals with whom they shared similar experiences. While this may have resulted in my
ability to corroborate or “triangulate” (Rogers & Goodrick, 2010, p. 446) findings across several
informants, it may have potentially also resulted in a more limited range of opinions and
experiences being represented in the analysis, especially given the small samples. 25

Triangulation “relates to strategies to overcome the potential bias that can arise from the use of a single method,
single data source, single observer, or single theoretical base” (Rogers & Goodrick, 2010, p. 446).
25
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Policy Implications
The importance of this study’s findings is in documenting the effect that the 311
technological innovation has had, at least in the three cities included in the case studies.
Contacting as a mode of public participation is important not just to democracy as a whole but to
public management specifically. Contacting can be an effective and efficient mechanism for
transmitting valuable information from the public to the public managers and policy makers who
serve them. Citing London (1994) and Van de Donk and Meyer (1995), Kakabadse, Kakabadse,
and Kouzmin (2003, pp. 49-50) state that public “feedback […] allows public officials to
consider a broader range of policy options on any given issue, based on the real-life concerns and
testimonies of everyday citizens.” Arguably, increased and broader participation from the public
improves this process.
The findings are valuable for jurisdictions that are considering broadening their set of
options for public participation. Participation patterns differ by venue or channel. The promise
of 311 is that, when successfully implemented, it may help to reach groups that are traditionally
less active in other venues and perhaps equalize access for participation, either within the 311
channel itself or across venues. This informs the work on effective participatory mechanisms
and approaches to designing such mechanisms (Fung, 2006; Thomas, 2012). Within 311
systems themselves, the cases described in this study have shown the continuing relevance of
multi-channel systems that facilitate access via a variety of means - both high tech and low tech even as more advanced options for communicating become available.
This study’s findings offer some considerations that 311 implementers may bear in mind
when designing and executing their implementation strategies. While 311 is intended to
streamline access to city government by having one centralized gateway, it is important that it
163

not become viewed as an obstruction of direct resident access to some participation venues, such
as access to elected political leaders (city council representatives, etc.). The example cited in the
Minneapolis case offers insights into how some residents may potentially construe 311 as
standing in the way of their right to gain access to their leaders. The case also offers an example
of a strategy for dealing with this situation that preserves citizens’ rights to their leader while still
allowing 311 to serve its purpose.
A second consideration is the expectations of residents. As a previous point noted, low
tech options for contacting are still important and are necessary for facitilating contacts by
certain segments of the population. However, with increasing advances in technology, some
residents become more demanding of their governments, holding them to the same standards of
accessibility and service as private sector service providers for communication options. As noted
in the case descriptions, though, local governments operate with a different set of fiscal and other
constraints that do not allow them to innovate as quickly as the private sector.
One of the main reasons for several of the challenges to implementing a 311 system that
have been highlighted in this study (particularly the difficulty of securing cooperation within city
government) is the decentralized structure of local government. As shown in the cases, local
government structures are complex. In some cases, there is a mix of different governance
structures for different entities operating within the same city, which facilitates, to a certain
extent, entities operating independently of each other, resulting in a situation that interviewee
204 described as “working in pure silos.” Implementing a collaborative system such as 311
challenges that independence. Overcoming this challenge would be one of the key aspects of a
plan for managing the organizational change associated with 311 implementation.
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The findings also offer insights into key features for ensuring successful implementation
of 311 and adds to the knowledge from industry and public practitioners. The findings add to
understanding on which aspects of implementation are tied to different outcomes. This would be
useful for informing practice on how to manage the different dimensions of a 311
implementation process to ensure effectiveness where various outcomes are concerned. To
achieve improved customer service and resident satisfaction, it is important for implementers to
manage the internal change dynamics that the innovation brings to the work of government
departments. To achieve increased contacting as well, the external marketing needs to be
customized to address the unique characteristics of the population in the implementing city.
Also, a more grassroots or community-level approach to public education appears to be
associated with better contacting outcomes.

Further Work
By necessity, this study was pre-defined to have a relatively narrow focus. However, it
may be expanded in any number of directions to build knowledge on the 311 phenomenon in
local government. This study focused on a short period of time – from just one year before 311
launch up to two years after launch. Future work can focus on establishing a trend to determine
if what was observed in the short-term was sustained over time. It would be particularly
instructive to see if/when the Minneapolis case began to see significant changes in contacting
rates. It would also be helpful to analyze subsequent periods’ data for comparison in the case of
Kansas City.
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As a comprehensive engagement initiative, given the case study discussions about the
continuing relevance of such low-tech channels as fax in some communities, 311’s multi-channel
potential is critical for ensuring widespread access to government through the contacting mode
of participation. This study did not explore the various 311 contacting channels offered by the
governments in the three cases. Over time, contact channels have mushroomed in tandem with
broader advancements in information and communications technology. It would be informative
to conduct the analyses carried out in this study separately for the various contacting channels to
determine how patterns differ across 311 channels.
In the case of some cities, the data on contacting provides the opportunity for a finer level
of analysis rather than the more aggregated or coarse measure of contacting used in this study.
For example, Denver’s survey question on 311 contacting provides a rough measure of
frequency of contact. Much of the richness of that data was lost when the 311 contacting
variable was operationalized as a dichotomous variable: contactors versus non-contactors.
Operationalizing contacting variables, where possible, as ordinal variables to identify more
frequent contactors, known as “frequent fliers” (Gootman, 2010), will permit finer modeling of
contacting behavior. This approach may allow for the development of a typology of contactors.
With an established record of 311 use in some 311 cities, coupled with the “open”
movements in government, which seek to encourage transparency in government, many cities are
now making their 311 data freely available online to the public (Nath, 2011, pp. 19-20). 26 Each
of the three cases has an open data website where 311 request data are available for download. 27
The “open movement” includes “open 311” and “open data” (see also O'Byrne, 2015, p. 48). See Open311
website http://www.open311.org/ for more information on open311. See Open Knowledge International website
http://opendatahandbook.org/ for more information on open data.
27
City and County of Denver (2015b) open data page: http://data.denvergov.org/
City of Minneapolis (2014) open data page: http://opendata.minneapolismn.gov/
City of Kansas City (2012) open data page: https://data.kcmo.org/
26
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These data are fostering a new stream of research in which scholars have begun to examine
patterns of 311 use, mostly at an aggregated/area level (see, for example, studies by Cavallo et
al., 2014; Clark et al., 2013). Analyzing service request data for the three cases can add another
layer to understanding the impact that 311 has by looking at the reasons or needs that motivate
311 contacting, the distribution of those requests across neighborhoods and how these evolve
over time. Three-one-one research is poised to continue generating new insights and new
interesting lines of research that can inform public management practices at the local government
level.
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APPENDIX A: THE CITY OF DENVER 2005 AND 2008 CITIZEN SURVEY QUESTIONS
Variable
2005 Questions
Contact City 12. Have you had any in-person or phone contact with an
employee of the City of Denver within the last 12 months
(including police, receptionists, planners or any others)?
1. No 2. Yes
311 Contact

Income

27. How much do you anticipate your household's total
income before taxes will be for the current year? (Please
include in your total income money from all sources for
all persons living in your household.)
1. less than $24,999
2. $25,000 to $49,999
3. $50,000 to $99,999
4. $100,000 or more

Race

29. What is your race? (Mark one or more races to
indicate what race you consider yourself to be)
1. American Indian or Alaskan Native
2. Asian or Pacific Islander
3. Black or African American
4. White/Caucasian
5. Other
30. In which category is your age?
1. 18-24 years

Age

2008 Questions
13. Have you had any in-person or phone contact with an
employee of the City of Denver within the last 12 months
(including police, receptionists, planners or any others)?
1. No 2. Yes
18. Please check the response that comes closest to your
opinion for each of the following questions:
f. In the last 12 months, about how many times, if ever,
have you or other household members called the City’s
311 number?
1. Once or twice 2. 3 to 12 times 3. 13 to 26 times 4.
More than 26 times 5. Never 6. Unaware of 311 services
D9. How much do you anticipate your household's total
income before taxes will be for the current year? (Please
include in your total income money from all sources for
all persons living in your household.)
1. less than $24,999
2. $25,000 to $49,999
3. $50,000 to $99,999
4. $100,000 to $149,999
5. $150,000 or more
D11. What is your race? (Mark one or more races to
indicate what race you consider yourself to be)
1. American Indian or Alaskan Native
2. Asian, Asian Indian or Pacific Islander
3. Black or African American
4. White
5. Other
D12. In which category is your age?
1. 18-24 years
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Variable

Services
rating

Home
owner
Have minor
children
Interest in
government

2005 Questions

2. 25-34 years
3. 35-44 years
4. 45-54 years
5. 55-64 years
6. 65-74 years
7. 75 years or older
10. How do you rate the quality of each of the following
services in Denver:
a. Police services; b. fire services; c.
ambulance/emergency medical services; d. crime
prevention; e. traffic enforcement; f. garbage collection; g.
recycling; h. yard waste pick-up; i. street repair; j. street
cleaning; k. street lighting; l. snow removal; m. traffic
signal timing; o. bus/transit services; p. city parks; q.
recreation centers/facilities; u. land use, planning and
zoning; v. code enforcement (weeds, abandoned
buildings, etc); w. animal control; x. economic
development; y. health services; z. services to seniors; aa.
Services to youth; ab. Services to low-income people; ac.
Public library services; ad. Public information services;
ae. Public schools
1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor 5. Don’t know
21. Is this house, apartment, or mobile home…
1. Rented for cash or occupied without cash payment?
2. Owned by you or someone in this house with a
mortgage or free and clear?
22. Do any children 12 or under live in your household? 1.
No 2. Yes
23. Do any teenagers aged between 13 and 17 live in your
household? 1. No 2. Yes
9. In the last 12 months, about how many times, if ever,
have you or other household members participated in the

2008 Questions

2. 25-34 years
3. 35-44 years
4. 45-54 years
5. 55-64 years
6. 65-74 years
7. 75 years or older
11. Please rate the quality of each of the following
services in Denver:
a. Police services; b. fire services; c. ambulance or
emergency medical services; d. crime prevention; e.
traffic enforcement; f. street repair; g. street cleaning; h.
street lighting; i. snow removal; j. traffic signal timing; k.
bus/transit services; l. garbage collection; m. recycling; n.
yard waste pick-up; o. city parks; q. recreation
centers/facilities; r. land use, planning and zoning; s. code
enforcement (weeds, abandoned buildings, etc); t. animal
control; u. economic development; v. health services; w.
services to seniors; x. Services to youth; y. Services to
low-income people; z. Public library services; aa. Public
information services; ab. Public schools
1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor 5. Don’t know
D5. Is this house, apartment, or mobile home…
1. Rented for cash or occupied without cash payment?
2. Owned by you or someone in this house with a
mortgage or free and clear?
D7. Do any children 17 or under live in your household?
1. No 2. Yes
9. In the last 12 months, about how many times, if ever,
have you or other household members participated in the
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Variable

Political
efficacy

Meeting
attendance

2005 Questions
following activities in Denver?
g. Watched a meeting of local elected officials or other
local public meeting on cable television
1. Never 2. Once or twice 3. 3 to 12 times 4. 13 to 26
times 5. More than 26 times
14. Please rate the following statements by circling the
number that most clearly represents your opinion:
d. The City of Denver government listens to citizens
1.Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neither agree nor
disagree 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6.
Don’t know

2008 Questions
following activities in Denver?
g. Watched a meeting of local elected officials or other
local public meeting on cable television
1. Never 2. Once or twice 3. 3 to 12 times 4. 13 to 26
times 5. More than 26 times
15. Please rate the following categories of Denver
government performance:
d. The job Denver government does at listening to citizens
1.Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor 5. Don’t know

9. In the last 12 months, about how many times, if ever,
have you or other household members participated in the
following activities in Denver?
f. Attended a meeting of local elected officials or other
local public meeting
1. Never 2. Once or twice 3. 3 to 12 times 4. 13 to 26
times 5. More than 26 times
9. In the last 12 months, about how many times, if ever,
have you or other household members participated in the
following activities in Denver?
i. Volunteered your time to some group/activity in Denver
1. Never 2. Once or twice 3. 3 to 12 times 4. 13 to 26
times 5. More than 26 times

9. In the last 12 months, about how many times, if ever,
have you or other household members participated in the
following activities in Denver?
f. Attended a meeting of local elected officials or other
local public meeting
1. Never 2. Once or twice 3. 3 to 12 times 4. 13 to 26
times 5. More than 26 times
Volunteer
9. In the last 12 months, about how many times, if ever,
have you or other household members participated in the
following activities in Denver?
k. Volunteered your time to some group or activity in
Denver
1. Never 2. Once or twice 3. 3 to 12 times 4. 13 to 26
times 5. More than 26 times
Note. Sources: The City of Denver 2005 Citizen Survey (National Research Center, 2005a) and The City of Denver 2008 Citizen
Survey (National Research Center, 2008a).
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APPENDIX B: MINNEAPOLIS 2005 AND 2008 RESIDENT SATISFACTION SURVEY QUESTIONS
Variable
2005 Questions
Contact City 12. In the last 12 months, have you contacted the City to
get information or services?
1. YES
2. NO
98. DON’T KNOW
99. REFUSED
311 Contact
Income

30. Please stop me when I reach the category that includes
your household’s annual income.
1. Less than $10,000
2. $10,000 to less than $15,000
3. $15,000 to less than $25,000
4. $25,000 to less than $35,000
5. $35,000 to less than $50,000
6. $50,000 to less than $75,000
7. $75,000 to less than $100,000
8. $100,000 to less than $150,000
9. $150,000 to less than $200,000
10. $200,000 or more
98. DON’T KNOW
99. REFUSED

Race

32. Now, can you tell me what best describes your racial
origin?
1. WHITE
2. BLACK, AFRICAN AMERICAN OR AFRICAN
3. AMERICAN INDIAN/NATIVE AMERICAN OR

2008 Questions
12. In the last 12 months, have you contacted the City to
get information or services?
1. YES
2. NO
98. DON’T KNOW
99. REFUSED
13. How did you contact the City (i.e., in person, by
telephone, by mail, by email or visit the City’s Web site?)
3. BY TELEPHONE – 311
30. Please stop me when I reach the category that includes
your household’s annual income for 2007. [READ
LIST]
1. Less than $10,000
2. $10,000 to less than $15,000
3. $15,000 to less than $25,000
4. $25,000 to less than $35,000
5. $35,000 to less than $50,000
6. $50,000 to less than $75,000
7. $75,000 to less than $100,000
8. $100,000 to less than $150,000
9. $150,000 to less than $200,000
10. $200,000 or more
98. DON’T KNOW
99. REFUSED
32. Now, can you tell me what best describes your racial
origin?
1. WHITE
2. BLACK, AFRICAN AMERICAN OR AFRICAN
3. AMERICAN INDIAN/NATIVE AMERICAN OR
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Variable

Age

Sex
Services
rating

2005 Questions
ALASKAN NATIVE
4. ASIAN, NATIVE HAWAIIAN OR OTHER PACIFIC
ISLANDER
5. HMONG
6. SOMALIAN
7. VIETNAMESE
8. LAOTIAN
9. ETHIOPIAN
10. HISPANIC/SPANISH/LATINO
11. TWO OR MORE RACES
12. SOME OTHER RACE
99. REFUSED
29. Please stop me when I reach the category that includes
your age.
1. 18 to 24 years
2. 25 to 34 years
3. 35 to 44 years
4. 45 to 54 years
5. 55 to 64 years
6. 65 years and over
99. REFUSED
38. RECORD GENDER
1. MALE
2. FEMALE
18. I will now read a list of services provided by City of
Minneapolis government. For each
please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with
the way the City provides the
service. What about…?
a. Protecting the environment, including air, water and
land
b. Preparing for disasters

2008 Questions
ALASKAN NATIVE
4. ASIAN, NATIVE HAWAIIAN OR OTHER PACIFIC
ISLANDER
5. HMONG
6. SOMALI
7. VIETNAMESE
8. LAO
9. ETHIOPIAN/OROMO
10. HISPANIC/SPANISH
11. TWO OR MORE RACES
12. SOME OTHER RACE
99. REFUSED
29. Please stop me when I reach the category that includes
your age.
1. 18 to 24 years
2. 25 to 34 years
3. 35 to 44 years
4. 45 to 54 years
5. 55 to 64 years
6. 65 years and over
99. REFUSED
38. RECORD GENDER
1. MALE
2. FEMALE
18. I will now read a list of services provided by the City
of Minneapolis government. For each please tell me how
satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the way the City
provides the service. What about…?
a. Protecting the environment, including air, water and
land
b. Preparing for disasters
c. Affordable housing development
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Variable

Home
owner
Have minor
children

2005 Questions
c. Affordable housing development
d. Revitalizing Downtown
e. Revitalizing Neighborhoods
g. Keeping streets clean
h. Cleaning up graffiti
i. Dealing with problem businesses and unkempt
properties
j. Garbage collection and recycling programs
k. Animal control services
l. Police services
m. Fire protection and emergency medical response
n. Providing quality drinking water
o. Providing sewer services
p. Protecting health and well-being of residents
q. Providing park and recreation services
Would you say you are…
1. Very satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied
98. DON’T KNOW/NO OPINION
99. REFUSED
25. Do you currently own or rent your current residence?
1. Own
2. Rent
98. DON’T KNOW
99. REFUSED
26. Please tell me if each of the following statements is
true of your household/members of
your household? What about…
a. There are children under the age of 18

2008 Questions
d. Revitalizing Downtown
e. Revitalizing neighborhoods
g. Keeping streets clean
h. Cleaning up graffiti
i. Dealing with problem businesses and unkempt
properties
j. Garbage collection and recycling programs
k. Animal control services
l. Police services
m. Fire protection and emergency medical response
n. Providing quality drinking water
o. Providing sewer services
p. Protecting health and well-being of residents
q. Providing park and recreation services
Would you say you are…
1. Very satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied
98. DON’T KNOW/NO OPINION
99. REFUSED
25. Do you currently own or rent your current residence?
1. Own
2. Rent
98. DON’T KNOW
99. REFUSED
26. Please tell me if each of the following statements is
true of your household/members of your household? What
about…
a. There are children under the age of 18
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Variable

Interest in
government

Political
efficacy

2005 Questions

2008 Questions

Would you say…
1. YES
2. NO
98. DON’T KNOW
99. REFUSED
21. How likely or unlikely are you to use each of the
following approaches to try to influence a City decision
on an issue you care about? What about…
a. Contacting my elected official
b. Joining a City advisory group
c. Contacting my neighborhood group
d. Attending a community meeting
e. Contacting City staff
f. Working with a group not affiliated with the City

Would you say…
1. YES
2. NO
98. DON’T KNOW
99. REFUSED
21. How likely or unlikely are you to use each of the
following approaches to try to influence a City decision
on an issue you care about? What about…
a. Contacting my elected official
b. Joining a City advisory group
c. Contacting my neighborhood group
d. Attending a community meeting
e. Contacting City staff
f. Working with a group not affiliated with the City

Would you say you…
1. Very likely
2. Somewhat likely
3. Somewhat unlikely
4. Very unlikely
98. DON’T KNOW/NO OPINION
99. REFUSED
23. Now I’d like your opinion on how you feel the City
governs. How would you rate Minneapolis City
Government on…?
e. Providing meaningful opportunities for citizens to give
input on important issues
Would you say…
1. Very good
2. Good
3. Only fair
4. Poor

Would you say you…
1. Very likely
2. Somewhat likely
3. Somewhat unlikely
4. Very unlikely
98. DON’T KNOW/NO OPINION
99. REFUSED
23. Now I’d like your opinion on how you feel the City
governs. How would you rate the Minneapolis City
Government on…?
e. Providing meaningful opportunities for citizens to give
input on important issues
Would you say…
1. Very good
2. Good
3. Only fair
4. Poor
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Variable

2005 Questions

2008 Questions

98. DON’T KNOW
98. DON’T KNOW
99. REFUSED
99. REFUSED
Note. Source: City of Minneapolis 2005 Residents Survey (National Research Center, 2005b) and City of Minneapolis 2008
Residents Survey (National Research Center, 2008b).
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APPENDIX C: CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI CITIZEN SURVEY QUESTIONS
Variable
311 Contact
Income
Race
Sex
Services rating

Home owner
Have minor children

2008 Questions
Q7c Have you called 311 in the last year?
(1) Yes (2) No
Q16. Would you say your total annual household income is:
(1) Under $30,000 (2) $30,000 to $59,999 (3) $60,000 to $99,999
(4) $100,000 or more
Q14. Which of the following best describes your race/ethnicity?
(Check all that apply)
(1) Asian/Pacific Islander (2) White (3) American Indian/Eskimo
(4) Black/African American (5) Other
Q17. Your gender
(1) Male (2) Female
Please rate each item on a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 means “very
satisfied” and 1 means “very dissatisfied.”
Q1b Overall quality of city parks and recreation programs and
facilities
Q1c Overall maintenance of city streets, buildings and facilities
Q1d Overall quality of city water utilities
Q1e Overall enforcement of city codes and ordinances
Q1h Overall quality of the city’s stormwater runoff/stormwater
management system
Q1i Overall quality of local public health services
Q1j Overall flow of traffic
Q5d The city’s overall efforts to prevent crime
Q5e Enforcement of local traffic laws
Q5f Overall quality of police services
Q5h Overall quality of local fire protection and rescue services
Q5i Quality of local ambulance service
Q5k Quality of animal control
Q5z Availability of information about city programs and services
Q6f Maintenance of traffic signals
Q6i Snow removal on major city streets during the past 12 months
Q6j Snow removal on streets in residential areas during the past 12
months
Q6m Overall quality of trash collection services
Q6n Adequacy of city street lighting
Q6t Enforcing codes designed to protect public safety and public
health
Q12 Do you own or rent your current residence? (1) Own (2) Rent
Q11 How many persons living in your household (counting yourself)?
(1) Under age 5 (2) Ages 5-9 (3) Ages 10-19 (4) Ages 20-34 (5)
Ages 35-44 (6) Ages 45-54 (7) Ages 55-64 (8) Ages 65-74
(9) Ages 75+
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Variable
Residency tenure

2008 Questions
Q13 Approximately how many years have you lived in Kansas City,
Missouri?
Interest in government
Q4 Would you be willing to attend a focus group or public meeting to
discuss city issues?
(1) Yes (2) No
Political efficacy
Please rate each item on a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 means “very
satisfied” and 1 means “very dissatisfied.”
Q5bb Level of public involvement in local decision making
Awareness
Please rate each item on a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 means “very
satisfied” and 1 means “very dissatisfied.”
Q5aa City efforts to keep you informed about local issues
Note. Source: 2008 City of Kansas City, Missouri Citizen Survey (ETC Institute, 2008).
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INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
Mail:

P.O. Box 3999
Atlanta, Georgia 30302-3999
Phone: 404/413-3500
Fax:
404/413-3504

In Person:

Dahlberg Hall
30 Courtland St, Suite 217

December 01, 2015
Principal Investigator: John Thomas
Key Personnel: Lewis, Gregory; Sewordor, Emefa; Thomas, John
Study Department: Public Management and Policy
Study Title: Technology and Public Engagement in the Administrative Process: How 311
Affects
Citizen-Initiated Contacts with Local Government
Funding Agency:
Review Type: Expedited 5, 7
IRB Number: H16224
Reference Number: 336395
Approval Date:
12/01/2015
Expiration Date:
11/30/2016
The Georgia State University Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and approved the
above referenced study in accordance with 45 CFR 46.111. The IRB has reviewed and
approved the study and any informed consent forms, recruitment materials, and other research
materials that are marked as approved in the application. The approval period is listed above.
Research that has been approved by the IRB may be subject to further appropriate review and
approval or disapproval by officials of the Institution.
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Federal regulations require researchers to follow specific procedures in a timely manner. For
the protection of all concerned, the IRB calls your attention to the following obligations that
you have as Principal Investigator of this study.
1.

For any changes to the study (except to protect the safety of participants), an
Amendment Application must be submitted to the IRB. The Amendment
Application must be reviewed and approved before any changes can take place.

2.

Any unanticipated/adverse events or problems occurring as a result of participation
in this study must be reported immediately to the IRB using the
Unanticipated/Adverse Event Form.

3.

Principal investigators are responsible for ensuring that informed consent is properly
documented in accordance with 45 CFR 46.116.


A Waiver of Documentation of Consent has been approved for this study in
accordance with the requirements set forth in 45 CFR 46.117 c.

4.

For any research that is conducted beyond the approval period, a Renewal
Application must be submitted at least 30 days prior to the expiration date. The
Renewal Application must be approved by the IRB before the expiration date else
automatic termination of this study will occur. If the study expires, all research
activities associated with the study must cease and a new application must be
approved before any work can continue.

5.

When the study is completed, a Study Closure Report must be submitted to the IRB.

All of the above referenced forms are available online at http://protocol.gsu.edu. Please do not
hesitate to contact the Office of Research Integrity (404-413-3500) if you have any questions or
concerns.
Sincerely,
Cynthia A. Hoffner, IRB Vice-Chair

Federal Wide Assurance Number: 00000129
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APPENDIX E: RECRUITMENT EMAIL TO PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES
INVITATION EMAIL TO 311 OFFICIALS AND PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR YOUR EXPERT KNOWLEDGE ON THE HISTORY AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF YOUR CITY’S 311 SYSTEM
Dear _______,

I am contacting you for an interview because of your expertise and knowledge about your city’s
311 non-emergency system. Your expertise, knowledge, opinions, and perceptions are the only
elements required to be interviewed. The interview should last no more than 30 minutes and will
be conducted via telephone or video conference. Should you agree to be interviewed, I will
follow up to arrange a time that is convenient for you. I hope you will participate.
This interview forms an integral part of my broader doctoral dissertation study on the impact of
the introduction of a 311 non-emergency system on citizens who contact local government. I am
interested in whether 311 systems have changed the numbers and demographics of who contacts
city governments. The interview portion will help develop a richer understanding of the context
in which your city implemented its 311 system. If you have questions about the study, please
contact me at 404-413-0131 (esewordor1@student.gsu.edu) or my advisor, Dr. John Clayton
Thomas at 404-413-0113 (jcthomas@gsu.edu). If you have questions regarding your rights as a
participant in this study, contact Susan Vogtner in the Georgia State University Office of
Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 (svogtner@gsu.edu).
You are free to decline this invitation if you feel that your participation would violate the terms
of your employment with the city. You are also welcome to seek permission from your manager
before participating if you deem it necessary. I am also prepared to seek permission from the
city if you require that as a condition for your participation in this study.
Thanks in advance for your consideration and response.
Emefa Sewordor
Doctoral Candidate & Graduate Research Assistant
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
14 Marietta Street NW
Atlanta, GA 30303
Phone: 404-413-0131
E-mail: esewordor1@student.gsu.edu
Website: http://pmap.gsu.edu/
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APPENDIX F: INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
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APPENDIX G: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Theme
Case Description
Marketing and
Promotion*








Management

Governance






Questions
When did your 311 system start? a
What are the main goals of your 311 system?
Where did the principal impetus come from for adopting
311? Was this a priority for the mayor’s office? Was this a
priority for some other office or department (please state the
name of the office or department)?
What did the city do to educate the public about the system
when it was first implemented? (Follow-ups) Was there a
marketing campaign? If so, can you tell what components it
entailed? Did you advertise? If so, where and how? Did you
use newspapers, radio, television, what else? Are there any
marketing materials you used that I could get copies of?
For how long were the education and promotion efforts
sustained?
What challenges, if any, did you face in your efforts to market
and promote the 311 system?
How is your 311 system organized and managed?
What organizational challenges is your 311 system facing?
How are those challenges being overcome?
How are citizens and other organizations involved in your 311
system?

Note. Source: Adapted from Nam and Pardo (2012, p. 5).
a
Author’s addition.
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APPENDIX H: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL FOR CONTACT TYPES IN DENVER
USING 2008 DATA
VARIABLES

No Contact
Probability
Change (%)

Middle income

-2.4

High income

-8.2

White

-6.8

Older adult

-1.2

Senior

2.2

Services rating

-11.4

Home owner

-3.5

Have minor children

-4.3

Interest in government

-6.6

Political efficacy

4.8

Meeting attendance

-11.9

Volunteer

-0.9

Constant

311 Contact
Coefficient Probability
Change (%)
0.18
(0.54)
0.21
(0.60)
0.12
(0.33)
0.045
(0.14)
-0.0071
(-0.019)
0.59
(1.57)
0.44
(1.40)
0.44
(1.21)
0.61**
(2.26)
-0.38
(-1.30)
0.74**
(2.36)
0.31
(1.16)
-2.04**
(-1.98)

3.3
-6.0
-6.3
-0.3
3.3
3.8
10.7
9.7
12.6
-6.8
6.6
10.4

Non-311 Contact
Coefficient Probability
Change (%)
0.064
(0.20)
0.77**
(2.13)
0.72**
(2.04)
0.096
(0.31)
-0.27
(-0.67)
0.73*
(1.95)
-0.074
(-0.22)
0.017
(0.046)
0.10
(0.35)
-0.14
(-0.45)
0.74**
(2.17)
-0.26
(-0.94)
-2.22**
(-2.18)

-1.0
14.2
13.1
1.5
-5.5
7.5
-7.2
-5.4
-6.0
2.0
5.4
-9.5

Observations
667
Note. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Base contact category is “no contact.”
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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APPENDIX I: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL FOR CONTACT TYPES IN
MINNEAPOLIS USING 2008 DATA
VARIABLES

No Contact
Probability
Change (%)

Middle income

5.6

High income

9.5

White

-5.2

Older adult

-4.5

Senior

-0.5

Male

8.1

Services rating

0.5

Home owner

-10.2

Have minor children

-2.0

Interest in government

-24.6

Political efficacy

-0.2

Constant

311 Contact
Coefficient Probability
Change (%)
-0.47*
(-1.87)
-0.53
(-1.43)
0.36
(1.31)
0.36
(1.38)
0.094
(0.33)
-0.26
(-1.26)
-0.078
(-0.21)
0.51**
(2.02)
0.16
(0.66)
1.36***
(3.29)
0.12
(0.53)
-2.65***
(-2.61)

-6.9
-6.8
4.9
5.3
1.5
-2.0
-1.4
6.1
2.5
13.2
2.2

Non-311 Contact
Coefficient Probability
Change (%)
-0.052
(-0.21)
-0.32
(-1.09)
0.11
(0.43)
0.052
(0.22)
-0.041
(-0.15)
-0.44**
(-2.25)
0.032
(0.11)
0.38
(1.52)
0.012
(0.054)
1.08***
(2.81)
-0.088
(-0.42)
-2.02***
(-2.67)

1.3
-2.7
0.2
-0.8
-1.1
-6.1
0.9
4.0
-0.6
11.4
-2.0

Observations
984
Note. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Base contact category is “no contact.”
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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